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TOP SECRET
DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qaeda
And the Intelligence Community Response

March 19, 2004
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope Note</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Early Years: Terrorist Financier (1986-1996)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Taliban Sanctuary Years: Evolving into a Strategic Threat (1996-2001)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IC's Efforts to Track, Disrupt, and Bring Bin Ladin to Justice</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Strategy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Intelligence Community Role</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working With Foreign Liaison</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Military</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and Resources</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of Collection</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning and Analysis</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert Action</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral Effort Using Afghan Tribal Assets</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executing The Plan</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kuala Lumpur Meeting</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadan 2000 Plans Disrupted</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Al-Qa'ida Activity Detected</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempting to Capture Bin Ladin</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Predator Initiative</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued Warning</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of CIA's Collection Posture Against UBL's Sanctuary</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of September 11</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The War with Terrorism: A Look Ahead</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where We Are in the Fight Against Terrorism</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorist Strategy for the Coming Year</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

September 11 brought the fight with international terrorism home to America in the most vivid way. But, the Intelligence Community (IC), and the FBI were already fully engaged in this war many years before September 11.

- The IC did not discover terrorism suddenly on September 11, 2001.

The growing terrorist threat to US citizens and facilities worldwide—including in the United States—has been at the top of the Intelligence Community's agenda for many years. This Report lays out a nearly decade-long record of Intelligence Community involvement in fighting terrorism and particularly Usama Bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida network.

- It is a record of keen awareness of the threat, disciplined focus, and persistent efforts to track, disrupt, apprehend, and ultimately bring to justice Bin Ladin and his lieutenants and dismantle al-Qa'ida. It is also a record of consistent efforts to warn policymakers of the seriousness of the al-Qa'ida threat.

The Early Years: Terrorist Financier (1986-1996)

Bin Ladin gained prominence during the Afghan war for his role in financing the recruitment, transportation, and training of ethnic Arabs who fought alongside the Afghan mujahedin against the Soviets during the 1980s. At age 22, Bin
Ladin dropped out of school in Saudi Arabia and joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately following the Soviet invasion in December 1979. His money and his experience as a frontline fighter enhanced his reputation.

Bin Ladin had drawn on his family's wealth and donations from sympathetic merchant families in the Persian Gulf region, to organize the Islamic Salvation Foundation, or al-Qa'ida ("The Base"). The foundation maintained recruitment centers and guesthouses in several Middle Eastern countries and organized and funded paramilitary training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

- Under al-Qa'ida's auspices, Bin Ladin also imported heavy equipment to build roads, tunnels, caves, hospitals, and storage depots in Afghanistan for use by the mujahedeen and, eventually, to form part of his terrorist infrastructure.

The Afghan experience was key to radicalizing Bin Ladin and cementing his dedication to Islamic extremist causes. It provided him with an opportunity to make and strengthen contacts with a wide variety of Islamic extremists of various nationalities. Many of the men who became key members of the al-Qa'ida leadership met and fought alongside him in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

- It is also at this time that Bin Ladin began perverting the teachings of Islam and the Prophet Mohammed for his own violent purposes. And it is then that he began to exploit underlying social, political, and economic discontent and widespread resentment of the West in many parts of the Muslim world.

- In a 1988 press interview, he claimed, "I felt it a sign from God to battle all opponents of Islam when a mortar shell that landed a few feet away from me did not explode." Urged on by fervent Islamic radicals, he began using his personal fortune to shelter and employ hundreds of militant, stateless "Afghan Arabs" and train them for jihad or holy war around the world.

Although Bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia to work in his family's construction business after the Soviets left Afghanistan in early 1989, he continued to support militant Islamic causes and radicals who by then had begun redirecting their efforts against secular and moderate Islamic governments in the region. He began publicly criticizing the Saudi Government and harshly condemned the Gulf War and the presence of US and other Western forces in the Arabian Peninsula.
TOP SECRET

- Saudi officials say they seized his passport from 1989 to 1991 for attacking the Al Saud. They revoked his citizenship in 1994.

Bin Laden came to the attention of the CIA as an emerging terrorist threat during his stay in Sudan from 1991 to 1996.

During his five-year residence in Sudan, Bin Laden combined business with jihad under the umbrella of al-Qa’ida. In association with powerful members of the ruling Sudanese National Islamic Front, he embarked on several business ventures that probably multiplied his fortune. His workforce in Sudan included militant Afghan war veterans.

While in Sudan, Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida financed Islamic extremists who opposed secular and moderate Islamic governments and who despised the West. Following are several examples of what the Intelligence Community learned at that time regarding al-Qa’ida’s activities from Sudan:

We believe his experience in Somalia played a significant role in molding his perceptions of the United States. He has publicly said the US withdrawal from Somalia demonstrated that Americans were soft and the United States a paper tiger that could be more easily defeated than the Soviets had been in Afghanistan.
The CIA's assessment of Bin Laden during the early 1990s was that he was a major terrorist financier. The IC viewed him largely as a financial supporter of other terrorist groups and individuals, not as the center of a separate organization or network focused on carrying out terrorist attacks on the United States. Moreover, he was only one of a number of potential terrorist threats and, at that time, not considered the most important. As such, the Bin Laden-al-Qa'ida target competed for resources with other targets.

Bin Ladin's prominence grew during the latter part of his residence in Sudan in the mid-1990s. By 1996 our awareness of the threat represented by Bin Ladin had grown significantly. The establishment in late January 1996 of an "Issue Station" within the DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to focus on the "Sudan-based terrorist financier Usama bin Laden"
soon provided intelligence revealing a broader and more pernicious terrorist capability that reached well beyond financial activity.

Bin Laden’s stay in Sudan, indications of al-Qaeda’s role in terrorism, and Bin Laden’s connections with Egyptian terrorists.

Bin Laden’s connection to the assassination attempt on President Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia in 1995.
defined Bin Laden as the head of a worldwide
terrorist organization bent on attacking the United States.

Ladin's intent to target the United States on its soil and his interest in
acquiring CBRN materials to produce weapons of mass destruction.

By the time Bin Laden left Sudan in 1996 and relocated himself
and his terror network to Afghanistan, the Intelligence Community had gained a
substantial appreciation of the significance of his threat and was taking strong action to
ty to stop him.

- CIA focused more resources on him by creating in January 1996 a Bin Laden
Issue Station in CTC.
The Taliban Sanctuary Years: Evolving into a Strategic Threat (1996-2001)

CIA efforts to track Bin Laden’s whereabouts continued even during the transition period of his relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan.

At the time, there was insufficient evidence to indict him in the United States and issue a US warrant for his arrest.
If any doubts remained about the emerging threat to the United States represented by Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida, they were gradually dispelled by a series of declarations he issued from his refuge in Afghanistan during the 1996-1998 timeframe.

- In an undated interview in Afghanistan published in July 1996 in the London daily *The Independent*, Bin Ladin declared that the killing of Americans in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in June 1996 marked the beginning of the war between Muslims and the United States.

- One month later, in August 1996, Bin Ladin, in collaboration with radical Muslim clerics associated with his group, issued a religious edict or *fatwa* in which he called "Declaration of War" authorizing attacks against Western military targets on the Arabian Peninsula.

- Eighteen months later, six months prior to the 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa, al-Qa'ida issued another *fatwa*—under the banner of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”—stating that all Muslims have a religious duty “to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military” worldwide.

- During a subsequent media interview, Bin Ladin explained that all US citizens were legitimate targets because they pay taxes to the US Government.

By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa'ida had established its intention to inflict high casualties and a modus operandi emphasizing careful planning and exhaustive field preparations, which Bin Ladin saw as a prerequisite for the type of spectacular operations he had in mind.

- For example, when asked in a November 1996 interview why his organization had not yet conducted attacks in response to its August *fatwa* statement, Bin Ladin replied, "If we wanted to carry out small operations, it would have been easy to do so after the statements, but the nature of the battle requires qualitative operations that affect the adversary, which obviously requires good preparation."

TOP SECRET
By early 1998, CIA knew that we were dealing with a sophisticated terrorist organization bent on causing large numbers of American casualties. The East Africa bombings in August 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 succeeded because of al-Qa'ida's meticulous preparation and effective security practices.

- CIA analysts looked at al-Qa'ida targeting studies and training materials captured around the time of the East Africa and USS Cole attacks. They published an in-depth intelligence study of al-Qa'ida's terrorist operations that revealed that much of the terrorists' advance planning involved careful, patient, and meticulous preparation.

- This included extensive surveillance and the preparation of casing studies that detailed the vulnerabilities of potential targets. In the case of the US Embassy in Nairobi, for example, the terrorists' casing study was prepared in 1993, five years before the attack.

- The analysts also pointed out in the same in-depth study of al-Qa'ida methods that we were also becoming increasingly concerned—and therefore warned about—al-Qa'ida's interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons and nuclear materials.

- In a December 1998 interview, Bin Ladin called the acquisition of these weapons a "religious duty" and noted, "How we would use them is up to us."
DCI Deutsch expressed his concern about the growing lethality, sophistication, and wide-ranging nature of the terrorist threat, and that terrorists would push this trend to its most “awful extreme by employing weapons of mass destruction.” DCI Tenet made similar warnings as early as 1998, when he pointed to Bin Laden’s attempts to purchase or manufacture biological and chemical weapons for an attack against US facilities.

None of Bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s extensive terrorist plotting, planning, recruiting, and training in the late 1990s would have been possible without the Taliban sanctuary in Afghanistan.

- Although Afghanistan had served as a place of refuge for international terrorists since the 1980s, the Taliban aided Bin Laden by permitting him to build and maintain terrorist camps, and refusing to cooperate with efforts by the international community to extradite him after the US indicted him in June 1998 for his call for a worldwide “holy war” against US citizens.

Since the Soviet invasion and its aftermath, Afghanistan became something akin to Terrorism Incorporated, a country with a vast infrastructure of camps and facilities for the refuge, training, indoctrination, arming, and financing of tens of thousands of Islamic extremists from all over the world.

- It provided Bin Laden an isolated and relatively safe operating environment to oversee his organization’s worldwide terrorist activities.

- Militants who received training there were sent to fight in jihad in Kashmir, Chechnya, or Bosnia. When they returned to their homes to resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they constituted a ready supply of manpower for terrorist operations. Two of the 9/11 hijackers followed this pattern.
The al-Qa'ida-Taliban training camps formed the foundation of a worldwide network by sponsoring and encouraging Islamic extremists from diverse locations to forge longstanding ideological, logistical, and personal ties.

...received basic training in the use of small arms and guerrilla tactics; more advanced and specialized training in subjects such as explosives, poisons, and assassination techniques.

- Bin Ladin emphasized indoctrination in extremist religious ideas and included the constant repetition that the United States is evil and that the current regimes of Arab countries are not true believers in Islam and should be overthrown as a religious duty.

In summary, what Bin Ladin created in Afghanistan was a sophisticated adversary.

The IC's Efforts to Track, Disrupt, and Bring Bin Ladin to Justice

The Strategy

By 1998, the key elements of the CIA's strategy against Bin Ladin were emphatically offensive rather than defensive. They included:

- Hitting Bin Ladin's infrastructure;
- Working with liaison to break up cells and carry out arrests;
- Pursuing a multi-track approach to bring Bin Ladin himself to justice, including working with liaison services, developing a close relationship with...
US federal prosecutors, increasing pressure on the Taliban, and enhancing our unilateral capability to capture him offensively.
In the spring of 1999, in response to the DCP's request for a baseline review of the CIA's operational strategy against Bin Ladin and a new strategic plan, CTC produced a new, comprehensive operational plan of attack against the Bin Ladin-al-Qa'ida target inside and outside Afghanistan.

The Plan emphasized in its multifaceted program the priority of capturing and rendering to justice Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.

... program to gather the intelligence to be able to track and act against Bin Ladin...
Another element of the strategy that emerged in 2000 and 2001 was the use of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). This central, Afghanistan-focused strategy was played out against the necessity for aggressive and complex efforts to disrupt planned Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operations on a worldwide basis, which diluted the focus on Bin Ladin himself.
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- Responding to the Millennium threat, the attack on the USS Cole, and the rash of indications of planned terrorist actions during Ramadan 2000 and the months leading to September 11 worked to shift the focus of operational effort away from internal Afghan operations.

CIA submitted a revised strategic proposal on counterterrorism to the NSC Staff in December 2000 that would have significantly expanded our activities.

- It was too late for the departing Clinton administration to take action on this strategic proposal, however.
The Intelligence Community Role

Up to this point, this paper has focused on CIA's role in developing our understanding of the al-Qaeda threat and devising and implementing a robust and well-focused program and strategy to counter it. We now turn to a critical aspect of the overall counterterrorism effort—the broader Intelligence Community role.

CTC has aggressively pursued inter-agency representation, both in line management and at the working level, since its establishment in 1986. Over the years, this emphasis has fostered both improved communications as well as begun to break down the often-cited cultural institutional barriers to creative and effective support and joint operations. By 2001, the Center had representatives from more than a dozen agencies involved in the fight against terrorism—10 percent of the Center’s personnel complement at that time.

FBI officers were detailed there nearly at its inception in 1996, with their representation growing

CIA operations officers served at FBI headquarters prior to September 11. CTC detailed to the FBI, and there is CIA representation on FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

CIA also has assigned officers to work with FBI to assist them in establishing their own foreign intelligence reporting and analysis capabilities.

- From the mid 1990s on, the Center has had officers detailed from NSA, while NSA—in addition to hosting working level CIA officers—had until recently a senior CIA Directorate of Operations officer serving.

As CTC ramped up its efforts against Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the relationships and institutional structures that developed over the years among Community agencies paid enormous dividends in the fight with the terrorists. What follows are a few of the more significant examples:
Over the years, the FBI and CIA have worked hand-in-hand in combating terrorism. Indeed, CIA's counterterrorism program, particularly from 1995 forward, was affected by the strong policy emphasis on criminal investigations and prosecutions as counterterrorism tools. There have been numerous successes and some instances where cooperation could be better. The need for us to work better together has long been abundantly clear.

- When problems do occur, it is the result of different organizational cultures, different objectives, different tradecraft, and in some cases a lack of interpersonal rapport.

FBI and CIA worked closely together in the aftermath of the first World Trade Center bombing.
FBI and CIA collaborated closely on the TWA 800 case.
After the crash, CTC immediately formed a working group to assist the FBI and other agencies in the investigation.

FBI and CIA cooperated closely on countering terrorist threats in 1998.

- After we received a rash of reports in 1998 threatening attacks in the United States, we worked together to provide advisories for local law enforcement agencies.

- One such episode occurred after a plot in the fall of 1998 to hijack a plane on the eastern coast of the United States to attempt to free the "blind Shaykh" from prison.

- CIA and FBI participated with other agencies in NSC-chaired meetings of the Counterterrorism Security Group to discuss this reporting and take action on it.
Also in 1998, FBI and CIA worked closely together in the wake of the East Africa bombings to disrupt a planned attack against our Embassy.

CIA and FBI also worked closely and successfully to defeat the suspected Millennium plots and several other cases in 2000.
Since 9/11, the two agencies have made collaboration and cooperation against terrorism a key objective.
Despite this excellent record of collaboration, occasional problems continue. A major, ongoing concern is FBI's own internal dissemination system. CIA officers still often find it necessary to hand-deliver messages to the intended recipient within FBI. In addition, FBI has not perfected its FI reporting system and headquarters-field communication, so dissemination of intelligence outside of FBI still is spotty.

In some cases, CIA and FBI could have performed better together.

The different organizational culture and goals of FBI and CIA sometimes get in the way of desired results. The FBI focuses on gathering evidence to solve crimes and CIA focuses on threat assessments and collecting and analyzing intelligence. When these two goals compete, problems have occurred.
A 2000 CIA Inspector-General (IG) report on CTC concluded that many improvements had been made and that relationships between CIA and FBI had been institutionalized.

Nevertheless, the IG report also pointed to continued problems that perhaps might be impossible to overcome fully because of "the natural tension [that] exists between the two organizations, deriving from their different missions, which can be negotiated but never eliminated." Some of the most salient difficulties cited by the IG were:

- The difference in organizational mission—intelligence collection and Covert Action for the Agency and successful prosecutions of terrorists for the FBI.

- The loss of potential intelligence opportunities because of deference to law enforcement goals.

- Concerns in both organizations about access to the other’s mission critical information.

Nonetheless, the leadership of the two agencies have consistently worked these issues and will continue to do so as we identify them.

- For example, the assignment of top-flight personnel to significant positions at the headquarters level of the two agencies has substantially improved coordination.
CIA will continue to move to correct problems and make progress in closing the gap between where we are and where we want to be. Progress in raising the level of cooperation among the Community agencies over the years has been key to warning policymakers and stopping and disrupting attacks against US interests overseas.

Without FBI input on the domestic nexus of international terrorism, CIA analysts would have been hard-pressed to provide threat warnings in early August 2001 that al-Qaeda continued to view the US homeland as a high priority target.

Working with Foreign Liaison

Working closely with foreign liaison partners has been an indispensable part of CIA’s counterterrorism strategy before and after September 11.
Support to the Military

The Intelligence Community, and CIA specifically, worked together in support of one actual and several planned cruise missile attacks against Bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership. The demand by policy officials for multiple, corroborative sources pinpointing the time and place where Bin Laden would be vulnerable to an attack combined with concerns about collateral damage to civilians, however, served as major constraints to the final go-ahead to launch.

- On August 20, 1998, the United States conducted multiple attacks with cruise missiles against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in response to clear evidence of Bin Laden's responsibility for the planning and execution two weeks earlier of the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Bin Laden and his lieutenants would be present in one of several camps located near Khowst in Afghanistan. Although we believe that we damaged several of the intended targets in Afghanistan and killed or injured approximately 80 terrorists, Bin Ladin escaped injury, possibly warned in advance of the attack.

- In late November 1998, military consumers of CIA HUMINT were increasingly interested in our tribal Afghan sources' reporting on Bin Ladin's movements in Kandahar for a possible cruise missile attack. The military expressed concern about our reporting being reliable enough for locational data. The military also expressed concern about collateral damage given the proximity
ultimately policy officials decided the risks of collateral damage to a nearby mosque were too great to call in a strike. 4

- In February-March 1999, military contingency planning on a strike against Bin Laden focused on hunting camps used by UAE princes.

Following policy officials discussions with the UAE about the presence of its military C-130s in the area in early March, the camp UBL reportedly had visited—Shaykh Ali’s Camp—was dismantled.

- In May 1999, the military again contemplated a cruise missile strike against Bin Ladin in the Qandahar area.

We intensely tracked and reported on Bin Ladin’s whereabouts for almost a week from May 13-19. Again, the military was concerned about the precision respect to identification of particular buildings as well as potential collateral damage to surrounding facilities, resulting in policy officials not authorizing a strike.

Budget and Resources

The IC’s war with al-Qaeda in the decade prior to September 11 did not come cheaply. In a period when overall funding for the Intelligence Community and the Agency showed little if any actual growth, CIA’s CBJ requests to the Congress for counterterrorism funds more than 4 For a number of these years the overall annual appropriation included substantial supplementals. These
While this growth pattern was clearly favorable, the fact that it rested significantly on supplemental appropriations and other emergency measures increased the difficulty in program planning.

These figures demonstrate a steady growth in positions targeted against terrorism.

(C/NF) A review of the context in which personnel resources were allocated indicates that despite the downsizing of CIA and the IC in general during the 1990s a series of DCI’s worked aggressively to provide an enhanced level of effort against this increasingly dangerous and sophisticated target.

(C/NF) In the decade prior to the attacks on September 11, the Intelligence Community experienced a substantial decrease in personnel resources across the board. This reduction began in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and continued well into the mid-1990s, reaching its nadir in 1999. Overall Community resources were reduced, resulting in a substantial decrease in case officers in the field, closing of some stations, and significant reductions of analysts and support personnel.

(C/NF) The Intelligence Community dealt with this resource-constrained post-Cold War environment by prioritizing the focus of its work through such mechanisms as PDD 35. But at the same time it continued to face new demands from the policy community for intelligence support that required new and different approaches and the
creation of new bureaucratic entities that drew on CIA expertise and staff personnel. Indeed, CIA had to contend with the resource demands of several emerging or heightened threats and events including:

- Mounting concern over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This issue moved sharply to the forefront as concerns arose over the lack of security of former Soviet WMD stockpiles, aggressive efforts by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to develop these weapons and their means of delivery and, at the end of the decade, the emergence of India and Pakistan's nuclear tensions.

- The Gulf War

(C/NF) The reduced supply of personnel and expertise and rising demand for support to policy makers and war fighters sharply constrained our ability to shift personnel resources within the Agency to address these new and shifting priority concerns. Our flexibility was further reduced by the very substantial time it takes to recruit, train, and develop the expertise of both analysts and case officers.

(C/NF) In this constrained environment, a series of DCI's nonetheless saw to it that the personnel resources committed to the counterterrorism effort was not only protected but actually enhanced. The depth of the Community draw down, personnel positions within CTC grew despite percent reduction in personnel Agency wide.

(C/NF) With respect to the analytic effort, in 2001 across the Agency were making analytic contributions to the counterterrorist mission in a variety of ways, such as traditional analysis, targeting, and operational support dedicated to al-Qa'ida. The equivalent of were working terrorism-related issues or applying specialized skills to the terrorism problem from their positions in the DIA, in addition to the CTC. After September 11 those numbers rose dramatically. The total analytic presence in CTC
We are using all of the traditional operational means available to accomplish this goal and are using new means of getting at this difficult target.
analyzing terror finance trends, working with the US policy and law enforcement communities, and utilizing all source information.

- Identified al-Qaeda’s growing interest in cash couriers and trusted hawala networks as vehicles for transferring funds in the Middle East and South Asia.
Integration of Collection

- In undertaking this integration effort, the ADCI for Collection convened daily meetings with analysts and collection officers from NSA, NGA, and CIA to develop a collaborative collection effort.

- Through focused collection, we were able to build a more complete picture of

- This integrated intelligence collection effort also supported military targeting operations prior to September 11, including the cruise missile attack against the al-Qaeda training camp complex in northeastern Afghanistan in August 1998; in addition, it helped to provide baseline data for the US Central Command's target planning against al-Qaeda facilities and infrastructure throughout Afghanistan.

Following the September 11 attacks, the IC redoubled its efforts to collect and integrate all of the intelligence disciplines. This information, greatly facilitated our ability to locate, track, and support US military operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban...
Community collection officers meet daily to ensure focused and dynamic collection on Bin Ladin and residual al-Qa‘ida leadership.

Warning and Analysis

Our analysts assessed al-Qa‘ida’s modus operandi, capabilities, and intentions to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, they warned policymakers during the summer of 2001 that the threat of terrorist attacks was real and serious. Such performance was the result of significant measures by the Directorate of Intelligence to enhance our analytical capabilities assigned to this target.

After the East Africa bombings in 1998, Bin Ladin and al-Qa‘ida were the target against which we arrayed.

Each analyst was responsible for the full range of tactical and strategic work, each bearing responsibility for supporting senior policymakers, operations, long-term research, current intelligence, briefings, targeting, and more. In reality, however, most analysts were consumed by tactical work. We needed to get the right balance between strategic and tactical analytical work by giving more effort to strategic analytic issues.

- CIA therefore created a Strategic Analytic Unit in July 2001 to fix this problem.

The Unit allowed us to isolate the analysts assigned to it from the grind of daily crises to focus on the bigger picture.
In addition, during 2000 and 2001, we engaged in a full-scale effort to push our analysis into the broadest possible circulation. Many of these steps contributed to our analysts' warning during the summer of 2001 that Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida were engaged in intensive operational planning and preparations against US interests. We documented the increased threat in current intelligence products such as the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the SEIB, citing plots in the Arabian Peninsula and Europe. Four current intelligence pieces particularly stand out.

- On June 29, 2001, our analysts published a piece in the SEIB entitled "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threats Are Real" which concluded that recent indications of near-term attacks were not part of a disinformation campaign, but were consistent with other reporting and public statements by Bin Ladin.

- A June 30 SEIB article entitled "Bin Ladin Plans High Profile Attacks," al-Qa'ida operatives expected their next round of attacks to have dramatic consequences.

- Another SEIB article, on July 25, noted that, although one Bin Ladin attack had been delayed for a few months, preparations for other, near-term attacks were still underway.

- A SEIB article on August 7, 2001, "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US," underscored Bin Ladin's desire to conduct terrorist attacks in the US homeland. It noted that the Millennium plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport might have been Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to strike in the United States. It pointed out that al-Qa'ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks.

The interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, through CTC's Community Counterterrorism Board, also issued several threat advisories during the summer of 2001.

In addition to the analytic effort done in CTC, analysts from across CIA's Directorate of Intelligence contributed to the counterterrorism mission by doing specialized work on topics such as the financial flows that enable terrorism.
Covert Action

Authorities

By 1998, the IC knew that in Bin Ladin we were dealing with more than a "terrorist financier" and that in al-Qa'ida we were dealing with a sophisticated and determined global terrorist organization that represented a serious threat to the security of Americans at home and abroad. As such, the CIA's strategy against this threat became emphatically offensive.
procedural limits they placed

- A December 24, 1998 MON for the first time authorized the use of lethal force in offensive operations designed to capture Bin Ladin spelled out the parameters within which lethal force would or authorized, restrictions remained in force in all subsequent operations.

authorities being approved were in keeping with Executive Order 12333, and that any forceful measures did not constitute assassination but were legal under the US definition of self-defense. Their implementation also was subject to constraints regarding the risks for collateral damage.

- A MON of February 1999 authorized the CIA to work with the Afghan Northern Alliance commander Masood against UBL.

- A December 1999 MON

Operations Armed with these specific authorities, constraints, and guidelines, the CIA between 1998 and September 11 pursued a multi-track approach to
bring Bin Laden to justice and destroy al-Qa'ida. It involved building up our HUMINT and technical collection capabilities, working with foreign liaison services and friendly local groups—including Northern Alliance commander Masood

Operational planning for a capture and rendition operation of Bin Laden may 1998 an operational plan to use a friendly local tribal group in Afghanistan to capture Bin Laden and turn him over to US officials.

- The operational proposals were discussed with the White House in May 1998. The plan also was discussed with other principals, but CIA did not formally submit the plan for approval because we assessed the chances for success as low.

- During the same general timeframe, Prince Turki, the Saudi Director of General Intelligence, to pressure the Taliban to expel or deport Bin Laden.

In the end, this initiative did not pan out, but given the potential loss of life involved in other plans, we chose to await its outcome.

In the wake of the East Africa bombings three months later, a similar plan to use the friendly tribal group to capture Bin Laden was forwarded to and approved by the President in the form of the August 1998 MON. Its authorities, as noted earlier, were expanded in subsequent MONs. The following actions were initiated under this authority.

- September 1998 - Afghan tribal assets initiated a search and rendition operation in their area of influence. Efforts by this group continued until 11 Sep 2001 without significant results. On 9 Aug 2000, an ambush operation was reportedly launched against a convoy in which UBL was a passenger; it was unsuccessful. We have been unable to confirm that this operation actually took place.

In addition to the unilateral efforts then underway, also enlisted for capture and rendition operations against UBL. While

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an exchange to develop a plan for the capture and rendition of Usama Bin Laden. The main resource to be used in this plan was a group of Afghan tribal assets.

provided several options to capture and render UBL including the ambush of a convoy in which UBL was a passenger or an assault on the compound being used by UBL near Kandahar. A MON authorizing action to capture and render UBL was signed on August 1998.

Final details for the effort were completed by September 1998.

continued to monitor his activities in an effort to launch a capture operation. This activity continued for several months with no results.

On December 24, 1998, the Afghan group was told that, under new guidelines just received, they were only authorized to use lethal force in the context of a capture operation, if the opportunity arose, contingent on a determination
that a successful operation to capture was not feasible. Following receipt of this new
directive, the group developed new plans
had launched an ambush against a convoy 
of vehicles in which UBL was believed to be a passenger. The ambush was terminated 
when the attackers heard the voices of women and children;

We have been unable to confirm that this operation actually took place. Although the group continued monitoring the activities of UBL until the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks, they were unable to execute a successful operation to capture UBL.

The principal reason for the inability to execute the capture and render operation was the absence of timely and accurate intelligence on the plans, intentions, and travel of UBL throughout the operational period. UBL was absent for extended periods of time, from the area in

UBL also had an adverse impact on efforts by the indigenous group to launch an operation throughout the operational period. Various questions on the reporting accuracy of the indigenous group also surfaced during the course of this operation. Most of the questions were never answered satisfactorily. This created major difficulties in making decisions regarding proposed operations based solely on reporting from this group.

Executing The Plan

In the spring of 1999 CIA began to put in place the elements of its operational strategy, "The Plan." At the time of the Plan's creation, CIA already had made a significant impact on the al Qa'ida organization and its affiliates.

- By the spring of 1999, CIA had

terrorist cells in Albania, Azerbaijan andstopped at least two probable attacks against US interests in Albania and in the Persian Gulf region. In addition, these operations created disruptions in the regional and international terrorist infrastructure al-Qa'ida was attempting to build in those countries and the region, and we believe created doubts in al Qa'ida's perceptions about its ability to organize and operate with impunity.

- This activity was in addition to efforts to bring the perpetrators of the East Africa embassy bombings to justice. CIA operations sent the message that the United States was not only going after al Qa'ida for crimes it had already committed but also seeking out, breaking up, and rendering to justice terrorists engaged in planning future attacks wherever we could find them.
There was an important, yet unintended, consequence of our activity against the al-Qa'ida target prior to our development of the Plan that deepened the challenge of identifying and stopping the terrorists' activities. They increased their security practices, not only for physically guarding Bin Ladin himself and his senior lieutenants, but also for compartmenting terrorist operations.

- Persistent publicity and leaks of information about our methods in the United States and abroad caused the terrorists to emphasize their compartmentation, and recruit individuals for operations who had never attracted any kind of attention.

- Thus, paradoxically, our successes against the terrorists made it harder to break up their future operations.

The Plan was thus intended to regain the initiative through a wide range of operational activities to identify, locate, and render to justice Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants. We understood that such an approach would require the development of the right type of officer.

- We knew there were insufficient case officers in CTC. We started to homebase Clandestine Service Trainees in CTC. In the meantime, we moved to encourage quality officers from line divisions and other directorates to rotate to CTC Headquarters and overseas slots, directly hired officers with special skills, and fully developed and cross-trained CTC homebased officers in all categories.

- We augmented our training program considerably.

understood that we needed to maintain and reinforce where necessary already-strong liaison relationships.
Our revamped approach began to pay big dividends towards the end of 1999 and continuing on in 2000.
get access to him, and tried to convince the Taliban regime that Bin Ladin was a liability to them.

It should be kept in mind that CIA efforts to get to Bin Ladin and his people in Afghanistan took place against a backdrop of a worldwide effort against
al-Qaeda. We cooperated with foreign liaison services throughout the world to break up a number of specific terrorist plots.

The Kuala Lumpur Meeting

It was during the December 1999-January 2000 pre- and post-Millennium period that two of the September 11 hijackers—Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—came across our screen, which has raised the question of how we were able to identify them but not uncover the plot they were part of. CIA, in fact, did some things on
this case superbly while others revealed flaws in our approach that we subsequently addressed.

Turning first to how we were able to identify al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, we learned through SIGINT from Malaysia. As a consequence, we were concerned that the suspects were traveling to Malaysia to support regional terrorist plans or operations.

The results of these efforts meant that we knew Khalid al-Mihdhar’s true name by early January 2000 and Nawaf al-Hazmi’s by early March 2000. These two dates, respectively, were our first opportunities to watch list them. We had another opportunity to do so in December 2000, when we were able to link one of the Cole bombing suspects as a participant in the Kuala Lumpur meeting. In August 2001, as a result of increasing concern about an al Qaeda attack in the US, we reviewed our holdings and on August 23, 2001, sent the Department of State, FBI, INS, and other US Government agencies requesting that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be entered into TIPOFF immediately and denied entry into the US.

The fact that we did not recommend either of them for watch listing in March or December 2000 is not attributable to a single point failure. Rather, it demonstrated that a whole new system was needed, not just a fix at a single point.

Ramadan 2000 Plans Disrupted

While we did not prevent the attack on the USS Cole, we were able, during the Ramadan period in the autumn of 2000, to break up terrorist cells planning other attacks against US and foreign military and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf region. These operations disrupted al-Qaeda plans for terrorist attacks during Ramadan.

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Attempting to Capture Bin Ladin

Let us now turn to our specific activities in the Afghanistan sanctuary to capture and render Bin Ladin.

None of the available potential capture units were judged to have more than a ten percent chance of capturing Bin Ladin.

- A Feihan tribal group was judged to be unlikely to successfully attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin.

- Masood had to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin, but with the understanding that he would be his own man, never an agent or surrogate of the US Government, and would help if his interests intersected with those of the United States. Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of success against the Taliban were judged to be less than five percent.
By late 1999, CIA realized that our chances to accomplish the aims of the US Government regarding Bin Ladin by using the options described above—local Afghan tribes, Masood, and neighboring liaison services—were extremely poor.

- Consequently, we needed a new initiative.

The Predator Initiative

After consulting with the Defense Department and others, the CIA began advocating the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Afghanistan for reconnaissance purposes in the spring of 2000.

- The idea of using UAVs in Afghanistan originated in April 2000 as a result of a request from the NSC's Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the CIA and the Department of Defense to come up with new ideas to go after the terrorists in Afghanistan.

- In response, the Assistant DCI for Collection, the Assistant DCI for Military Support, and the Director of Military Operations (J-3) at the Pentagon agreed that Predator UAV reconnaissance flights could be a useful source of actionable intelligence of on-the-ground terrorist activity in Afghanistan.
The decision to recommend to the NSC that CIA and the other agencies supporting the program be allowed to proceed with Predator testing and operations was made in late May 2000. The decision came only after considerable deliberations and debate at CIA about the Predator's utility as a collection platform, the manner in which the aircraft should be used, and the risks involved.

mid-August 2000, the program was well on track and progressing rapidly.

- Testing began

able to conduct the first Predator mission over Afghanistan September 7, 2000.

- The Taliban unsuccessfully scrambled a Mig-21 during and some in CIA expressed concern that the aircraft was vulnerable to detection. Such concern intensified after the US Air Force notified CIA that it would have to pay for lost aircraft.

the UAV had completed 10 missions with varying degrees of success.
It is important to note that at this time CIA and the policy community saw the objectives of the Predator program as two-fold: giving the United States “eyes on the target” capability and collecting intelligence.

- Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Laden; however, we had no way at the time to react to this information.

Planning began for a 2001 deployment, and counterterrorism officials discussed the possibility of capitalizing on an Air Force program to weaponize the Predator by adapting it to carry and fire Hellfire missiles.

- CIA recognized that significant issues would need to be resolved to implement the program.

- CIA leadership from the beginning felt it important that there was a full understanding by the President and the National Security Council of the capabilities of the armed Predator and the implications of its use.

The decision to advocate arming the Predator followed considerable debate within the Agency.

- Some contended that the potential risks involved in deploying an armed aircraft exceeded the potential intelligence return or operational advantages, while others argued that the opportunity to strike at Bin Laden, if he could be located, would outweigh the risks involved in an aircraft being shot down over Afghanistan.

Another debate centered on whether reconnaissance only flights should be conducted while the weaponized capability was being engineered and policy and legal questions were being resolved.

- Some maintained that flying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes produced high-quality imagery intelligence and insights that could not be obtained otherwise.

- Others posed what eventually became the Agency’s position: that continued use of the UAV for reconnaissance only could reveal to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban the areas in Afghanistan in which the United States was particularly interested and possibly result in shooting one down. Either premature
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discovery or loss would reduce the chances of success if policymakers later decided to use the weaponized aircraft.

Liability for lost Predators and developing a command and control arrangement also emerged as important issues.

- Neither DoD nor CIA wanted to assume the cost of lost UAVs. While we finally agreed to split the cost evenly, the question was still in negotiation. It is important to emphasize, however, that this issue, while contentious, did not slow down the program. We continued to work all the preparations for deployment, including resolving several technical problems with the missile, with the full expectation that the funding question would eventually be resolved.

September 4. As a result, CIA was authorized reconnaissance purposes only.

Continued Warning

The leadership of the Agency repeatedly warned the policy community in the Executive Branch and the Congress of the seriousness of the threat.

- During the Millennium threat in late 1999, we told the President to expect between 5 to 15 terrorist attacks against American interests both here and overseas.

- In spring and summer of 2001, we sought every opportunity to vehemently express our concern about the high level of threat, and we launched the massive program of disruption described above.

- We placed the Bin Ladin threat prominently in every single annual testimony to the appropriate Congressional Committees on the Worldwide Threat since 1998. In the 1999 testimony, for example, the DCI stated that, "There is not the slightest doubt that Bin Ladin is planning attacks against us. He will strike
anywhere in the world he thinks we are vulnerable...and I must tell you we are concerned [these strikes] can occur at any time.” We also warned about the growing likelihood of an unconventional CBRN attack in the United States homeland and elsewhere.

The threat from al-Qa’ida was “an immediate and pressing concern.” And that, “Despite our successes, there are limits to what we can do. We will generally not have specific time and place warning of terrorist attacks...The result...is that I consider it likely that over the next year or so that there will be an attempted terrorist attack against US interests.”

During the week of July 2, 2001, the DCI contacted by phone approximately 13 of his foreign liaison counterparts to urge them to redouble their efforts against al-Qa’ida. The chief of the Counterterrorist Center, the chief of Near East Division, and others made additional urgent calls.

The DCI’s concern about the al-Qa’ida threat was such that he sent a memo to the top leaders of the CIA on December 4, 1998 stating the following:

- “We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Ladin. Our work to date has been remarkable and in some instances heroic, yet each day we all acknowledge that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously experienced. We must redouble our efforts against Bin Ladin himself, his infrastructure, followers, finances, etc. with a sense of enormous urgency. We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.”

Even with the intense focus on terrorism in general and Bin Ladin in particular, the Intelligence Community had to deal with several other major challenges that demanded the highest attention.

- Some issues were themselves closely linked to terrorism, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the danger that some terrorist group would acquire such weapons. In this regard, we have worked extensively—both operationally and analytically—on the danger of rogue elements helping terrorists gain access to these weapons.

- Throughout the 1990s and beyond, we were intensely engaged in supporting US policy and our military forces...
High priority issues had resource consequences for collection, operations, and analysis. And some of these issues required increased tasking of collection assets that were in direct competition with our efforts on terrorism.

Summary of CIA's Collection Posture Against UBL's Sanctuary

By September 2001 our intelligence collection posture in Afghanistan covered a wide array of capabilities that could help bring about CIA's strategy against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida.

Following UBL's departure from Sudan in the spring of 1996, we had intelligence operations targeting his Afghanistan presence.

By spring 1998 we had opened contact with the Northern Alliance's Commander Masood and the UISFA.

The period following the DCI's December 4, 1998 declaration of war memo saw a continued buildup.
Our efforts against al-Qa'ida over nearly a decade, and particularly our actions to penetrate the Taliban sanctuary, laid the groundwork for our rapid response to the September 11 attacks. This, in conjunction with our close coordination with the Department of Defense, was a major factor in the US Government's ability to defeat the Taliban and drive out al-Qa'ida from its Afghan redoubts with minimal casualties.
During the IC’s nearly decade-long war with Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida prior to September 11 we learned enormously about the threat—their intentions, their methods, their tactics, their determination, their strengths, and their vulnerabilities.

- We used this knowledge to improve our operations, to exploit every opportunity to collect information on the threat, and to gauge the risks and costs of what it would take to defeat the enemy.

- We also used it to provide strategic warning that al-Qa’ida was the number one threat to the security of Americans and that a major attack against US interests, possibly including even the US homeland, was coming. We succeeded in giving the policymaker a good appreciation of the increasing danger the US faced from the terrorists.

- Al-Qa’ida’s extreme security measures, compartmentation, and sophisticated tradecraft, as well as their sanctuary in Afghanistan, prevented us from obtaining the detailed information required to provide tactical warning of the major attacks against our embassies in East Africa, of the bombing of the USS Cole, and of the tragedies of September 11.

- In each of these cases, we saw the smoke but could not see the flames directly.

When we talk about results, it is natural to focus on those instances when terrorist operations succeed by making horrific headlines. Seldom do we discuss the headlines that might have been were it not for disruptions by the heroic efforts of our intelligence and law enforcement officers.

- Examples of those headlines would include: “Hundreds killed during Millennium terror attacks”

- to name a few where we know plots were successfully disrupted.

The IC’s war with al-Qa’ida taught us a few ingredients that boost the prospects for success:

- The various INTs working together produce better results.

- Close cooperation with friendly liaison services is essential.

- Aggressively tracking down all leads increases the chances for disruption.

- Finally, good luck helps.

Our success in thwarting the plot to bomb the US Embassy in Tirana is an excellent example
Our actions during the Millennium, when, as already related, we launched a massive worldwide effort that led to the arrest of many terrorists and the breakup of cells overseas, showed the importance of close cooperation with foreign liaison friends.

- There were no attacks, and we probably saved thousands of lives.
With the increase in Ramadan-related threat reporting in November-December 2000, CIA worked with to detect and preempt attacks.

In the spring and summer 2001, we launched another massive disruption effort in response to the increase in terrorist operational activity and indicators of imminent attacks. Our actions stopped several attacks and probably caused terrorists to postpone others. For example,

The IC also was at war with other terrorist groups, not just al-Qa'ida. And we scored successes on those fronts too.
Impact of September 11

The tragedies of September 11 did what the Intelligence Community's loud and incessant warnings could not do. They galvanized the attention and ended the inhibitions of the US Government; they galvanized and enraged the American people into action; and they galvanized foreign governments to take strong measures against terrorism.

- We, together with our allies, used our military power to clean out the terrorist den that Afghanistan had become.
- We are spending billions of dollars in addressing lax security measures around our nation's transportation infrastructure, particularly airports.
- We are implementing vastly increased security measures around our energy and industrial infrastructure.
- We are revamping the process surrounding the administration of foreign student visas and developing the kinds of information flows to keep track of foreign visitors.

We have significantly expanded the authorities and resources of the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to target the terrorist threat.

- The USA Patriot Act of 2001, among other things, removed legal impediments to the ability of law enforcement agencies to share with CIA intelligence and information.
- Because of the strong support we have received from these Committees and the Congress, we have significantly increased the funding and support for our counterterrorism and homeland security objectives.

- These new resources have buttressed our pre-September 11 initiatives to prevent and deter terrorism.

None of these authorities, resources, and measures would have been likely without the traumatic impact of September 11. There is now a whole new approach to the issue of homeland security.

- This country's infrastructure was absolutely unprotected, and we have been helping the President's Homeland Security Coordinator Tom Ridge think through how to protect it.
The attacks changed all the rules—perhaps forever.

The War with Terrorism: A Look Ahead

The war with international terrorism continues, and the fight will be long and difficult.

- It will require the patience and diligence that the President has asked for.
- It will require resources—sustained over a multi-year period—to re-capitalize our intelligence infrastructure at a pace that matches the changing technical and operational environment we face.
- It will also require countries that have previously ignored the problem of terrorism or refused to cooperate with us to step up and choose sides.
- It will require even closer sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

And despite all our efforts, another major terrorist attack is not just possible, but likely.

- Our effectiveness has increased since September 11, and the Intelligence Community will continue to be riveted to an offensive strategy of bringing that war to the terrorists. But, in the counterterrorism business there is no such thing as 100 percent success, and there never will be.

- A 1.000 batting average would mean the complete absence of terrorism, which would be extraordinary and unprecedented.

As we look ahead in this war with terrorism, and Congress tries to legislate effective measures against the threat, significant questions arise about security and freedom, safety and privacy, which call for extensive public debate and careful consideration by Congress. Terrorists have learned to exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in a free, open, and democratic society like ours.
The hijacking of September 11 moved freely in this country, operating in a manner that gave our law enforcement colleagues no probable cause to pursue.

They used the international banking system to freely transfer funds and finance their activities.

The war, therefore, will need to be pursued not just abroad but also at home, and success or failure will have to be defined in terms of the overall national effort.

As the President's National Security Advisor Dr. Rice pointed out early in 2002, one of the lessons of September 11 is that "Our efforts to understand international terrorism and our own vulnerability, and the terrorist attacks undertaken the false belief that sound foreign policy comes at home."

Where We Are
In the Fight Against Terrorism
Over the past year, we have made substantial progress in attacking the al-Qaeda target. We have focused on the al-Qaeda leadership and on neutralizing worldwide al-Qaeda cells.

nevertheless, al-Qaeda retains a capacity to mount destructive attacks.

While these successes have disrupted al-Qaeda's command and control.
DCI TASK FORCE REPORT:

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE WARNING

29 May 1992

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## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION
- Purpose of the Task Force ................................................... 1
- Definition of Intelligence Warning ........................................... 1
- Fundamental Observations ..................................................... 2
- Scope of the Intelligence Warning Issue ................................... 2

### DIMENSIONS OF THE CHALLENGE
- Odds Favor the Adversary ..................................................... 3
- Stacked-Deck Against the Analyst ........................................... 3
- Structural Deficiencies ....................................................... 4
- New Intelligence Warning Challenges ...................................... 4

### CURRENT STATE-OF-AFFAIRS
- DCID 6/1 Players ............................................................... 4
- DCID Weakness ................................................................. 5
- Community Posture ............................................................ 5
- National Intelligence Officer for Warning ................................. 6
- Regional NIOs ................................................................. 6
- NFIP Program Managers ...................................................... 6
- National Warning Staff ........................................................ 6
- Summary Assessments .......................................................... 7

### ANALYTICAL ISSUES
- Relevant On-going Analytical Improvements ............................... 7
- Differing Analytical Techniques ........................................... 7
- Leveraging Targeted Collection ............................................ 8

### RECOMMENDATIONS
- Proposed Strategy .............................................................. 8
- Recommendation One: DCI Endorsement .................................. 9
- Recommendation Two: Single Individual Accountable .................. 9
- Recommendation Three: Dedicated Warning Elements ................... 10
- Recommendation Four: Streamline The Structure ......................... 11
- Recommendation Five: Broaden The Scope .................................. 11
- Recommendation Six: Revise The DCID .................................... 12

### A TASK FORCE CONCERN
- The Resource Issue ............................................................. 12
INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Task Force

The Task Force on Intelligence Warning was formed in response to a request by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). His concern, as he explained it to the Task Force at our first meeting, was: "Does the intelligence warning structure that the Community now has in place make sense, and is it adequate in light of the changes taking place in the world." The DCI further explained that he felt fundamental changes were probably called for since the traditional, first priority "Warsaw Pact threat" warning problem, "big W," was transitioning to threats stemming from world-wide instabilities, "little w," and to warning needs deriving from new dimensions to the national security interests of the United States. All members of the Task Force agree that the DCI's concerns are timely and that intelligence warning is of such national importance that a thorough review of the Community's posture is necessary. Further, in view of planned US military force draw downs and the adoption of a new National Military Strategy—which emphasizes short-notice responses to regional crises and reconstitution of forces in response to the emergence of major threats—the intelligence warning mission remains a critical one. We believe we have completed our assignment, as reflected by this report's "ground truth" judgements and assessments. Further, we are confident that our recommendations are appropriate and responsive to the DCI's need for support in his capacity as the nation's principal intelligence warning officer.

Definition of Intelligence Warning

The Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/1 on National Intelligence Warning defines the mission of intelligence warning as "...to avoid surprise, to the President, the National Security Council and to the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance to the security of the U.S." The Task Force believes this definition remains essentially valid, provided the intelligence programs implemented to fulfill the warning mission take cognizance of the new realities and intelligence demands of the 1990s. The kinds of foreign events, and the individual foreign nations, that are of major importance to the security and the interests of the U.S. have changed in recent years, and will continue to change. The result is a broader set of national consumers than the ones now identified in the DCID will need national intelligence warning support—for issues going well beyond foreign military attacks and government instabilities.
Fundamental Observations

Drawing on the assistance and the reflective remarks of forty-seven expert witnesses who collectively have been engaged in the production or the application of warning intelligence for over four decades, the Task Force developed four fundamental observations that heavily influenced our approach to evaluating the Community’s intelligence warning activities, and the formulation of our recommendations. These observations are:

- Providing policymakers with persuasive intelligence warning—in time for them to act in ways that influence a potential foreign development likely to be adverse to the interest of the United States—is the most important intelligence service the Community can perform for the security of the U.S.

- Sustained, effective intelligence warning has been an elusive goal of the Intelligence Community for the entire duration of the modern Community’s existence; all bureaucratic solutions previously attempted have not worked for the long haul.

- Many credible senior intelligence managers believe, as does the Task Force, that all major intelligence warning failures of the past five decades have been the result of the Community’s inability to consolidate and analyze diffuse raw intelligence successfully, and to extract a meaningful warning judgement; no such failure has been rooted in a simple dearth of information.

- Except for the priority requirement of warning of a military attack on the U.S. or its allies by the former Soviet Union, the National Intelligence Community has never seriously attempted to establish dedicated analytical programs for intelligence warning on a global scale.

Scope of the Intelligence Warning Issue

The above set of observations were a sobering and challenging point of departure for the Task Force. The storyline of these observations is very stark. First, intelligence warning should be the first priority of the Intelligence Community because of its high payoff value, but it isn’t. Second, although the magnitude and scope of US intelligence activities provide ample data to make effective intelligence warning possible, the "warning problem" has yet to be solved. Third, except for the Warsaw Pact "big W" threat, a major effort to provide intelligence warning on the full range of US national security interests has never been attempted.

The Task Force realized that these issues constitute the fundamental challenge to be solved by our effort, while the detailed structure of the National Warning System is of secondary importance. This scope change, in part, was the result of the insightful testimonies of several experienced intelligence officers, whose remarks vividly pointed out that there are many dimensions to the causes of the historical poor-to-marginal performance of the National Intelligence Community for...
intelligence warning. In view of this historical perspective, the Task Force realizes that the recommendations proposed here are likely to fall short of constituting any total solution to the problem of providing effective intelligence warning; we believe, however, that they point in the right direction.

DIMENSIONS OF THE CHALLENGE

Odds Favor the Adversary

The Task Force believes that the objective of effective intelligence warning has remained an elusive goal for the Community, not because of any lack of serious efforts to work the problem in the past on the part of many highly qualified and motivated people, but because the mission itself—even assuming the acceptance of warning on the part of consumers, which is often not the case—is extremely difficult for at least four sets of reasons.

First, intelligence warning is difficult because it often hinges on assessments of intentions, on the specific moves contemplated by a foreign principal during complex situations. Often the foreign principal’s intentions are not fixed during the formulative stages of a crisis situation. Hence intelligence cannot easily anticipate decisions that the subject actors themselves have not yet made. Also, technical means and security procedures are becoming increasingly available that help these foreign subjects conceal their intentions, plus their directives for implementation actions, and are extremely challenging to US intelligence capabilities. Intelligence warning has been, is, and will likely remain so analytically challenging that a high rate of success cannot be guaranteed. Not trying, however, will result in unacceptable risks to the nation.

Stacked-Deck Against the Analyst

A second dimension of the challenge of providing effective intelligence warning was brought to the attention of the Task Force by numerous witnesses. It was explained repeatedly that practically all the environmental factors that analysts in the major intelligence organizations are subject to make it difficult for them to produce break-through warning assessments. These difficulties begin with inherited and developed cultural views that often skew analysts’ interpretations of data on non-Western culture nations. Though it is almost a cliche, post-mortems on intelligence warning failures continue to note that such failures are often due to a lack of understanding of the radically different values and motives of a foreign adversary relative to the social-economic-cultural yardsticks that most US intelligence analysts make judgments by. Furthermore, many bureaucratic and professional "environmental" factors within the intelligence community put a premium on consensus and inhibit general consideration of the "unthinkable" interpretation of ambiguous intelligence.
Structural Deficiencies

A third dimension of the intelligence warning challenge has to do with the Community's posture and practices established specifically for intelligence warning, i.e., the National Warning Intelligence System. Though the Task Force recognizes that organizational structure changes by themselves can make only marginal improvements in the performance of the warning mission, we nevertheless believe that there are serious deficiencies in the current National Intelligence Warning System structure.

if the National Intelligence Warning System is meant to be an integrated inter-agency process with procedures for compiling and prioritizing requirements, with standards for assessing warning conditions on a global basis, and with systematic reporting and dissemination procedures, then no such "system" currently exists and the National Warning System is more of an illusion than a reality. The Defense Intelligence Warning component of the National System does have considerable structure and standards, but the scope of this operation does not make it a substitute for a national system.

New Intelligence Warning Challenges

The fourth dimension of the "warning problem" lies in the fact that the current structure and in-place programs and systems for intelligence warning were largely designed for the traditional "big W" problem. The Task Force believes that the scope of US intelligence warning activities needs to be expanded, if not now then eventually, to encompass the full range of US national security concerns, such as economic competitiveness, global energy management and global environment management. The identity of new consumers, the dynamic state of policy development, and even the role of national intelligence itself are all issues that are in a state of flux regarding these and other new national security concerns. Structuring a relevant intelligence warning analytical program for these new dimensions to foreign affairs will remain a formidable challenge.

CURRENT STATE-OF-AFFAIRS

DCID 6/1 Players

The Task Force reviewed DCID 6/1 for two purposes: (1) To determine if the guidance provided in this directive still makes sense in the context of an era where "little w" is becoming the priority need of the nation, not "big w"; and (2) To use the principal provisions in the directive as a reference for understanding the current community structure and its assignment of responsibilities for national intelligence warning. On the whole, the intent and directions provided in DCID 6/1 remain pertinent today. It is clear that the Directive was meant to be the basis for an aggressive, coordinated Community effort on warning intelligence, collectively referred to as the National Intelligence Warning System.
National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W), who is to be the focal point for Community-wide warning matters; the Community components with a responsibility for warning intelligence, for

A major weakness with the DCID is that below the DCI, responsibilities are distributed and, therefore, overall accountability is open-ended.

No one is really responsible for the viability of the whole System however; the Task Force believes that this flaw in the DCID is a major reason why the full intent of the DCID has never been realized, as explained below.

Community Posture

The Task Force found that the overall level of analytical effort explicitly devoted to warning throughout the Community is sparse and unfocused.

As one senior manager expressed the current state-of-affairs, "...the business of warning, while important, is essentially underdeveloped, under-funded, unprofessionalized and surprisingly under-defined, especially analysis." The findings of the Task Force do not dispute this statement. It needs to be highlighted, however, that this state-of-affairs is not a recent condition. The situation is not simply a current-players problem.
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

The Task Force recognizes that the establishment of the NIO/W position has proved to be a very meaningful step for fostering intelligence warning. But in a sense it has been a token approach toward National Intelligence Warning. A full commitment to give the NIO/W definitive operational responsibilities, to provide sufficient infrastructure support, to institutionalize his or her responsibilities with the NFIB, and with the mission of each of the NFIC Program Managers, has never been made.

As a result, however, the NIO/W and his or her immediate staff have become a substitute for, not the linchpin of, a substantial Community-wide intelligence warning program.

The indirect approach for identifying warning intelligence is inadequate.

NFIP Program Managers

While the GDIP Program Manager has a very extensive intelligence warning system in place, the other Program Managers do not---beyond the mission of flagging an impending strategic attack against the United States. All Program Managers sponsor watch center operations, which contribute to the warning mission to a considerable degree. On a day-to-day basis, however, these centers emphasize current intelligence reporting, which more often than not addresses intelligence warning implicitly rather than explicitly. Their topical coverage is also open-ended rather than focused on specific consumer warning needs. The DCI centers play important intelligence warning roles when a foreign development becomes a crisis management situation. Overall, however, there is little organized production in any of the Programs devoted to long-term strategic warning issues.

National Warning Staff

The National Warning Staff is not now staffed or positioned to act as a major national player in the Community for intelligence warning. Its role needs clarification, and its relationship within the Community needs to be strengthened through better personal communications and mutual coordination of efforts.
Summary Assessment

This is not to say that there is no organized and effective national intelligence warning work underway in the Community. The efforts and products of the NIO/W, including his immediate staff and the NWS, were repeatedly praised by consumers on the NSC Staff, in Defense, and by the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committee staffs as often being very insightful and generally out in front of emerging threats. The regional NIOs and all Agencies make important contributions to the steady flow of intelligence to consumers which results in a continuing awareness of foreign developments, the most basic form of intelligence warning. The NID and PDB are clear standouts on this score. The Defense Intelligence Warning System provides an active warning network with a global mission to support the CINCs as well as the National System. And under crisis management conditions, the Community invariably rallies and focuses on warning assessments that support departmental needs as well as the collective national security process. Nevertheless, these activities are not sufficiently coherent and do not have enough consistent integrity to be regarded as a National Intelligence Warning System. This weakness is very apparent to the consumers, who both exploit and disdain what they generally perceive to be, with respect to warning issues, a fractionated and indecisive Intelligence Community.

ANALYTICAL ISSUES

Relevant On-going Analytical Improvements

The Task Force does not have a simple solution to the formidable challenge of changing the analytical environment in large intelligence agencies to foster more insightful intelligence warning on a routine basis. We note that the steps directed by the DCI to improve National Estimates are very complementary to this end. We particularly endorse the new emphasis on including more alternative views and on encouraging more adversarial explorations of available data in the analytical processes supporting National Intelligence Estimates. The guidance to include a worst case scenario in draft estimates should directly result in improved intelligence warning assessments of possible emerging threats. While moving in the right direction, however, the Task Force does not believe that these efforts, by themselves, will sufficiently improve intelligence warning.

Differing Analytical Techniques

A question the Task Force explored in some depth is the issue of whether the analytical process for deriving intelligence warning is different from routine, all-source finished intelligence production. This question is important because if there are fundamental differences in analytical approaches, then the structural solutions for intelligence warning should cater to the unique approaches of intelligence warning that seem to work--in order to optimize the process. On the surface, it appears that both types of analysts follow the same fundamental
analytical processes, i.e. they both commonly apply the principles of deductive and inferential logic, they build evidential cases based upon the same type of data sources, and they rely on experience-derived expertise for developing conclusions based on proven precedents. The explanation of why warning analysts are more likely to identify threatening developments lies in the fact that they approach a problem with the objective intent of doing so, and other analysts most often do not.

Leveraging Targeted Collection

The Task Force found that all elements in the Community who are concerned with intelligence warning need to pay more attention to collection requirements management. Beside the personal efforts of the NIO/W—and for traditional threats, e.g., North Korea—there appears to be little current interagency coordination, or any central approach for developing a comprehensive collection strategy on warning concerns before they become crisis management problems. On-going Community restructuring plans, which include several changes for more effective collection management, and the naming of a VC/NIC with collection responsibilities, make it an opportune time to develop imaginative collection programs in support of intelligence warning. Along with existing collection systems, the planned expansion in HUMINT potentials for acquiring raw intelligence that has high value for intelligence warning. Better leveraging the full complement of US intelligence collection capabilities for global intelligence warning could be an important step toward enhancing the Community's performance in this important sphere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Proposed Strategy

In view of the high priority senior consumers accord to intelligence warning, and the challenge of the task, the Task Force believes a comprehensive strategy is necessary in order to achieve fundamental improvements in the Community's performance on intelligence warning. The recommendations that follow are a complementary set, designed as the base set of actions needed to launch the strategy. The merit of each recommendation should be judged in this total context.

The Task Force's proposed strategy for improved intelligence warning is keyed to five strategic objectives:

- Improve the Community-wide support to the DCI, in his role as the nation's principal intelligence warning officer, by establishing a process for developing explicitly articulated warning assessments that are both timely and relevant to the interests, concerns and priorities of senior consumers.

- Establish accountability for warning intelligence efforts by clearly assigning responsibilities and by conducting periodic performance evaluations.
o Establish a base analytical program for warning intelligence production, structured on the premise that warning intelligence is more comprehensive if provided both by line units and by elements dedicated to warning assessments.

o Facilitate community-wide sharing of alternative warning assessments, and of related time-sensitive intelligence pertinent to national intelligence warning assessments.

o Improve the quality of intelligence warning analysis throughout the community through the sustained training of analysts, augmented by methodology research—plus focused management attention to warning intelligence issues.

The Task Force holds that a more institutionalized intelligence warning system than now exists will result from the pursuit of these strategic objectives. That is, substantial analytical programs, routine collection initiatives, and increased inter-agency participation will result and, therefore, give more depth to the National Intelligence Warning System.

Recommendation One: DCI Endorsement

The Task Force recommends that the DCI explicitly endorse the above strategy for improved intelligence warning and ask for the complete cooperation of all NFIC principals in its implementation.

Recommendation Two: Single Individual Accountable

The Task Force recommends that the NIO/W be named Vice Chairman of the NIC for Warning (VC/NIC/W), to serve as the DCI's principal advisor on warning. Though the aversion to proliferating NIC Vice Chairmen is shared by the Task Force, this status matches and truly reflects the enhanced responsibilities of the NIO/W that we recommend. The VC/NIC/W would not be just a focal point for warning but would be the principal advisor to the DCI on all matters pertaining to warning. We see the VC/NIC/W discharging this responsibility in two ways: (1) The individual in question will be the principal substantive advisor on warning issues to the DCI and to the NFIB; and (2) The individual will provide advice to each of the NFIP components on their respective roles and postures for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. As the DCI's principal advisor on warning matters, the VC/NIC/W will:

o Assure that the DCI is provided intelligence warning, in a timely manner, that is relevant to senior policymakers' interests and to national level policy issues. The VC/NIC/W's primary responsibility in this sphere is to ensure that a process is in place that supports the DCI with warning assessments on a community-wide basis—a process that results in: Assessments that are full-ranged regarding all reasonably possible scenarios; assessments that are either prepared by or under the NIOs' direction, or that include their views; and that allow the
VC/NIC/W to add his or her personal assessment when the VC/NIC/W judges the community product to be incomplete or even misleading.

- Assure that timely intelligence warnings are disseminated to consumers in a progressive fashion, keyed to the pace of a developing situation.

- Provide guidance to warning elements of Community components to ensure that all their efforts are mutually complementary, inclusive of the needs of all priority consumers, and responsive to the strategic objectives cited above.

- Monitor the operations of these Community component warning elements within the context of their participation in the national intelligence warning system, particularly with respect to sharing new and alternative warning assessments and supporting the preparation of national warning products.

- Advise the NFIP principals and the directors of their components on their operational roles, training programs and overall posture for supporting the National Warning System.

- Report periodically to the DCI, the NFIC and other concerned Departments on the Community’s performance with respect to intelligence warning as well as on future warning intelligence requirements.

**Recommendation Three: Dedicated Warning Elements**

The Task Force recommends that each major NFIP component establish or designate, as appropriate, an element whose mission is to act as the focal point for warning within that organization and to network with its counterparts in the other organizations that collectively constitute the National Intelligence Warning System. Though these elements are under the operational management of their parent organizations, they should be responsive to general guidance provided by the VC/NIC/W. These elements need not be large, but the analysts in them should be experienced individuals with demonstrated skills. The elements do need to be positioned within their parent organization in ways that give them direct access to senior levels of management. With respect to function, these elements should:

- Perform and monitor investigative intelligence analyses directed at identifying and/or tracking potential warning concerns, in response to guidance provided by, among others, the VC/NIC/W.

- Make internal line units aware of the dynamic warning interests of consumers in order to better posture these units for initiating warning assessments that are timely and relevant to consumer interests.

- Act as the organization in question’s agent for sharing new and alternative warning assessments, and related time sensitive
intelligence, with all counterparts in the interagency warning intelligence network and with the VC/NIC/W.

- Ensure that tailored collection requirements are initiated, and encompass all reasonably possible scenarios that could generate high threat warnings.

- Support the preparation of national warning products by directly participating in their production or by supporting other elements within their organization in their preparation of such products.

- Facilitate the establishment of warning intelligence training programs and the development and appropriate use of warning intelligence methodologies within their organization.

Recommendation Four: Streamline The Structure

The Task Force recommends the following additional structural changes to the current operation of the National Intelligence Warning System in order to improve the effectiveness of these operations and to provide adequate support to the VC/NIC/W:

- All major Community components should adopt or reinstitute the practice of designating an officer—presumably the Director of its warning element—with specific responsibilities for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. Other Executive Branch components and departments should be encouraged to, at least, designate a liaison officer as a point-of-contact to the VC/NIC/W staff.

Institute regular—at least monthly—meetings that draw together relevant regional NIOs, plus senior representatives and substantive experts from the Community’s warning components. A specific warning document should be issued after each such meeting.

- The National Warning Staff should be converted into an enhanced support staff to the VC/NIC/W. The duties of the individual members of this new staff should be defined in a complementary fashion so that the VC/NIC/W is assisted by functional experts in all of his or her many responsibilities. It is imperative that the staff be collocated with the VC/NIC/W.

Recommendation Five: Broaden The Scope

The Task Force recommends that the concept of national intelligence warning no longer be limited to military attacks and the instabilities of foreign national governments. Instead, this concept should be a variable encompassing the full range of current U.S. national interest and security concerns.
Recommendation Six: Revise The DCID

The Task Force recommends that DCID 6/1 be revised to reflect any and all changes stemming from the above recommendations that the DCI endorses.

A TASK FORCE CONCERN

The Resource Issue

The Task Force recognizes that the recommendations offered are challenging and will encompass legitimate management concerns. Nevertheless, we believe extraordinary efforts are required when attempting to make cultural changes, which is the implicit objective of our proposed strategy for improving intelligence warning. We would not have recommended such extraordinary efforts if the priority of the problem did not warrant them and if we did not have confidence in the leadership of the Community to accomplish the tasks called for. Our only major concern is the future resource posture of the Community and its capability to support an enhanced National Intelligence Warning System as envisioned by the proposed strategy. In view of the continuing importance of intelligence warning, plus the increasing complexity of what warning needs to encompass, it would be a national mistake if adequate resources to support the warning mission of the 1990s should not be available.
SUBJ: CT: PRESENCE OF AL-QAI’DA OPERATIVE TAWFIQ MUHAMMAD BIN SALAH BIN RUSHAYD BIN ATTASH IN LOS ANGELES IN SUMMER 2000; ASSOCIATION OF BIN ATTASH WITH U.S.-BASED EXTREMISTS

SENIOR AL-QAI’DA OPERATIVE AND USS COLE ATTACK PLANNER TAWFIQ MUHAMMAD BIN SALAH BIN RUSHAYD BIN (ATTASH)) AKA ((KHALLAD BIN ATTASH)), WAS IN THE AREA OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA DURING JUNE 2000 FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS. WHILE IN LOS ANGELES, BIN ATTASH ATTENDED PRAYER SERVICES AT A LOCAL LOS ANGELES AREA MOSQUE. BIN ATTASH WAS SEEN IN THE COMPANY OF SEVERAL FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS.

BIN ATTASH WAS SEEN IN THE COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES-BASED SUNNI EXTREMISTS FAHAD AL-((THURAYY))
Yeah. Everything you write is consistent with my understanding of that suspicious travel in January 2000.

Also, here are my "timeline" entries the early-mid January 2000 events, which includes travel to Malaysia by "Khaled" [My guess always was that Khaled was in fact Quso and Nawaf might have been Khallad] [could have been Salim, but who knows.]

"al-Nibras."
January 3, 2000
USS The Sullivans refuels in Aden, Yemen.

[Investigation] Attempted attack on a US ship (possibly the USS The Sullivans) failed due to the weight of the boat causing it to get stuck in the sand at the launch site. (Site 5) Was set to coincide with the 27th day of Ramadan known as the “Night of Destiny”. Perpetrators forced to leave the boat there.

SECRET
Hi. During the millennium threat or shortly after (?) we were chasing a traveler id'd by NSA as “Khalid” LNU, who traveled from the middle to the far east. As I remember it, pictures and surveilled him, then he, what, went to Bangkok and disappeared? Anyway, after the Cole bombing, we had a another look at the pics, thinking Khalid might have been Khallad. He wasn't. But I believe and others thought that Khallad was actually among those in the little group.

Anyway, the possible second suicide bomber... NIBRAS... may have been in SE Asia around the same time (traveled with Quso) was called Khalid... I'm wondering if the traveler might not have been Nibras...

Anybody know where those photos are? I don't have them.

If you find them, could you send 'em over to me? Thanks.
TO: [Blank]
FROM: [Blank]
OFFICE: [Blank]
DATE: 05/24/2001 06:07:03 PM
SUBJECT: [Blank]

Agee we need to compare notes. are coming here on Tuesday 1-3 pm to compare notes.

I frankly need to check on all the questions you asked.

Re: Khalid in Asia, that was my (and I assume others’) interpretation. Maybe I'm wrong, maybe not... I suppose I can raise this with [Blank]

Interested in comparing notes in a small forum expert to expert so both sides can shake the thing and see what gaps are common... that sounds like a great subject to start with.

Khalid al-Mihdar in Malaysia; can’t see "Khalid" I'm either missing something or someone saw something that wasn't there.

[Blank]

Sent on 24 May 2001 at 06:07:03 PM
MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

OFFICE:

SUBJECT: Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar

REFERENCE:

TO:

FROM:

DATE: 08/21/2001 04:05:02 PM

SUBJECT: Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar

WHAT? Same passport number? How interesting. I know his fellow travelers made one or two trips to the US in the same January time frame, yes? Probably would be useful to memorialize the US visits of the party in a cable....

I was reviewing all the cables on Khalid Al-Mihdhar, I noticed he had a U.S. Visa in his passport. I asked INS to check and they just came back and said he entered the U.S. on 15 January 2000 and listed the Los Angeles as his destination. He departed the U.S. on 10 June 2000. I looked through traffic and could not find anything else.

I'll be sending to FBI to pass what we know of Khalid Al-Mihdhar and that he entered the U.S. on 15 January. Maybe there is something they can do -- perhaps run his name by Ressam? I will be here in the morning, and will then be meeting with in the early afternoon to talk about the U.S.S. Cole and will give her a head's up. Let me know if you need me to do anything.
FROM:

OFFICE:

SUBJECT: KHALAD

REFERENCE:

OK. This is important. After an inordinate amount of digging, I finally found the cable identifying Khalad. Can I recommend going back and revisiting the case?

This is a major league killer, who orchestrated the Cole attack and possibly the Africa bombings.

also, can this be sent? Thanks.
MEMORANDUM FOR: 
FROM: 
OFFICE: 
SUBJECT: Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar 

6 August 2002

WHAT?:?? Same passport number? How interesting. I know his fellow travelers made one or two trips to the US in the same January time frame, yes? Probably would be usefufl to memorialize the US visits of the party in a cable.....

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: DATE: 25-April-2012
TO: Michael F. Scheuer  
FROM:  
DATE: 05/05/98  
SUBJECT:  

Mike, planning for the ubi rendition is going very well. have come up with a very good plan - it fits the military model and is detailed, thoughtful, realistic, and keeps the risks up front and clearly addressed. The team really is enthusiastic about the effort and quality of work presented.

Still the odds of success are iffy - as in any special ops raid of this type - hundreds of variables which can be anticipated but not really planned for - and the thing could blow up at any point along the way. Still a much better plan than I anticipated.

Odds the op will get the green light - 50-50; odds it will succeed 40–60 (If we define success as ubi either in custody or dead).

CC:  
Sent on 5 May 1998

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 25-April-2012

SECRET
SUBJECT: Talking Points Regarding Usama Bin Ladin for the DCI's 2 September 1998 SSCI Briefing

The Intelligence Community (IC) knows more about Usama Bin Ladin than about any other top tier terrorist organization.

Covert action operations have been prepared Bin Ladin has been indicted, and most of the information pertinent to that action was acquired by CIA.

--Render Bin Ladin to Justice: A full rendition operation was designed, practiced and ready to go in May 1998.

b. Participation/Contribution of other IC Components:

--DoJ: high-level
--NSA: moderate
--DoD: low-level
--FBI: low-level
Retaliation by Bin Ladin's organization and its terrorist allies is certain after a capture operation—whether or not it is successful. That said, terrorist attacks by those organizations on U.S. interests are certain, whether or not we run an operation.
SUBJECT: Further Options Available Against Usama Bin Ladin

1. An effort against Usama Bin Ladin has been ongoing. During this period, there have been several times when it appeared possible that a capture attempt would take place; yet in each case, the effort was not made for one reason or another. It is perhaps a good time to review the ongoing initiative and consider other options which might be launched concurrent with the initiative.

2. One option would be to revitalize the effort by providing more direct tasking which would allow them to directly assault his quarters. This option would be much less complicated than a capture attempt of a road convoy and would perhaps be more in line with the type of raids conducted during the war. It might require modification of the existing NDN covering this operation. Given the threat posed by UBL to the United States, this is an option worth considering.

3. A second option would be to enlist the support to Afghan warlord Ahmed Shah Masood. Masood is currently in Northern Afghanistan fighting Taliban forces who are attacking him. It is thought that he will be able to successfully withstand the Taliban attacks and will be a force to consider in Afghanistan for many years to come. Masood is a soldier and accomplished guerrilla fighter. He has demonstrated an ability to plan and execute difficult operations.
Many of these options are not in and of themselves a clear best choice.

The more options we pursue, the greater the likelihood that one will succeed.
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**FILE**

**INTELLIGENCE OPTIONS FOR ATTACKING THE USAMA BIN LADIN PROBLEM**

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**DATE**
24 November 1998
TOP SECRET

Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem

Following are the range of options that are available for US policymakers to choose from to address the Usama Bin Ladin problem:

CONTINUE CURRENT PLAN: We are keeping our tribal assets deployed and wait for an opportunity to ambush and capture him as he moves around.
continue to try to bring Bin Ladin to justice.

- Upside: Little or no collateral damage to noncombatants.
- Downside: We are in a responding-to-events mode; we cannot take the initiative; limited likelihood of success.

TRIBAL RAID ON ONE RESIDENCE: the tribals have completed plans for an armed, nighttime raid of one of the residences.

- Upside: Restores the initiative to us; plays to the paramilitary talents of the tribals; increases chances of success. The tribals prefer this option to an ambush because they believe it is less dangerous to their forces both during the operation and after. The assets, for example, believe they can better control the operational setting when attacking a single house than when attacking a multi-vehicle convoy. They also believe that a raid has a better chance than an ambush of being executed quietly, thereby decreasing the chance that nearby Taliban security forces will be alerted.

- Downside: Increases risk of collateral damage to noncombatants; increases the risk of casualties among our operatives; scenario lends itself to a quick response by Taliban forces.

one-shot deal: if Bin Ladin is in the house he will either captured or killed—if the tribal assets achieve surprise capture is likely; if surprise is not achieved, Bin Ladin and his guards will resist and likely die in the engagement.
US MILITARY: We are providing the military with the locations of the residences Bin Ladin is shuffling among. A simultaneous cruise missile attack on each would increase the likelihood of catching Bin Ladin at one of them.

- Upside: Restores the initiative to us; no risk of US casualties; high chance of success if Bin Ladin is in one of the residences; little risk of casualties to our assets; clear signal of U.S. resolve.

- Downside: High risk to noncombatants; clear exposure of the US hand; might miss some/all of the targets. Acute embarrassment if information inaccurate.
Masood is an outstanding guerrilla commander whose northern Afghanistan base has an agent network. Masood agents/operatives might be able to kill Bin Ladin but would have a more difficult time capturing and then exfiltrating Bin Ladin.
• Upside: Gives us new Agency-run options; likely increase in FI on Bin Laden; no risk to US lives.

• Downside: Low chance of success in capturing (as opposed to killing) UBL; reduced US ability to control asset actions; unlikely to produce results in near- or medium-term.
TO: Michael F. Schueer
FROM: [Redacted]
OFFICE: [Redacted]
DATE: 12/20/98
SUBJECT: [Redacted]

Teleconference among the principals that was called as a result of the news that UBL is at the Habash house, believe they are seriously considering a missile attack tonight. Don't know for sure.

Mike, Thanks for the heads up.

DCI wanted my views - I said hit him tonight - we may not get another chance. But given the political mess there I had doubts the decision would be to go ahead - and I was correct. The call was disappointing.

We have been hammering the Taliban on UBL & that we would hold them responsible & the bombing of Iraq demonstrated the threat was real. The increased security on the streets only raises the ante and makes it that much more difficult, dangerous to conduct the raid. I am not a hawk on the bombing but we should have done it last night. We may well come to regret the decision not to go ahead.

CC: [Redacted]
Sent on 21 December 1998
thanks for your note. i couldn't sleep so i thought i'd come in and catch up a little. i'm sure we'll regret not acting last night. this is the third time you and your officers have put ubl in this govt's sights and they have balked each time at doing the job. how many times can we/h/they expect to get a shot? there is at times such a sense of unreality in these out-of-langley deliberations that it is hard to assimilate exactly how things work. they spent a good deal of time yesterday, for example, worrying that some stray shrapnel might hit the habash mosque and "offend" muslims--seemingly to forget the four days the just spend bombarding what bin laden calls the "muslim laqi people." the policymakers also seem obsessed with having others--audits, pubs, etc. do what we won't do.
Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama Bin Laden

Purpose: To inform Congressman Hastert about CIA's operations against Usama Bin Laden (UBL).

Background: The Agency's overall objectives regarding Bin Laden are to capture him and render him to justice; to support US military options targeting Bin Laden; to dismantle Bin Laden's international infrastructure; and to run to ground threat reporting.

- We have established assets in Afghanistan and have authorized them to try to capture Bin Laden when the opportunity presents itself. We have arranged to try Bin Laden if we can capture and deliver him.

- The 20 August 1998 US missile strikes on Khosistan.

We currently are collecting information the military needs for possible further missile strikes.

- The return of two senior Bin Laden lieutenants to the United States to face trial.

- We spend an enormous amount of time and manpower running UBL-related threats to ground.

We have prevented the bombing of our Embassy in Tirana and probably those by running threats to ground.

Some points you may wish to make in your presentation:

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DATE: 25-April-2012
The Agency's current state of operations against Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) can be divided into the following categories:

A. Seeking Bin Ladin's Location

- Bin Ladin is in Shaykh Ali's camp in the desert south of Qandahar. Our assets remain prepared to mount a capture operation.

Collection

The Intelligence Community is devoting all applicable resources to collecting against Bin Ladin:

- Appropriate Agency and foreign intelligence assets are engaged and focused on pinpointing UBL's location and preempting future attacks.
Disruption Operations

Our disruption operations now are aimed at capturing Bin Laden.

Intelligence:
The formulation of contingency plans for US military activity against Bin Laden.

Data are being used to assist in dismantling his international infrastructure, and gathering additional actionable intelligence.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)

NOTE FOR:
FROM: Michael F. Scheuer
OFFICE: CTC/TFL
DATE: 05/17/99
SUBJECT: your note

thanks for your note: your guys did a splendid job and I wish you would give them my best and tell them how much all hands here admire their determination and responsiveness. they did all they could, and then some, to get this job done.

I believe you are exactly right when you say don't do it, it won't get done. if when the history of this operation gets written from the hqs end it will show that for the past 40 months the cia, and especially the do, has been in this endeavor virtually alone. for the first two-plus years—really until the african bombings—the u.s. military did not believe that ubl was a problem/threat saying ubl was not a priority for them.
we have been kept perpetually short-handed.

and are still troubled or at least confounded, by the still unexplained decision to forego the capture op at tarnak last may, which in my estimate is still the best opportunity we have had.

regret the length of this bleat, but having a chance to get ubl three times in 36 hours and foregoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry. i’ve driven officers relentlessly—at time ruthlessly—and the administration has passed up a half-dozen good-to-excellent chances to complete the operation. my perception is that everytime a chance comes up the dci finds himself alone at the table, with the other principles basically saying “we’ll go along with your decision mr. director,” and implicitly saying that the agency will hang alone if the attack doesn’t get bin laden. it’s a frustrating business, and indeed it’s hard to understand:

their stark fear of attacking a terrorist bent on killing as many americans as possible.

still, you and we will continue to pursue the target with determination and professionalism, and hope best always. scheuer.

cc:

sent on 17 may 1999
**SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF**
3 May 2001

(b)(1) (b)(3)
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)

**Terrorism: Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack**

10-minute videotape of Bin Ladin the widest public airing

In a press conference in May 1998, just months before the East Africa bombings, Bin Ladin used the media to predict news to gladden his supporters' hearts.

Bin Ladin's heightened public profile may be an attempt to profit from the attention being paid to the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and to reassert his importance as a backer of Islamic causes. Bin Ladin in January and February appeared in two videos about the wedding of his son; both featured rhetoric supporting the Al-Aqsa intifadah, and the second showed Bin Ladin reading a poem extolling the attack on the USS Cole.

**APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:**
25-April-2012

**TOP SECRET**
Terrorism: Bin Laden and Associates Making Near-Term Threats

These warnings are consistent with what appears to be a new public threat issued by Bin Laden. An Arabic news channel reported on Saturday that its correspondent in Afghanistan interviewed Bin Laden last week and was told to expect a "severe blow" against US and Israeli interests during the next two weeks.

The station did not show footage of the interview that would substantiate its claim, but the correspondent's description of security measures imposed during his meeting with Bin Laden is consistent.
Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks

Operatives linked to Usama Bin Laden’s organization expect the near-term attacks they are planning to have dramatic consequences, such as major casualties. The up roar in two weeks.

Arabian Peninsula as a likely venue for an anti-US attack. Yemen, Kuwait and Bahrain. Attacks on targets in Israel, Jordan, and Europe also could occur.

Events such as the G-8 summit in Genoa next month would be inviting targets.
Multiple reports indicate that extremists expect Bin Ladin to launch attacks over the coming days, possibly against US or Israeli interests. Bin Ladin was in hiding.

An Arabic news channel reported on Monday that Bin Ladin had gone into hiding in Afghanistan because he feared a US airstrike.

The time frame may be flexible. US facilities have been warned of the threat and are heightening security, which could delay an attack because operatives would need to revise their plans.
Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threats Are Real

The US is not the target of a disinformation campaign by Usama Bin Ladin. A warning of near-term attacks against US and Israeli interests is consistent with public statements issued by his organization, and his current motivations.

-- Bin Ladin’s aides last week told a journalist to expect attacks against US and Israeli targets during the next two weeks, a bold move that risks Bin Ladin’s credibility if he fails to follow through.

-- The Taliban had insisted that Bin Ladin avoid linking himself directly to attacks, but his public anti-US speeches in recent months, including multiple statements implying involvement in the USS Cole bombing, indicate he no longer feels bound by such constraints.

-- The war in Chechnya and violence between Israelis and Palestinians have increased competition for funding and recruits among Sunni extremists during the past year, ratcheting up pressure on Bin Ladin to mount an attack soon.

The passage of a week since the warning that an attack would occur within one or two days does not signal a diminished danger. Other threats point to a longer time frame more attacks are planned for a later date.

-- Bin Ladin’s operatives closely monitor security measures at their intended targets. They may have delayed an attack until conditions are more favorable or alternative targets are identified.

Bin Ladin’s increasingly inflammatory rhetoric may be intended to ensure he gets credit for impending attacks and to reinforce his image in the event of US retaliation as a heroic figure standing up to US aggression. Bin Ladin must make an especially strong case to receive credit for an anti-Israeli attack, which might otherwise be attributed to other terrorists, such as Lebanese Hizballah or Palestinian groups.

Bin Ladin must make an especially strong case to receive credit for an anti-Israeli attack, which might otherwise be attributed to other terrorists, such as Lebanese Hizballah or Palestinian groups.
Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay

Attacks planned by Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaeda organization may have been delayed by heightened US security, the attacks will occur soon. Necessary to pursue jihad against Americans and that operations would soon be carried out against US and Jewish interests.
Terrorism: Bin Laden Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned

Results could still be expected. US security measures would delay operations, but that plans to attack are still in train. Unspecified things were moving at a fast pace,
Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing

Indicates that an Usama Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operation has been postponed still planned but had been delayed a few months.

Preparations for other attacks remain in train. Suspicious activity continued late last week

Longer-term planning for terrorist operations against US and Israeli interests also continues,
Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in the US

Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."

-- A service reported that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit an operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt at a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam says that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but also that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

-- Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

His attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 show that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled the Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qaeda members, including some US citizens, have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure here. Two al-Qaeda members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

-- A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Usama Bin Laden

1. We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Laden. Our work to date has been remarkable and in some instances heroic, yet each day we all acknowledge that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously experienced.

2. We must now redouble our efforts against Bin Laden himself, his infrastructure, followers, finances, etc. with a sense of enormous urgency.

3. We must acknowledge that our efforts can no longer be solely relied upon to bring Bin Laden to justice. As a result, we must now pursue multiple paths simultaneously. This should include:

   a. Discussions with all liaison services who may have a capability to capture and render Bin Laden to justice.

   b. Active and immediate efforts to ensure that we are able to provide the military with timely and accurate information for targeting purposes against Bin Laden.

   c. Immediate operational exploitation, planning and threat warning partners.

   both unilaterally and in concert with liaison
e. We need to immediately push the rest of the collection community to make Bin Ladin and his infrastructure our top priority. I want Charlie Allen to immediately chair a meeting with NSA, NIMA, CITO, and others—to ensure that we are doing everything we can to meet CTC's requirements.

f. I want to know that we are pursuing all available conventional and special collection methods to get after Bin Ladin, his infrastructure, people and money.

g. We need an immediate engagement with Special Operations Command and all DoD collection assets/programs, SAPs, etc. which may be of assistance to our efforts.

4. (TS) We need an integrated plan which captures these elements and others which may be appropriate. This plan must be fully coordinated with the FBI.

5. (TS) We are at war. The DDCI will chair the group to coordinate the actions proposed above and any other actions which may be possible. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community:

George J. Tenet

cc: Counselor to the DCI
Bin Laden Determined To Strike in US

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Laden implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the lightning to America.”

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Laden told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told a service at the same time that Bin Laden was planning to exploit the operative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1998 may have been part of Bin Laden’s first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressam says Bin Laden was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Laden associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa’ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa’ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Laden cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a service in 1998 saying that Bin Laden wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Shaykh” Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

continued
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.
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National Security Information

Approved for Release

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Date: 25-April-2012

Top Secret

(Security Classification)
6 January 1997

Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?

Summary

agents of Usama Bin Ladin purchased a container of uranium but bogus nuclear material

efforts by Bin Ladin suggests he is taking steps to develop the capability to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—possibly involving chemical agents and biological toxins as well as nuclear material—for terrorist operations, or may plan to give these substances to supporters.
effort by Bin Ladin's agents in 1994 to purchase uranium:

in a metallic cylinder

bogus weapons-grade nuclear material
information from the past several years tying Bin Ladin to other efforts to acquire WMD capabilities:

The possibility of mounting operations with WMD was exploring

To What End?

Bin Ladin's stated intention to undertake hostile acts against the US presence in the Persian Gulf region—based as it is on an implacable antipathy toward the United States—could be abetted strongly by access to WMD material.

- In public statements made in late November, Bin Ladin warned that "qualitative operations" would be necessary to pursue "a real battle between the Islamic Nation and US forces." We do not know exactly what Bin Ladin might be threatening or how serious he is about following threats with action.

Targeting US interests in the Persian Gulf.
Subject: Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?

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TOP SECRET
Subject: Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?

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1 - H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
1 - LTG Patrick M. Hughes, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
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5. EO 12958 3.5(c)
6. EO 12958 6.2(c)

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DATE: 25-April-2012
Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?

Summary

agents of Usama Bin Ladin purchased a container of uranium, but also nuclear material. Efforts by Bin Ladin suggest he is taking steps to develop the capability to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—possibly involving chemical agents and biological toxins as well as nuclear material—for terrorist operations, or may plan to give these substances to supporters.
Pursuing WMD?

An effort by Bin Laden's agents in 1994 to purchase uranium:

in a metallic cylinder

bogus weapons-grade nuclear material
information from the past several years tying Bin Ladin to other efforts to acquire WMD capabilities.

To What End? 

Bin Ladin's stated intention to undertake hostile acts against the US presence in the Persian Gulf region—based as it is on an implacable antipathy toward the United States—could be abetted strongly by access to WMD material.

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Targeting US interests in the Persian Gulf.
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10

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Warning

1. I have reviewed the report of the Task Force on Improving Intelligence Warning and believe that the Task Force has done the Intelligence Community an important service both in highlighting the deficiencies in the present warning system and also in making proposals for a new and invigorated approach to this problem.

2. In keeping with the report of the Task Force, but also drawing on a number of the very useful comments that have been provided from throughout the Community, I have decided the following:

   -- First, appropos of both the Task Force report and a number of comments, warning needs to be further defined in order to make the system work and be responsive. Warning is not the same as the entire universe of contemporary intelligence. The term "warning," as it applies to intelligence, means to sound an alarm, to give notice, to give admonishing advice to policymakers. It connotes urgency and implies the potential need for policy action in response. It is a different intelligence function than simply informing policymakers or enhancing their understanding of an issue or development. For the purposes of this decision memorandum, warning would include identifying or forecasting events that could cause the engagement of US military forces (from the scale of embassy evacuations to larger military activities) and of events that would have a sudden deleterious effect on US foreign policy and security (e.g., coups, third party wars, refugee surges, and so forth). The National Intelligence Warning function should be limited to possible developments no more than six months in the future.

   -- In keeping with Recommendation 1 of the Task Force report, I explicitly endorse a comprehensive strategy for the Community, including improved Community-wide support to the DCI in this connection; improved accountability for warning intelligence efforts through the clear assignment of responsibilities and periodic performance
SUBJECT: Warning

evaluations; establishment of an integrated analytical program for warning intelligence production combining both line units and elements dedicated to warning assessments; the sharing of Community-wide alternative warning assessments; and improved quality of intelligence warning analysis through sustained training of analysts augmented by methodology research.

The NIO for Warning (NIO/W) will continue to serve as my and the Community's principal advisor on warning. This individual will be the principal substantive advisor on warning issues to the DCI and to the NFIB, and will provide advice to each of the NFIP components on their respective roles and postures for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. The duties of this officer will include:

- Assure that the DCI is provided intelligence warning, in a timely manner, that is relevant to senior policymakers' interests and to national level policy issues. The NIO/W's primary responsibility in this sphere is to ensure that a process is in place that supports the DCI with warning assessments on a Community-wide basis—a process that results in: assessments that are full-ranged regarding all reasonably possible scenarios; assessments that are either prepared by or under the NIOs' direction, or that include their views; and that allow the NIO/W to add his or her personal assessment when the NIO/W judges the Community product to be incomplete or even misleading.

- Influence warning-related intelligence collection both informally and through the National Intelligence Collection Board.

- Assure that timely intelligence warnings are disseminated to consumers in a progressive fashion, keyed to the pace of a developing situation.

- Provide guidance to warning elements of Community components to ensure that all their efforts are mutually complementary, inclusive of the needs of all priority consumers, and responsive to the strategic objectives cited above.
SUBJECT: Warning

- Monitor the operations of these Community component warning elements within the context of their participation in the National Intelligence Warning System, particularly with respect to sharing new and alternative warning assessments and supporting the preparation of national warning products.

- Advise the NFIP principals and the directors of their components on their operational roles, training programs and overall posture for supporting the National Warning System.

- Coordinate closely with the designated warning elements of the Intelligence Community.

- Report periodically to the DCI, the NFIC and other concerned departments on the Community's performance with respect to intelligence warning as well as on future warning intelligence requirements.

I am not persuaded that it is necessary at this point to create another Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council to carry out the warning function. I intend to give the NIO/W the authority necessary to carry out the responsibilities described above. If that proves insufficient, then changes in status can always be made.

- Each major NFIP component should establish or designate an element whose mission is to act as the focal point for warning within that organization and to work with its counterparts in other organizations that collectively constitute the National Intelligence Warning System. These elements will constitute the Warning Community and will remain under the operational control and management of their parent organizations, but should be responsive to the general guidance provided by the NIO/W. These organizations should:

- Perform and monitor investigative intelligence analyses directed at identifying and/or tracking potential warning concerns, in response to guidance provided by, among others, the NIO/W.
SUBJECT: Warning

- Make internal line units aware of the dynamic warning interests of consumers in order to better posture these units for initiating warning assessments that are timely and relevant to consumer interests.

- Act as the organization in question's agent for sharing new and alternative warning assessments, and related time sensitive intelligence, with all counterparts in the interagency warning intelligence network and with the NIX/W.

- Ensure that tailored collection requirements are initiated, and encompass all reasonably possible scenarios that could generate high threat warnings.

- Support the preparation of national warning products by directly participating in their production or by supporting other elements within their organization in their preparation of such products.

- Facilitate the establishment of warning intelligence training programs and the development and appropriate use of warning intelligence methodologies within their organization.

As suggested by the Task Force, there should be the following additional structural changes to the current operation of the National Intelligence Warning System. All major Community components should adopt or reinstitute the practice of designating an officer—presumably the director of its warning element—with specific responsibilities for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. The National Warning/Staff should be transferred to the NIX/W as enhanced support staff. The duties of individual members of this staff should be defined in a complementary fashion so that the NIX/W is assisted by functional experts in his or her many responsibilities. This staff will be co-located with the NIX/W.

3. An essential change in the warning system is that it not exist in isolation from and parallel to the remainder of the analytical and collection community. It is also imperative that

SECRET
SUBJECT: Warning

the warning system trigger actions by the rest of the Community, with respect to both analysis and collection. There must be a mechanism for vetting warning in such a way as to avoid a significant number of false alarms and at the same time ensure that its warnings cannot simply be brushed aside either within the Intelligence Community or the policy community. Accordingly:

-- Warning reports may be initiated either by the NIO/W or, through him, by any warning element of the Intelligence Community.

-- Warning reports growing out of the National Intelligence Warning System will be sent in the first instance to the DCI and principals of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Mechanisms should be created to ensure that such reports are delivered directly to the NFIB principals within the minimum possible amount of time, for example one to two hours after their completion.

-- Upon receipt of the warning report, NFIB agencies will provide to the NIO/W a written reaction to the warning report according to a schedule established by the NIO/W, depending on the urgency of the matter. Simultaneously, the Community Management Staff Deputy for Requirements and Evaluation will provide a report to the NIO/W on the status of collection relating to the subject of the warning report.

-- The NIO/W will summarize these materials (and forward the reactions as well) for the DCI. Depending on the urgency of the matter, the DCI (or the DDCI in his absence) may authorize the dissemination of the warning report to the policy community.

-- The DCI will then decide whether to commission a National Intelligence Estimate on the issue. The warning NIE would address a single warning issue and would be the product of the NIO/W in coordination with the appropriate NIO or NIOs and members of the analytic communities.

-- Authorization of dissemination of a warning report to the policy community or the commissioning of a warning NIE will include direction to intensify collection activities on the subject at hand. Warning-related collection management will be enhanced and focused by the appropriate intelligence agencies. The NIO/W will monitor these collection enhancements.
SUBJECT: Warning

-- With dissemination of a Warning Report or Warning Estimate, the National Intelligence Collection Board will meet to decide on steps for enhancing focused collection on the warning subject.

-- Following the issuance of a warning NIE, the NIO/W may, with the approval of DCI or DDCI, issue a National Intelligence Warning Spot Report to keep pace with and identify warning situations.

-- Every six months, the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council for Evaluation will examine the production of the National Warning System and report to the DCI and NFIB on the performance of the system and experience during the preceding period.

4. The weekly "Watch Report" meeting henceforth will be chaired by the NIO/W, with other participants remaining unchanged.

5. It is important in the warning process that regional NTOs and the line analytical elements of the Intelligence Community be involved, at a minimum, in dialogue by the NIO/W to ensure that the DCI is advised not only of the views of the NIO/W, but those of the line analytic components as well.

6. The measures I have described above should be implemented immediately. The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council will provide a report to the DCI and NFIB principals in 90 days on the establishment of the new National Warning System, together with recommendations for further refinement and adjustments to improve performance.

Robert M. Gates

SECRET
DCI Update
Terrorist Threat Review
28 August 2001

TOP SECRET
Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly

- Islamic fundamentalist travels to US to learn to fly a 747 in Minnesota.
- Pays for training in cash.
- Interested to learn that 747 doors don't open in flight.
- Wanted training on London-JFK flights.
- FBI arrested him based on the fact that he overstayed his 90-day visa.

We are withholding his name at the FBI's request.

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www.intelwire.com
ASSOCIATES OF TERRORIST USAMA BIN LADIN WERE ACTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN. ALL WERE KNOWN AS SENIOR AIDES TO BIN LADIN AND APPEARED TO HOLD SIGNIFICANT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PLANNING TERRORIST OPERATIONS OR SUPERVISING AND TRAINING RECRUITS. ONE TRAVELED FREQUENTLY TO THE UNITED STATES AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR SOME OF HIS ASSOCIATES.

THE FIRST OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WAS KNOWN AS ((KHALED)) AS WITH ALL OF BIN LADIN'S ASSOCIATES INSIDE AFGHANISTAN, THIS NAME MAY OR MAY NOT BE AN ALIAS. BIN LADIN'S ASSOCIATES OFTEN USE A NUMBER OF NAMES, SOME OF THEM A VARIATION ON THEIR TRUE NAMES, WHEN INTERACTING WITH OTHERS IN THE BIN LADIN NETWORK. KHALED WAS A RELATIVE OF CONVICTED WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBER RAMZI ((Yousef)) AND APPEARED TO A TRUSTED LIEUTENANT OF BIN LADIN.

"KHALED" MAY BE A REFERENCE TO KHALID AL-SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) WHO IS MARRIED TO A RELATIVE OF YOUSEF AND HAS BEEN INDICTED IN U.S. COURTS FOR HIS 1994 INVOLVEMENT IN A PLOT TO BLOW UP U.S. CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT.

AMONG OTHER THINGS, KHALED WAS ACTIVE IN RECRUITING PEOPLE TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING TO THE UNITED STATES, TO CARRY OUT UNSPECIFIED ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF BIN LADIN.

ONCE THEY ARRIVED IN
SECRET

THE UNITED STATES, HE NOTED THAT THEY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH COLLEAGUES ALREADY LIVING THERE. THEY WOULD BE ENGAGED IN PLANNING TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES.
MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin-Ladin, Followers in Training
GMP20010624000131 London MBC Television in Arabic 1800 GMT 24 Jun 01

Reference:
1. MBC Correspondent Says He Has Met Bin-Ladin GMP20010623000150 London MBC Television Arabic 1810 GMT 23 Jun 01

[Corrected version: Video report by MBC correspondent in Afghanistan Bakr Atyani; this report contains photos or other graphic elements; if you see the phrase "Attachment Not Included", you are using a system that cannot display these images.]

[FBIS Translated Text]
The followers of Usamah Bin-Ladin are conducting continuous military maneuvers and training in the desert of Afghanistan in preparation for a military strike against US interests in the world.

The pictures, which MBC obtained from the media office of the Al[0]-Qa'idah[0] Organization, led by Usamah Bin-Ladin, show the size of the military capabilities possessed by this organization.
[Begin Bin-Ladin recording] The only way to defeat this humiliation and infidelity, which prevails in the land of Islam, is through jihad, bullets, and martyrdom operations. [end recording]

In the desert of Qandahar, we were able to meet Usamah Bin-Ladin. The meeting was attended by Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, which recently joined Usamah Bin-Ladin's group, forming what is now known as the Al-Qa'ida Organization. The meeting was also attended by Usamah Bin-Ladin's right-hand man, Abu-Hafs, who preferred not to appear on camera.

The journey to the headquarters of Usamah Bin-Ladin in the Qandahar desert from the center of the city of Qandahar lasted for three hours. We were taken to the headquarters of Usamah Bin-Ladin in a car with darkened windows. Following strict security measures and thorough search we were allowed to meet Usamah.

Bin-Ladin was happy at the statements of his followers that the next weeks will witness important surprises and that US and Israeli interests in the world will be targeted. He refused to make any comment on this because the Taleban Movement bans him from making any press statements.

[Begin Taleban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil recording] The government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will never allow any person to use its territory to strike against or threaten the interests of any country in the world. It will also not allow that its country be used for any terrorist action. [end recording]

Observers believe that the current tension between Usamah Bin-Ladin and the United States could lead to an explosion that could take place at any moment, especially since the US troops stationed in the Middle East have been put on a state of alert for fear of an attack or in preparation for a military strike against Usamah Bin-Ladin's positions.

Abu-Hafs, Bin-Ladin's right-hand man, told us: We are ready for any surprise. We are ready to vacate our positions in less than half an hour if the United States attempts to bomb our positions.

[Begin Bin-Ladin recording] Men should send their sons to the fields of battle and confrontation so that they can receive military training to champion the religion of [Prophet] Muhammad, may God's peace and blessings be upon him. [end recording]

The coming days will answer the question: Who will strike first and what form will it take?

1. click here to view bin-ladin's followers defusing a bomb
2. click here to view bin-ladin's men in training and bin-ladin speaking with a map behind him
3. click here to view bin-lading and al-zawahiri sitting next to each other and speaking to mbc correspondent
4. click here to view bin-ladin sitting at a table and speaking into a microphone
5. click here to view bin-ladln's men in training

6. click here to view bin-ladln speaking into a microphone

7. click here to view bin-ladln's men storming a house with rifles in their hands

[Description of Source: London MBC Television in Arabic -- Saudi-Financed, Covering Events in the Arab World]

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Unclassified
Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitate Al-Qaeda Travel

6 December 2002

Al-Qaeda uses fraudulently acquired Saudi passports to document its operatives and facilitate international travel. Some of the passports are stolen, issued to terrorists under false pretense.

Forgers fraudulently issue or alter these passports to create false identities, impersonate other citizens, and conceal suspicious travel.

Thousands of Saudi Passports Lost or Stolen

Saudi passports have been lost or stolen in recent years.

Saudi blanks are particularly problematic because they lack the document control number normally used for tracking their disposition before issuance.

This report was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(e)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 25-April-2012
In late 2001, the Saudi Government began a transition to new style passports that are more difficult to fraudulently issue or alter because they incorporate a number of significant security features.
TERRORISM: Terrorism: Bin Laden Threatening To Attack US Aircraft

TERRORISM: Terrorism: Bin Laden Threatening To Attack US Aircraft

Terrorist financier Usama Bin Laden in an interview published this week with a US journalist indicated he may attack a US military passenger aircraft using antiaircraft missiles. His comments follow those he made at a press conference last month in which he indicated the results of his jihad would be visible "within weeks."

- Authorities in Saudi Arabia arrested members of a Bin Laden network and seized antitank missiles

If Bin Laden's organization has antiaircraft missiles, the risk to US aircraft would be greatest in Saudi Arabia, where Bin Laden has support and infrastructure, but US aircraft also could be targeted elsewhere in the Gulf region. Bin Laden directed most of the rhetoric in his press conference last month toward the US military in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi regime.

- Last month he claimed to have almost completed preparations for an attack against the US this month, indicated such an attack would occur in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait

There have been previous indications but no strong evidence that Bin Laden has considered targeting US military personnel in the UAE.
Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa’ida Train on the Run?
Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa’ida Train on the Run?

Key Findings (U)

Al-Qa’ida used its sanctuary and network of training facilities in Afghanistan not only to impart the skills necessary to carry out terrorist operations and jihad but also to select and vet terrorist recruits, foster a jihadist lifestyle, build commitment to the cause, and develop liaison relationships with other groups.

Al-Qa’ida’s Afghanistan camps played a central, if not a crucial role in the planning of the 11 September attacks and in the selection and training of cadres to execute the plot.

- In their Afghanistan haven, the organizers and masterminds were able to exchange views at length in face-to-face meetings as the plot took final shape in the Ramadan 1999/2000 time period.

- The in-person meetings greatly reduced the risk of discovery that more remote communications—by cell phone or Internet, for example—would have entailed.

- Although al-Qa’ida could still exploit the open society in the United States to repeat a terrorist act on the scale and with the complexity of 11 September, it will be much harder to assemble as well-trained and carefully selected a team as the 19 hijackers without a safehaven comparable to Afghanistan.

A variety of sources suggest that, after the plot was set in motion in December 1999, the selection process for members of the “second wave” of hijackers—the support team for the pilots—also took place in Afghanistan and that it involved direct contact with the al-Qa’ida leadership, including Bin Ladin.

and that Bin Ladin personally interviewed and assessed each applicant.

in the past year al-Qa’ida has set up small, temporary pockets of training in
The group is a long way, however, from recreating the comprehensive training program it had in the Afghanistan camps. In the short run, al-Qa'ida can feed off the fruits of its labor in Afghanistan to maintain its operations and conduct small-scale training. The organization trained people in its camps in Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001. Most of the trainees received only basic training, but experienced trainers from those camps are now scattered to other locations where new training activities have been reported.

- Al-Qa'ida members can train with or provide trainers to allied terrorist groups.
- Al-Qa'ida and associated groups are using a number of venues for small training efforts, including madrasas, refugee camps, secluded compounds in areas under limited government control, schools, mosques, apartments, and the Internet. The training of a handful of men for terrorist operations is difficult to detect.

Over the long run, al-Qa'ida's failure to find a safehaven in which to reestablish its full training programs will affect the nature of the organization, its ability to carry out complex operations such as the 11 September attacks, and its standing among associated terrorist groups. It will be more difficult and risky to bring new recruits into the organization without the lengthy vetting process that was possible in Afghanistan. Senior planners will be less able to observe trainees and choose those best suited to operations. It will be more difficult to create the psychological environment necessary to turn out disciplined terrorist operatives who can carry out complex operations. Finally, al-Qa'ida will increasingly be forced to train with other groups—rather than being in the position to offer other groups training—and thus will lose an important source of leverage and influence in Islamic extremist circles.
Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Findings (U)</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Afghanistan (U)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Candidates</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering in Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Training</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitators and Associates</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Training (U)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picking Up the Pieces (U)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlook (U)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Could Al-Qa'ida Do?</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qaeda Train on the Run?

The Role of Afghanistan (U)

Al-Qaeda's training facilities in Afghanistan served multiple functions—from allowing Bin Laden to forge the organization to acting as the crucible for the 11 September plot. The Afghan training system:

- Imparted the skills necessary to carry out terrorist operations and fight in jihad.
- Allowed careful selection and vetting of terrorist recruits and operatives by the most senior members of the organization.
- Fostered a jihadist lifestyle among all recruits, allowing al-Qaeda leaders to meld men of widely varied backgrounds and nationalities into a focused, single-minded corps.
- Provided the isolation and psychological atmosphere necessary to support classic brainwashing techniques that turned recruits into committed operatives who—like several of the 11 September hijackers—could be trusted to live for several years in the West and still carry out their mission.

Al-Qaeda used its Afghanistan camps as currency to increase its influence with other terrorist groups and to build an international network of trained Islamic terrorists to which al-Qaeda could later turn for support for its operations. According to various intelligence reporting, among the groups that trained in al-Qaeda camps in the past are al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Jamaah Islamiyya (JI). Al-Qaeda also sent trainers to other groups—particularly those in

Southeast Asia—to help set up training programs.

The Afghanistan safehaven was a crucial factor in the planning and implementation of complex operations, including the 11 September attacks. Our analysis, one-and-a-half years after the attacks, indicates the plot was conceived and almost entirely directed from Afghanistan. The safehaven played a key role in the planning and execution of the operation, including the hijackers' selection, indoctrination, training, and initiation into the plot. Even the plot's relatively autonomous senior coordinator, Muhammad Atta, relayed his updates on the situation in the United States and recommendations for changes in the plan to Afghanistan, seeking the input of the al-Qaeda leadership.

Targeted Candidates

Like many other eventual al-Qaeda members, the 11 September hijackers were targeted for recruitment outside of Afghanistan, primarily in Germany and Saudi Arabia, according to a variety of reporting. Al-Qaeda recruiters, trusted clerics, and family recommendations played roles in spotting candidates.

- Muhammad Heydar Zammar, an extremist with suspected al-Qaeda connections

recruited three of the four pilots—

Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah

- Nawaf al-Hazmi probably recommended his brother, Salim al-Hazmi, for recruitment

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to
Several of the Saudis appear to have been recruited from Saudi universities or mosques. Gathering in Afghanistan

Travel to Afghanistan was a critical step in turning al-Qa’ida recruits into committed terrorists. The experience of travel to the “pure Islamic state,” the camaraderie among recruits, and the discipline and commitment exhibited by al-Qa’ida instructors had a powerful influence to it. The time spent in Afghanistan mobilized, radicalized, and transformed the youth.

All 19 hijackers, as well as several of the plot’s main facilitators, spent time in al-Qa’ida training facilities and guesthouses in Afghanistan during the two years before the September 2001 attacks.

The visits of the four pilots to Afghanistan were short relative to those of the “second wave”—the support team for the pilots. Some of the second wave made more than one trip and most stayed many months in the training camps.

Selection

According to a variety of intelligence reporting, while men were recruited worldwide, actual selection into the ranks of al-Qa’ida occurred only in Afghanistan, after the organization had ample opportunity to observe candidates’ performances in training. In Afghanistan, senior planners observed recruits to better match individuals to specific operations and operational environments and chose those best able to blend into the target country.

A variety of sources suggest that, after the plot was set in motion in December 1999, the selection process for members of the “second wave” of hijackers also took place in the Afghanistan camps and that it was thorough and involved direct contact with the al-Qa’ida leadership, including Bin Laden.

We do not know how many potential suicide attackers were evaluated when the team that carried out the 11 September attacks was chosen, but it was a large number.

Controlled Training

Most of the hijackers underwent training similar to that given other al-Qa’ida recruits. The al-Faruq training camp west of Kandahar appears to have been the preferred location for the training and vetting of most second-wave hijackers probably because of its proximity to Bin Ladin and the senior al-Qa’ida leadership. Of the 12 young Saudi hijackers who were in Afghanistan concurrently during the spring of
2001, at least seven underwent the basic training regime at al-Faruq.

- Three other Saudis—Khalid al-Mihdhar, Satam al-Suqami, and Majid Muqied—trained at Khaldan, another large basic regime training camp that was located in Pakita Province south of Kabul.

Al-Qa'ida instructors conducted training in stages designed to winnow out all but the best and most reliable recruits.

- According to a variety of intelligence reporting, all recruits received standardized basic training, including training in firearms, heavy weapons, explosives, and topography. Recruits learned discipline and military life and were subjected to artificial stresses designed to measure their psychological fitness and commitment to jihad. After the initial stage of training, al-Qa'ida instructors chose candidates to be suicide operatives and others physically and emotionally capable of advancing to the next level.

- Advanced training focused on tactical classes, such as explosives handling and detonation, sabotage, and kidnapping. Al-Qa'ida's philosophy was taught along with advanced theological training. Al-Qa'ida also offered this training to recruits from other terrorist groups.

Specialized training—such as surveillance, urban warfare techniques, and the manufacture of explosives—was reserved for al-Qa'ida members who had been selected to participate in terrorist operations and who had pledged bay'at (an oath) to Bin Ladin. Facilitators received tailored training consistent with their specialties, and operatives received training tailored to the specific operations.

The second wave of hijackers engaged in months-long, daily, intensive instruction, which included martial arts, ideological and religious indoctrination, and familiarization with procedures that would allow them to blend in with their surroundings in the United States. They likely were put through physical endurance tests, including food and water deprivation, to test their dedication to the cause and ability to withstand captivity—a common practice at al-Qa'ida training camps.

Al-Hamian, who trained in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000 and swore an oath of allegiance to Bin Ladin, apparently had second thoughts after he made an unapproved visit to his family while on a trip to Saudi Arabia with hijacker Ahmad al-Nami. The two had been instructed to get US visas from the Consulate in Jeddah, but al-Hamian felt misgivings about the suicide mission after speaking with a brother and refused to return with al-Nami to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan offered the second-wave hijackers the opportunity to cement their personal ties and loyalties to each other in a relatively secure location as they absorbed the skills needed to execute the plot. Senior planners could observe potential operatives and assemble a team with complimentary skills. Bin Ladin suggested that the hijacker teams in each aircraft comprise individuals who knew each other well and had formed close bonds during training.
Facilitators and Associates
Several of the plot's key facilitators and members of the Hamburg network also trained in Afghanistan. Like the second-wave hijackers, the visits of the associates and facilitators took place after the Hamburg pilots' travel to Kandahar in late 1999. The Hamburg associates may have made these trips to Afghanistan so that the al-Qa'ida leadership could personally assess their trustworthiness and utility to the unfolding plot.

- Mounir al-Motassadeq, convicted in Germany for his role in supporting the conspiracy, admitted at his trial to having been in Afghanistan from June to August 2000.

- Zaccarias Moussaoui, whose role in the 11 September plot is still being determined, visited Afghanistan in April 1998 and later that year, August through October 1999, and again in December 2000.

Flight Training (U)
although Muhammad Atta instructed the three Hamburg pilots to enroll in flight training, he did not specify where. Plot senior coordinator Muhammad Atta had enough decisionmaking latitude to seek flight instruction in the United States, upon discovering that it was cheaper and shorter in duration than similar training in Europe.

- The three Hamburg pilots used the Internet to research flight schools in the United States, to submit applications for training and, having arrived in the United States, to order flight deck videos from an aviation store in Ohio.

- Al-Qa'ida's continued interest, even after 11 September, in obtaining this kind of training is clear from the discovery of flight training brochures in some of the Afghanistan training camps after the fall of the Taliban.

Picking Up the Pieces (U)
Al-Qa'ida today can draw on numerous resources to provide training outside Afghanistan. The organization trained people in its camps in Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001.

- Experienced trainers from Afghanistan's camps are now scattered in other locations.

The group has extensive contacts with other terrorist groups, including many that are in debt to al-Qa'ida for past aid.

- Al-Qa'ida can utilize a variety of venues for small training programs, including madrasas, refugee camps, secluded compounds in areas under limited government control, schools, mosques, and even apartments.

- Al-Qa'ida sympathizers are also increasingly taking to the Internet to disseminate training materials, such as poison manuals, and conduct online training.
We have no information indicating that al-Qa'ida has been able to recreate anything approaching the large-scale training program it once had in Afghanistan.

However, that al-Qa'ida in the past year and a half has conducted or attempted to conduct short-term, small-scale training in areas where it has a presence. For example:

- Al-Qa'ida and local extremist groups have trained in Pakistani border regions in preparation for launching operations against US and coalition forces and the Afghan Government.
Al-Qa‘ida can feed off the fruits of its past labor in Afghanistan to continue conducting operations and conduct small-scale training in the near term. It probably will be relatively easy to covertly train small groups of terrorists in the skills necessary to conduct operations. The training of a handful of operatives will be difficult to detect.

The orchestration of major attacks, however, will become increasingly difficult without a new safehaven that would give the al-Qa‘ida leadership the freedom to operate and control the plotting.

Without the Afghanistan camps to continue training thousands of men, al-Qa‘ida will have a smaller pool of recruits to choose from. Moreover, if al-Qa‘ida is not able to exercise firm control over its training programs, conduct consecutive courses, and have its senior leaders observe and vet new trainees, it will be more difficult to bring adequately trained new recruits into the organization. Moreover, those who are brought into the group may not enjoy the full confidence of al-Qa‘ida’s senior planners to operate independently over long periods of time with unwavering commitment to the cause.

- Over the long run, the failure to find a safehaven in which to reestablish its training programs will affect the nature of al-Qa‘ida’s organization and the broader extremist community and al-Qa‘ida’s standing among associated terrorist groups.

- Al-Qa‘ida may lose leverage over allies as the global antiterrorist campaign further degrades its ability to provide financial, logistic, and training support to allied groups and to its own fighters.
DCI Counterterrorist Center

*Read and Return*

**Attack on the USS Cole:**

Preliminary Findings

10 November 2000

*Read and Return*
Key Assessment

- Attack on the USS Cole was carried out by a cell comprised of residents of Yemen, some with family ties to Saudi Arabia and to the transnational (mujahidin) network.

- Cell likely had support from Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization.
  - Assessment based on the identities of key suspects in the plot.
  - Intelligence links the key suspects and the operation to al-Qa'ida.
Investigation Results

identified players in the operation.

one is in custody. working to locate the other three.

Suspects' Links to UBL/Mujahidin

Intelligence reporting indicates that each suspect has ties to the transnational mujahidin network and/or al-Qaeda.

- Hassan al-Khamri
- Jamal al-Badawi
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri figured prominently in Africa Embassy bombing investigation and the 1998 plot to smuggle "Sagger" missiles into Saudi Arabia.
Other Intelligence Pointing to a UBL Role

plans for an operation against US Navy by a Bin Laden-affiliated group.
Gaps in the Bin Ladin Case

Caveats:

- Intelligence reporting on the command and control aspects of the operation is not conclusive.

Some names of suspects.
The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen

Summary (U)

The potential for terrorist attacks against US personnel responding to the USS Cole bombing in Aden, Yemen, is high. Attacks may originate from terrorist groups seeking to exploit high-profile targets as well as local extremists opposed to the US presence in Aden.

Terrorist Presence (U)

Aden presents a potentially hostile environment for US government personnel responding to the attack on the USS Cole. Several transnational terrorist groups—including Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization—maintain a presence in Yemen, including some who have targeted US interests in Aden.

- In December 1998 the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), an offshoot of the Yemen Islamic Jihad (YIJ) with ties to transnational Islamic extremists, kidnapped 16 Western tourists, prompting a government rescue effort which resulted in the deaths of some captives. The IAA previously had claimed allegiance to Usama Bin Ladin.

- The IAA had targeted US and UK tourists for kidnapping in part to force the Yemeni Government to release five Britons and an Algerian arrested in Yemen less than a week prior to the Cole attack.

This Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment was initiated by the Chief, DCI Counterterrorist Center, and drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was coordinated by the Community Counterterrorism Board.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 25-April-2012

SECRET

0000571
earlier for allegedly planning bombings and acts of sabotage against Yemeni, US, UN and British targets in Aden.

- In December 1992 three bombs exploded outside the two hotels in Aden. US military personnel supporting Operation Restore Hope in Somalia had been billeted at one of the hotels. Seven people died in the attacks, but no US citizens were injured. Yemeni authorities blamed the attack on the YI...

In addition to domestic terrorists, transnational terrorist groups—including Usama Bin Laden's al-Qa'ida organization—have targeted US interests in Yemen.

- The US Embassy publicly warned US citizens in Yemen of a possible terrorist threat.

Security Environment (U)

Yemen has taken limited steps against terrorists within its borders but faces obstacles to undertaking more sweeping counterterrorist measures. The government does not control large areas of the country, which historically has been dominated by tribes, some of whose leaders sponsor foreign and indigenous Islamic extremists.

As a result, a number foreign terrorists continue to operate in Yemen with little apparent fear of adverse government reaction.

Yemeni Government officials have made a commitment to provide security to US personnel working in Aden, but in the aftermath of the Cole attack their initial support to the US team was slow and inadequate and the team is operating without clearly defined physical security standards. US officials have limited resources on their own to implement...
Threat to US Personnel (U)

Even as US and Yemeni authorities take steps to enhance security, the opportunities for deliberate attacks against US personnel are increasing. The coverage of the ongoing investigation by local and international media is certain to raise the team's profile with the local population and terrorist groups.
Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively (U)

Many Islamic terrorist and extremist groups rely on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for funding, and their exploitation of these organizations is likely to grow.

- NGOs also provide an easily exploitable international network for logistics support, which for many terrorists is more valuable than the funds they may receive through NGOs.

Although there are more than 5,000 Islamic NGOs and charities, only a few dozen support terrorists. Those that do generally fall into three basic categories:

- Large, internationally active organizations headquartered in the Persian Gulf countries, which provide official support to the NGOs. These organizations most often are exploited by individual employees sympathetic to terrorist causes without the knowledge of the organization's leadership. The illicit activity tends to take place at local branch offices rather than at headquarters locations.

- Private NGOs, some of which are headquartered outside the traditional Muslim world. Several offices of these NGOs exist solely to support a militant cause, making them somewhat more susceptible to extremist penetration.

- NGOs closely affiliated with a state sponsor of terrorism.

The availability of funds, cover, and logistics networks makes NGOs an appealing resource for terrorist groups. NGOs typically are awash in money.
logistical support NGOs offer includes cover employment, false documentation, travel facilitation, training, and, in some cases, weapons. Terrorists typically penetrate NGOs by finding individual sympathizers who divert resources in support of the group, but in a few instances, entire NGO offices, including senior management positions, are staffed by extremists.

Most efforts by Persian Gulf states to curb terrorist use of NGOs by restricting the collection of funds within their borders have been ineffective, largely because the steps taken do not address the diversion of resources at the branch offices. Domestic popular support in the Gulf states for the work of Islamic NGOs often outweighs pressure on these governments to improve NGO accountability. Donors may be reluctant to contribute to an NGO publicly linked to terrorism in the aftermath of a specific terrorist incident, but over time these donors tend to believe such cases are rare and that their contributions are going toward the NGO’s legitimate work.

Measures adopted by NGOs to provide greater headquarters oversight of local branches could deter abuse where it is growing the fastest.
Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively (U)
Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively (U)

Most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) worldwide are accredited with the United Nations, and many work with the United Nations High Commission for Relief following natural disasters or other humanitarian crises, providing food, clothing, shelter, immediate medical care, and other social services. The majority of Islamic nongovernmental organizations are educational or charitable non-profit organizations established by Sunni Islamic activists and typically pursue a double agenda—to provide humanitarian relief to needy communities and to spread the Islamic faith as they interpret it. Islamic NGOs also consider the defense of Muslims involved in armed conflicts part of their “humanitarian” duties—explaining why many Islamic NGOs provided support, including weapons, to the Afghan and Bosnian mujahedin forces in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively.

- Despite their nongovernmental status, many Islamic NGOs receive substantial financial support from traditional Muslim government institutions.

Three Types of NGOs Used by Terrorists

Of the more than 6,000 Islamic NGOs and charities, only a few dozen—which fall into three basic categories—support terrorists.

The first group includes the large, internationally active NGOs based in Saudi Arabia or one of the Persian Gulf states that are exploited by individual employees with ties to extremists. These NGOs receive the political—and sometimes financial—support of their host governments. Terrorist abuse of such NGOs takes place at the local branch office rather than at the organizations’ headquarters. Senior NGO leaders usually are unwitting of the activity and willing to take corrective action when apprised of the abuse.
The second type of NGO terrorists use are the private organizations—some also are headquartered in the Persian Gulf countries—that either have opened offices in areas of military conflict involving Muslims or have grown out of such conflicts. The outbreak of the Balkans conflict in the mid-1990s increased significantly the number of these organizations, as Islamic activists opened Europe-based NGOs to aid Bosnian Muslims.

- The Pakistan-based Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) is the premier example of this type of NGO. Established in Peshawar in 1984 by Usama Bin Ladin and Palestinian Abdallah Azzam to facilitate the travel and training of Arab volunteers to fight with the mujahidin in Afghanistan, the NGO has opened new offices in at least 20 countries since the mid-1980s.
Finally, the third type of NGO terrorists use is one that maintains a close affiliation with a state sponsor of terrorism and often acts more as a foreign policy or intelligence tool of the state sponsors, particularly Iran, Sudan, and Libya.  

Many Islamic terrorist and extremist organizations use NGOs to fund their activities. For many terrorists, NGOs represent a dependable, and seemingly endless, resource base. The popularity of the legitimate charitable work performed by most NGOs ensures their staying power and ability to raise money.

2 The US Department of State reviews states suspected of sponsoring terrorism and provides an official list of these annually. Currently, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba are on that list. (U)
Using a number of NGOs affords terrorist groups protection from potential financial disruptions, such as from the closure of any one NGO.

NGOs also have provided terrorist and extremist groups with logistical support, which in many cases may be more valuable than outright funding. Several Islamic NGOs offer terrorists cover employment, false documentation, travel facilitation, training, and in some cases, weapons.
Case Study: Bin Ladin Use of al-Haramayn

Usama Bin Ladin has established close relationships with employees in several al-Haramayn offices and has used these ties to divert resources to support his terrorist agenda. Members of Bin Ladin's organization, either planted or coopted by Bin Ladin after they began working for the NGO.
Extremists have capitalized on the international status of many NGOs to maintain cells and secure safe havens in several countries. Most Islamic charitable NGOs are accredited with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which gives them credentials terrorists can use to travel more freely across borders and to establish cells in new areas under the guise of pursuing a humanitarian mission.

Various Methods of Infiltrating NGOs

Terrorist groups typically exploit NGOs by establishing a close relationship with an NGO employee who sympathizes with their cause. The sympathizer then diverts NGO funds or logistics support to the terrorist group, usually in small amounts to avoid detection by NGO management.
In a few cases, NGO offices are staffed almost entirely by extremists, probably the result of sympathizers convincing their colleagues to engage in the illicit activity or senior managers directing their subordinates.

State sponsors increasingly have turned to private NGOs to hide their involvement in terrorism.

Bin Ladin apparently has created his own NGOs and planted members of his organization, al-Qa‘ida, in others.
Mixed Results in Curbing Terrorist Use of NGOs

**Minimal Efforts by Donor States.** Efforts by Persian Gulf states to curb NGO support to terrorists have had limited impact and are only partially enforced. Control measures adopted in the past few years whose citizens are the major source of funding for Islamic NGOs—focus on the collection of funds within their countries only, offering no oversight of the finances once the money reaches branch offices or recipients abroad.
Several factors work against a stronger response from host countries.
• Separating funding used for illicit versus legitimate activities is difficult. No method currently exists to ensure that funds collected in the Gulf states by NGOs are not diverted to terrorists or their supporters in the branch offices.

• Even if host countries controlled the donor collection process, terrorists could still use local branch offices for logistics support.

• The popularity of Islamic NGOs in the traditional Muslim world, with their religious and humanitarian mandates, makes strong actions a tough sell to local constituencies. Gulf state governments, in particular, may fear that efforts to control NGOs or pressure them to control themselves would be viewed by the public as limiting the organizations' ability to perform its legitimate tasks.

**Actions Against Individual Abusers a Successful Tactic.** The greatest success against terrorist abuse of NGOs has come in the form of legal or official action against individuals. Such action not only disrupts temporarily the terrorists' flow of support, but the resulting negative publicity also has forced some NGOs to monitor their personnel more closely to avoid losing donors.

Closing an entire NGO branch office has proven a significant—though sometimes temporary—disruption to terrorists, forcing extremists in the vicinity to scale back their activities.
Unfavorable publicity concerning terrorist-ridden local branches or individual extremists employed by NGOs could persuade NGO headquarters' elements to improve their oversight of employment and travel documentation and the accountability of funds. Moreover, donor or host nations could take advantage of
Subject: Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively (U)

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<td>Leon Fuerth</td>
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1 - Dale Watson, Deputy Assistant Director for Terrorism

National Security Agency

1 - Director, NSA

Department of Energy

Department of Justice

1 - Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division

Department of Treasury
Masood

- Promising initial locational reporting

- ALEC Station's locational reporting will no longer be singlethreaded
Is UBL Leaving Afghanistan?

- Some Taliban reportedly contemplating how to effect his departure.

**Assessment:**
- As long as Mullah Umar holds on to power, Bin Laden is most likely to stay in Afghanistan.
- Once Bin Laden leaves Afghanistan, his moratorium on terrorist strikes will be moot.
TO: PRIORITY NIMA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC, DIA/NSA, ANCHORY POL GEORGE G MEADE MD, SECSTATE WASH/DC/INR/DSIA/SCT/DC, DIA WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC, DA AES WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, DIRNAVCRIMINUS NAV WASHINGTON DC//ATAC/0022/, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAP WASHINGTON DC, JWAC DAHLGREN VA//J2//DC, DEPT OF TREASURY, DOEHQ//IN/, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SECRET SERVICE//ID/, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR/, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC//OI/, US CUSTOMS SERVICE W, COGARD INTELSURCEN WASHINGTON DC, DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60/, FAA NATIONAL HQ, US NRC WDC, NRO WASHINGTON DC//OS-HCO//

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 25-April-2012

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SUBJ: TERRORISM: DISCOVERY THAT 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 HIJACKER MOHAMED ATTA DID NOT TRAVEL TO THE CZECH REPUBLIC ON 31 MAY 2000


INITIAL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING TERRORIST ATTA'S PRESENCE IN 31 MAY 2000 WERE INCORRECT.
BASED ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THE KIDNAPPER OF AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT NUMBER 11, ATTA, WAS IN THE TRANSIT LOUNGE ON 31 MAY 2000.

1 JUNE 2000: ATTA REQUESTED A CZECH VISA IN BONN, WHICH WAS ISSUED TO HIM BECAUSE OF HIS LONG-TERM RESIDENCY IN GERMANY. ATTA THEN PURCHASED A BUS TICKET.

2 JUNE 2000: AT APPROXIMATELY 0615 HOURS, ATTA ARRIVED IN PRAGUE. EITHER ATTA OR SOMEONE ELSE PURCHASED A TICKET IN HIS NAME FOR CZECH AIRLINES FLIGHT.

3 JUNE 2000: ATTA TRAVELED FROM PRAGUE TO NEWARK, NEW JERSEY VIA CZECH AIRLINES FLIGHT 52.
SECRET

TO: IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, SECSTATE WASHDC//INR/, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, DIRNSA, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SECRET SERVICE//ID/, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR/, FAA NATIONAL HQ, DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//, USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL, USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB

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PLANNING BY USAMA BIN LADIN TO HIJACK U.S. AIRPLANE; SUCCESSFUL CIRCUMVENTION OF SECURITY MEASURES IN U.S. AIRPORT

2 of 4
BIN LADIN WAS PLANNING TO EXECUTE NEW OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES (U.S.) TARGETS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PLANS TO HIJACK A U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE PROCEEDING WELL. TWO INDIVIDUALS FROM THE RELEVANT OPERATIONAL TEAM IN THE U.S. HAD SUCCESSFULLY EVaded SECURITY CHECKS DURING A TRIAL RUN AT "NEW YORK AIRPORT". BIN LADIN HOPED THAT THE OPERATION WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE THE START OF RAMADAN.

CIRCA 20 DECEMBER.) THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION IS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF BLIND SHAYKH 'UMAR AHMAD 'ABD AL-((RAHMAN)), RAMZI ((Yousef)) AND MUHAMMAD SADIQ ((ODEH)), A SUSPECT IN THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN NAIROBI, KENYA. YOUSEF AND RAHMAN WERE CONVICTED OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING IN NEW YORK. MOHAMMAD SADIQ ODEH WAS ARRESTED...
Intelligence Report

DCI Counterterrorist Center

12 April 2001

Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target

Usama Bin Ladin's financial assets are difficult to track because he uses a wide variety of mechanisms to move and raise money. By using a combination of traditional banks, money couriers, underground bankers—known as hawala dealers—and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to transfer funds, he capitalizes on a large, difficult-to-identify network with few long-lasting nodes for penetration.

- Couriers and hawala dealers are used to move funds leaving behind no paper trail. The wide use of hawala dealers in the Gulf and South Asia make it difficult to determine which are moving money for legitimate purposes and which are moving money for terrorist-related activities.

- Bin Ladin further distances himself from fund transfers undertaken for him by using financial lieutenants, members of al-Qaeda, trusted sympathizers, and even businessmen who may not know they are moving money for al-Qaeda.

- NGOs pose a significant problem because the majority of the work they do is legitimate. Bin Ladin associates or supporters funnel money to Bin Ladin, often under

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the guise of humanitarian aid. These transfers are difficult to stop because we are unable to distinguish between funds earmarked for legitimate humanitarian purposes and those that support terrorist activities.

We have identified a number of sources of income for Bin Ladin, including NGOs, sympathetic donors, personal investments, commercial activities, and even drug trafficking. It is difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy what percentage each contributes to his overall financial position, but his assets are sufficiently diversified that eliminating access to one or two of these sources would not appreciably reduce the operational capabilities of his organization. Al-Qaeda has shown that it is skilled at adapting to varying conditions and will seek out alternative sources of income if necessary.

Gaps in our understanding contribute to the difficulty we have in pursuing the Bin Ladin financial target. We presently do not have the reporting to determine how much of Bin Ladin's personal wealth he has used or continues to use in financing his organization; we are unable to estimate with confidence the value of his assets and net worth; and we do not know the level of financial support he draws from his family and other donors sympathetic to his cause.
Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target

Usama Bin Ladin's finances have become increasingly difficult to track since he moved to Afghanistan in 1996, and al-Qa'ida began shifting its financial activities underground. The shift was due in large part to the organization's increased need for security following the US Embassy bombings, its reluctance to rely on Afghanistan's rudimentary banking system, and a more cautious approach to operating businesses following Bin Ladin's abrupt departure from Sudan—where he reportedly was forced to liquidate most of his assets at a loss. Because it is now difficult to attribute directly any business holding or bank account to Bin Ladin or his organization, we focus on identifying the key players, his funds, and the mechanisms he uses to move them. In addition, the international community specifically targeted Bin Ladin's finances late last year by passing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 which calls on all members states to freeze any funds associated with al-Qa'ida. This likely will cause Bin Ladin and his associates to be even more discreet with their financial practices.

Tracking Bin Ladin's Funds - A Moving Target

Bin Ladin's extensive financial network uses a number of mechanisms to transfer the funds necessary to conduct al-Qa'ida's activities. Among these are underground bankers known as hawala dealers, money couriers, and financial lieutenants who oversee financial transfers, open bank accounts, and ensure that funds arrive at their appropriate destination. In addition, numerous supporters and sympathizers of al-Qa'ida take advantage of their positions with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and charitable organizations to secretly divert funds to Bin Ladin and his associates without the knowledge of senior NGO officials. The wide-ranging mechanisms used to transfer funds are difficult to track.
Money Changers and Hawala Dealers.

Bin Ladin depends on an unspecified number of key money changers and hawala dealers in Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to help al-Qa'ida remit and receive funds. These money changers and hawala dealers are used widely in the Gulf and South Asia and can remit funds anywhere in the world. Their popularity likely stems from the fact that they leave virtually no paper trail and conduct business on the basis of trust. Once the money they have transferred reaches its chosen destination, it is hand-carried by a trusted associate and delivered to its intended recipient. Because Bin Ladin uses numerous, interchangeable hawala dealers and couriers, it is difficult to track this transfer mechanism.
Financial Lieutenants. Bin Ladin makes the final decision on how funds are spent, but he entrusts key lieutenants with various aspects of his financial network, including fundraising, investing, and funding transfers. Bin Ladin, by using these trusted individuals, Bin Ladin is able to distance himself and his name from the source of the funds, further complicating our ability to track his finances.

NGOs. Terrorist funds that flow through NGOs are hard to track because the majority of the money moving through the NGOs is for legitimate humanitarian needs. The funds earmarked for humanitarian purposes are co-mingled with those slated for nefarious purposes, making it extremely difficult to identify and seize funds directly linked to terrorist activities.
Sources of Financial Support for Bin Ladin

NGOs, Saudi citizens, and sympathetic donors raise funds for Bin Ladin at the grassroots level.

Investments, commercial activities, and drug trafficking also provide Bin Ladin with a flow of funds.

NGOs: Bin Ladin associates and supporters use the fundraising capabilities of a number of NGOs to collect donations for Bin Ladin and his organization.
Sympathetic Donors. Bin Ladin has a vast network of sympathizers who provide his organization with financial support.
We do not have enough information to quantify accurately the value of Bin Ladin's assets.

We do not know the level of financial support that Bin Ladin draws from family accounts in the Kingdom and his interest in his family's construction business.
Identifying Al-Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report

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EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(e)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)
Identifying Al-Qaeda's Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report

Key Findings (U)

Wealthy individuals in the Arabian Peninsula and grassroots supporters from around the world are critical funding sources for al-Qaeda.
Identifying Al-Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report

Donors generally channel money intended for terrorist-related activities through middlemen—including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), mosques, fundraisers, and businessmen—rather than giving the funds directly to Bin Laden or other senior al-Qa'ida members. This practice hides the donors' role and allows them to deny knowing funds went to terrorists.

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome.
Charity: The Third Pillar of Islam (U)

Charity is one of the principal duties of all Muslims as stated in the Quran. Alms-giving is divided into the obligatory (zakat) and the voluntary (sadaqa), but the distinction is not always maintained. Zakat is a religiously mandated charitable obligation on all Muslims.

Sadaqa, unlike Zakat, is a voluntary donation made to anyone at any time of the year in any amount. In Arabic, Sadaqa means "charity."

Devout Muslims give their contributions directly to Islamic organizations and needy individuals or, in some countries, to a government-run fund, which organizes the collection and distribution of charitable donations.

Mosques, terrorist groups receive funding and logistical support from Islamic clergy (imama) and other personnel at mosques.

Mosques and Islamic cultural centers with radical members sent donations to extremist groups.

Collecting money from a mix of small and large personal and corporate donations and giving the money to couriers for delivery.

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Other Facilitators. Donors also use fundraisers and facilitators—merchants and businessmen—to route money to terrorist groups.
Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam - An Update
Overview of Today’s Briefing

- Status of the Investigation
- Usama Bin Ladin as a Worldwide Threat
- Probable Reaction to a Strike Against Usama Bin Ladin at Khowst
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Bombings

Status of the Investigation
Leads Point to Usama Bin Ladin and Associates

- All credible intelligence links bombings to prime suspects: Bin Ladin and the Egyptian groups al-Jihad and al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya
Bin Ladin sponsored bombings reportedly planning to bomb embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam

- Man injured in Nairobi blast appears linked to Bin Ladin
Usama Bin Ladin

Worldwide Terrorist Threat
Promoting Universal Jihad

• Goal of Worldwide Islamic government
• Strategy:
  – "Liberate" Saudi Arabia and Palestine
  – Fight against "dictators"
  – Promote unity among extremist groups
• Formed "International Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders"
Ties to Extremists and Presence Worldwide

- North and Sub-Saharan Africa
- Yemeni, Saudi, Omani
- Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian
- Southeast Asia
- Mujahedin groups in Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Kosovo
- North America and Europe
Bin Ladin: Links to Terrorism

- World Trade Center, Manila Air, OPM/SANG
- Attacks on US in Somalia and Yemen
- Assassination attempts
- Less destructive attacks in

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Bin Ladin: Casts US as Enemy

• Bin Ladin blames United States for Muslim problems
• Declared war on the US in 1996
  – Decreed in February 1998 that Muslims kill Americans and their allies, including civilians
  – Promised results of this declaration “within weeks” in May 1998
Probable Reaction to Strike Against Usama Bin Ladin in Khowst
Some Form of Retaliation
Virtually Assured

- Retaliatory attack by supporters almost a certainty
- Anti-US violence in Pakistan likely
- Follow-on actions by Bin Ladin’s organization still possible
- Exact response based on whether Bin Ladin, senior colleagues, leaders of other groups, and families are killed
Strike at Khowst May Affect Bin Ladin’s Allies

- Broad range of nationalities train at the camps
- A number of Islamic extremists likely present at the sites
Factors Affecting the Timing and Targets for Retaliation

- Disruptive effect of Bin Ladin's death or capture in the operation
- Emergence of a strong replacement from among his followers
- Effectiveness of separate effort to neutralize his worldwide network
Post-Bin Ladin Splits Still Pose Dangers to the US

- Less likely, but Bin Ladin's organization could break into factions
- Lack of central authority could cause some factions to retaliate quickly
- US official presence and civilians at risk worldwide, but especially in Arabian Peninsula and Pakistan
SUBJECT: DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Laden

FROM: Chief, Counterterrorist Center

1. Currently, we have acquired information regarding his local movements, security arrangements, and business activities.

large amounts of money Bin Laden is spending on support for the Taliban. Bottom Line: near to providing real-time information about Bin Laden's activities and travels in Afghanistan.

25 August 1997

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-April-2012
SUBJECT: (S) DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Laden
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EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(e)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)

TOD: 090102Z JAN 97

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WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, SECRET SERVICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH
DC//OIPR//, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEN/DEPT OF
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A FATWA ISSUED BY USAMA ((BIN LADIN))'S ISLAMIC ARMY WHICH ALLOWED FOR ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. MILITARY IN SAUDI ARABIA.

ISLAMIC ARMY'S PLANS FOR AN OPERATION IN SAUDI ARABIA IN LIGHT OF THE FATWA, AS WELL AS THE GROUP'S MOVEMENT OF EXPLOSIVES TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR EXPLOSIVES TRAINING TO IRAN

BIN LADIN BELIEVED THE ISLAMIC ARMY LACKED THE EXPERTISE THEY WERE PLANNING. ENLISTED IRANIAN ASSISTANCE TO TRAIN ISLAMIC ARMY MEMBERS IN EXPLOSIVES TECHNIQUES.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJ: TERRORISM: USAMA BIN LADIN’S FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE EGYPTIAN AL-GAMA’AT AL-ISLAMITYA, AS WELL AS ALGERIAN AND LIBYAN EXTREMISTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
RELEASE DATE: 25-April-2012

BIN LADIN, HIMSELF, PROVIDES THE IG WITH OPERATIONAL FUNDS. THIS MONEY IS USED SPECIFICALLY TO MOUNT TERRORIST ATTACKS.
TO: IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
SECSTATE WASHDC//INR//, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC,
ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC,
CSAF WASHINGTON DC, DIA, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
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DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//, FAA NATIONAL HQ,
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 25-April-2012
DIST: 24 DECEMBER 1998

TIMEFRAME FOR COMPLETION OF HIJACKING OPERATION

2. USAMA ((BIN LADIN)) HOPES TO HAVE COMPLETED THE HIJACK OPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES BY CIRCA 10 JANUARY 1998. THE OPERATION, HOWEVER, MAY HAVE RUN INTO TROUBLE KEY OPERATIVES HAD BEEN ARRESTED AT A SMALL AIRPORT NEAR WASHINGTON, D.C. OR NEW YORK.
TO: IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, SECSTATE WASHDC, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, DIRNSA, SECRET SERVICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR//, ZEN/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA NATIONAL HQ, USCINCSOC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL, USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB

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DIST: 8 JANUARY 1999

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 25-APRIL-2012
THE HIJACKING OPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S.)
WAS STALLED FOLLOWING CONFIRMATION OF THE ARREST OF TWO PERSONS
WHO WERE INVOLVED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DIST: 18 DECEMBER 1998

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: DATE: 25-April-2012
POSSIBLE ARREST OF TWO PERSONS INVOLVED IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PLANNED OPERATION AGAINST AN AIRCRAFT IN THE UNITED STATES. PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN THE NEW YORK AREA, AND MAY HAVE HIT PROBLEMS NEAR WASHINGTON, D.C., OR NEW YORK. NO PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN THE PLAN TO HIJACK U.S. AIRPLANE IN THE UNITED STATES.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)

TO:   DIRNSA, SFCSTATE WASHDC, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA
      WASHINGTON DC, CHQ WASHINGTON DC, CSC WASHINGTON DC, CSAP
      WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, SECRET SERVICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
      INVESTIGATION, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
25-April-2012
SUBJECT:

SUDANSE LINKS TO EGYPT'S GAM'AAT AL- ISLAMIYA AND TRAINING OF EGYPTIANS

1. HAS EXTENSIVE LINKS TO EGYPT'S GAM'AAT AL- ISLAMIYA (GA) PROVIDING WEAPONS INSTRUCTION AND RELIGIOUS TRAINING
SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJ: FUNDING OF THE GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYA BY WEALTHY SAUDI
       OPPOSITIONIST 'USAMA BIN LADEN: COMPOSITION OF SUDANESE
       WIFE OF THE EGYPTIAN GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYA

TEXT: 1. WEALTHY KHARTOUM-BASED SAUDI OPPOSITIONIST 'USAMA
       (BIN LADEN) IS A REGULAR SUPPORTER OF AND CONTRIBUTOR TO THE
       EGYPTIAN GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYA (19)
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks

Reporting [redacted] suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq 'Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) saying that, as of late October, the IG had completed planning for an operation in the US on behalf of Bin Ladin, but that the operation was on hold. A senior Bin Ladin operative from Saudi Arabia was to visit IG counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options—perhaps including an aircraft hijacking.

IG leader Islambuli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during the “next couple of weeks” to free 'Abd al-Rahman and the other prisoners, according to what may be a different source.

The same source late last month said that Bin Ladin might implement plans to hijack US aircraft before the beginning of Ramadan on 20 December and that two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport.

2. Some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack training, according to various sources, but no group directly tied to Bin Ladin’s al-Qaeda organization has ever carried out an aircraft hijacking. Bin Ladin could be weighing other types of operations against US aircraft. According to [redacted], the IG in October obtained SA-7 missiles and intended to move them from Yemen into Saudi Arabia to shoot down an Egyptian plane or, if unsuccessful, a US military or civilian aircraft.

An [redacted] in October told [redacted] that unspecified “extremist elements” in Yemen had acquired SA-7s.

3. [redacted] indicate the Bin Ladin organization or its allies are moving closer to implementing anti-US attacks at unspecified locations, but we do not know whether they are related to attacks on aircraft. A Bin Ladin associate in Sudan late last month told a colleague in Kandahar that he had shipped a group of containers to Afghanistan. Bin Ladin associates also talked about the movement of containers to Afghanistan before the East Africa bombings.

In other [redacted] Bin Ladin associates last month discussed picking up a package in Malaysia. One told his colleague in Malaysia that “they” were in the “ninth month [of pregnancy].”

An alleged Bin Ladin supporter in Yemen late last month remarked to his mother that he planned to work in “commerce” from abroad and said his impending “marriage,” which would take place soon, would be a “surprise.” “Commerce” and “marriage” are codewords for terrorist attacks.

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The author can be reached [redacted].
TO:  IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, SECSTATE WASHDC,
DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA AHIS WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC,
CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, DIRNSA,
TREASURY DEPT, DOE HQ, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
SECRET SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR//, DIRNACIC,
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA NATIONAL HQ.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
25-April-2012
TERRORISM: INCORPORATION OF AYMAN ZAWAHIRI'S AL-JIHAD ORGANIZATION INTO USAMA BIN LADIN'S AL-QA'IDA; RECENT ACTIVITIES OF EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATES OF AL-QA'IDA

ZAWAHIRI'S ORGANIZATION HAS INCORPORATED INTO AL-QA'IDA TO OVERCOME SHORTAGE OF FUNDS. ZAWAHIRI HAS BEEN RELYING INCREASINGLY ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM USAMA (BIN LADIN), WHICH HAS RESULTED, FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, IN THE INCORPORATION OF ELI INTO AL-QA'IDA.
Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan

Summary (U)
Pakistani militant groups, with al-Qa'id and Taliban assistance, are planning attacks threatened to attack US diplomatic and commercial facilities, as well as US citizens in Pakistan, according to press reports.

Usama Bin Ladin is strongly encouraging these attacks. Since his return to Afghanistan in 1996, Bin Ladin has forged close ties to several Pakistani militant groups, particularly those with connections to the Taliban.
Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan

Increasing Terrorist Threats

Several Pakistani militant groups, with al-Qaeda and Taliban assistance, are planning attacks.

Arab extremists based in Afghanistan also may be planning attacks.

This assessment was prepared by the DCCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis and the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed.
Bin Laden, Taliban Strongly Encourage Attacks

Bin Laden, who has close ties to several Pakistani militant groups, is strongly encouraging the anti-US attacks.
Islamabad has taken a number of steps since 11 September to bolster domestic stability and limit the influence of radical militant groups.
Appendix B

Long-standing Pakistani Militant Ties To Bin Ladin

The Kashmiri militant groups

have longstanding ties to Osama Bin Laden. A close association with the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan set the stage for Bin Laden to link up

Training. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, it took control of militant training camps in the country and provided increased access

Usama Bin Ladin to direct the activities at many of the facilities. Militants trained

at Bin Laden-run camps in Afghanistan.

Nature of the Links

The ties between the militant groups and Bin Laden include ideological affinity, rhetorical support, shared training facilities

• The militant groups also find common cause with Bin Laden and the Taliban through their struggle to wrest control of Kashmir from India, which fits into the global Islamic jihad espoused by Bin Laden.

• Instruction at the camps includes basic training in the handling of light weapons and grenades, more advanced work with heavier weapons, and terrorism techniques

Ideology. A common adherence to an extremist understanding

creation of an Islamic theocracy governed by sharia law and administered by Muslim clerics, or ulama—is the most basic tie
Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism

Afghanistan plays a key role in harboring, training, and sponsoring international terrorists, including Usama Bin Ladin. The country's Taliban leaders—sympathetic to Islamic extremist causes—allow more than two dozen training camps to operate in their territory and provide logistics support to members of various terrorist organizations and mujahidin engaged in jihads in a variety of locations, including Chechnya and Kashmir.

- The camps provide an opportunity for Islamic militants to forge long-lasting ideological, logistical, and personal ties with colleagues around the world.

We estimate that mujahidin have received training in Afghanistan since 1979. The current training curriculums include religious indoctrination and instruction in the use of small arms and guerrilla tactics. Some camps provide instruction in special tactics for carrying out terrorist operations, including courses in explosives.

The nurturing of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan has international implications. In the past two years, terrorist plots in North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia link back to Afghanistan. Militants who receive training there often are sent afterwards to fight in jihads. When they return home to resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they constitute a ready supply of manpower for terrorist operations.

- Afghanistan provides Bin Ladin a relatively safe operating environment to oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities. He would be hard-pressed to find another location offering the same security and freedom of action.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 25-April-2012
The Taliban will support terrorist groups in Afghanistan as long as it is dominated by Mullah Omar's more hardline faction and locked in a struggle to gain control of the territory still in Northern Alliance hands. The Taliban is not likely to succumb to international pressure to alter its policy, given the limited leverage outsiders can bring to bear.

- **Pakistan**—as the Taliban's principal foreign patron—would appear to have the most influence over the Taliban but would face a domestic backlash and logistical hurdles if it tried to apply significant pressure on the Taliban.

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**Origins of Afghanistan's Terrorist Links**

Afghanistan's ties to international terrorism are rooted in the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s and its aftermath. Muslims from around the world participated in the anti-Soviet resistance, created an infrastructure to support the insurgency, and helped lay the groundwork for Afghanistan's continuing role as a training ground for mujahedin involved in terrorist groups and in later jihads in other locations. Much of the infrastructure, including the training camps, remained after the Soviet withdrawal, buttressed by the presence of a large cadre of war veterans well versed in guerrilla tactics and willing to pass on their experiences and skills.

- Afghanistan—at the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia—is close to much of the Islamic world and is a convenient location for militants to train for operations planned in other countries. Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, moreover, provides a natural defense against law enforcement and counterterrorism actions.

Political instability and civil war in Afghanistan following the fall of the Communist Government in 1992 contributed to the favorable environment for terrorist-related activities. Even before the Taliban emerged, some Afghan leaders provided logistic support to the Islamic militants who helped them defeat the Soviets; others provided more significant assistance because it was financially profitable and boosted their Islamic and leadership credentials.

- **Abdul Rasul Sayyaf**, for example, **promoted militant training in camps under his control as a way to establish himself**.

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\*Jihad: Literally, holy war; used to designate either a war against unbelievers or a personal struggle to overcome one's imperfections. Extremists tend to broaden the concept of unbeliever, justifying terrorist violence as a jihad against anything or anyone perceived as anti-Islamic. (U)**
Another warlord, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, oversaw training operations.

Terrorist Activities in Afghanistan Today

The Taliban's origins, composition, and brand of highly orthodox Islam predispose the group to supporting worldwide Islamic extremist causes. The Taliban's senior leaders, including Mullah Omar and most of his close subordinates, are former mujahidin from the war against the Soviet Union and staunchly support the concept of jihad. They even refer to the ongoing Afghan civil war as such, notwithstanding that the Taliban's opposition is composed largely of fellow Sunni Muslims.

To fight its own civil war, the Taliban relies heavily on foreign mujahidin from camps in Afghanistan as well as Pakistani and Afghan students recruited directly from Pakistan's religious schools—some of which are widely regarded as breeding grounds for Islamic militancy.

Training Camps (U)

A wide variety of reporting indicates that over two dozen training camps exist in Afghanistan. The camps provide instruction in military and terrorist tactics and religious indoctrination. The graduates often go directly to fight in the Afghan war or to jihads in Kashmir, Chechnya, or elsewhere before returning to their own countries, where many await instructions for participation in terrorist operations, according to multiple sources.

The camps form the foundation of the worldwide mujahidin network by allowing Islamic militants from diverse locations to forge longstanding ideological, logistical, and personal ties. Some have received training in Afghan camps since 1979.
• An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 fighters have trained in Bin Ladin-supported camps since Bin Ladin's return to Afghanistan in 1996.

Camp Financing. Financing for the camps is varied, including public and private charitable organizations, individual supporters of Islamic causes, and "tuition" paid by camp attendees, according to a variety of sources. Islamic militant groups raise money directly from wealthy donors—primarily in the Persian Gulf states and Western Europe—to support terrorist training, and they funnel money through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) suggests Bin Ladin also provides substantial funds, directly and through NGOs, to most of the training camps in Afghanistan.

Military and terrorist training. receive basic training in the use of small arms and guerrilla tactics, advanced and specialized training in subjects such as explosives.
In addition to military and terrorist tactics, training in the Afghan camps emphasizes religious indoctrination. Trainers frequently use the religious training to select militants whose religious fervor qualifies them for more specialized terrorist training. The religious instruction includes repetition of the ideas that the United States and Israel are evil and that the regimes of Arab countries are not true believers in Islam.

Training in nonconventional weapons. Terrorists experiment with nonconventional weapons. In Derunta, militants have received instruction.
Afghanistan as Safehaven for Terrorists (U)

Afghanistan has served as a place of refuge for international terrorists, such as Bin Laden and his associates, since the 1980s. The Taliban aids Bin Laden by assigning him guards for security and refusing to cooperate with extradition efforts.

- Mir Amal Kansi, perpetrator of the 1993 killings outside CIA headquarters, and Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, also received safehaven in Afghanistan.

Key Hub for Mujahidin Network (U)

The mujahidin network—an informal collection of fighters and support pipelines first established during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union—has continued to grow over the last two decades. The network takes advantage of lax security along Afghanistan's borders to move militants, funds, and supplies on behalf of Bin Laden and other Islamic extremist groups. Many of these men and materiel are "exported" from Afghanistan to fight in jihads in Chechnya and other locations.
In September 2000, hundreds of men were training in Afghanistan.

International Repercussions of Afghanistan-Based Terrorism

Islamic extremism nurtured in Afghanistan creates ripples throughout the world. The arrests in December 1999 of an Islamic extremist cell in Jordan and of an Algerian member of an extremist network in Canada attempting to smuggle explosives into the United States highlight the linkages between Afghanistan and Islamic extremist threats to US interests worldwide. Although both networks consisted primarily of locally-based extremists who lacked formal affiliations with other terrorist groups, available intelligence suggests that operatives of al-Qa'ida—Bin Laden's organization headquartered in Afghanistan—directed both operations, and many of the cell members had received training in Afghanistan.

- the Jordan cell members, and particularly Khadr Abu Hawshar—an Afghan veteran who belonged to al-Qa'ida—were in contact with Abu Zubayda, an al-Qa'ida member involved in the training and movement of mujahidin into and out of Afghanistan, and Khalil Deek, a well-known figure in the mujahidin network based in Pakistan, who may also be a member of al-Qa'ida.

- Ahmed Ressam—a former Montreal resident who tried to smuggle over 100 pounds of explosives and timing devices into the United States—had trained at Bin Ladin's camps in Afghanistan. Subsequent investigation indicated that Ressam's associates in Montreal—a network of North Africans involved in criminal activities and support to various extremist groups, including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)—were preparing for terrorist attacks. Mohammedou Ould Slahi.

- Several suspects in the Canada plot had contact with Abu Zubayda and others in Afghanistan responsible for orchestrating the movement and training of mujahidin. Financial and logistics support for the Canada operation also may have come from extremist elements in Afghanistan.
The Algerian and Egyptian Islamic extremist movements have benefited from the leadership and military skills acquired by some of their members in Afghanistan.
Narcotics Network Supports Extremist Activities

The Taliban, Bin Laden, and other extremist groups benefit from the narcotics network in Afghanistan. The Taliban earns substantial revenue from taxing opium poppy cultivation, licensing drug labs, and collecting fees for drug shipments. In many cases the Taliban facilitates drug trafficking and receives payment. Bin Laden has taken advantage of the situation in Afghanistan to encourage the Taliban and drug barons to increase narcotics output and expand trafficking activities to support his war against Western interests. Bin Laden also has encouraged associated extremist groups to traffic in narcotics to support their causes and operations.

- Bin Laden participates in a range of legitimate and illicit business activities and encourages affiliated extremist groups and the Taliban to finance their activities in a similar manner, thereby reducing the financial burden on his organization.
- Afghan traffickers may view Bin Laden's support as a religious and political justification for their involvement in the narcotics trade.

- The Taliban, Bin Laden, and regional traffickers often use the same networks of regional moneychangers to conduct international financial transactions—the Taliban, to circumvent international sanctions; Bin Laden, to support his terrorist apparatus; and the traffickers, to launder the proceeds of drug sales.
The terrorist presence in Afghanistan has fanned anti-American sentiment and activities in Pakistan and other parts of South Asia. Leaders of three extremist groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh signed Bin Ladin's 1998 anti-US fatwa, publicly declaring their intention to retaliate for any US attack on Bin Laden.

- Former President Clinton's trip in March 2000 to India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan reports that local Islamic extremists were targeting him for assassination.

- Anti-US fervor in Pakistan peaked in November 1999 when the US Embassy and American Center in Islamabad were the targets of rocket attacks.

The Future of Taliban Support for International Terrorism

Bleak prospects for fundamental change in Taliban policy. The Taliban gives every indication of continuing to support terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Intelligence reporting highlights that the Taliban's fortunes on the battlefield have an impact on the group's dependence on Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization.

- The Taliban probably calculates that it gains more in terms of support for the war effort by allowing foreign terrorists to operate within its territory than it loses from international sanctions and the absence of international recognition.

- Even if the Taliban were to successfully complete its military conquest of Afghanistan Omar is firmly committed to Bin Ladin's continued stay in Afghanistan despite the negative impact the terrorist's presence has had on the Taliban's ability to gain international recognition. Bin Ladin would probably become an important provider of infrastructure and development assistance in the likely event the Taliban does not receive it from the international community.

Even in the unlikely event the Taliban broke apart or was defeated on the battlefield, the factional infighting that probably would ensue as Afghanistan's displaced warlords...
returned would benefit Bin Ladin and other Islamic extremists in the country. At least two of the warlords, Sayyaf and Hikmatyar—the most extreme Islamists among the factional leaders—operated terrorist camps before the Taliban came into existence and probably would try to court Bin Ladin to gain an edge in the struggle for ascendancy.

Factors that might cause the Taliban to reduce support to terrorism. The Taliban might, at least temporarily, temper its support for terrorism—for example, by closing down some of the training camps. In two independent scenarios:

- **The Taliban consolidates control over the rest of the country.** The Taliban may expect a military victory would bring them closer to international-recognition and reconstruction aid, concluding that some anti-terrorism measures could make a difference with the international community.

- **The Taliban's leadership dynamic changes.**

Leverage Over the Taliban is Limited

The Taliban's stomach for enduring the consequences of international and bilateral sanctions makes applying effective pressure difficult. A variety of reporting indicates that the imposition of US and UN sanctions has had no significant impact on the Taliban's terrorism policies.
Pakistan faces significant hurdles in maintaining pressure on the Taliban.

The porous nature of Afghanistan’s borders pose a serious logistical challenge.

The Taliban also has supporters who would work to undermine punitive measures against the Taliban.
$75 Million in Reward Money
Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations

(b)(1)
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EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(e)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)
EO 12958 6.2(c)

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CTC 2002-40117CH
Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations

Key Findings (U)

Saudi Arabia is a key base of financial support for al-Qa'ida. Most of the money originates from wealthy individuals, fundraisers who solicit smaller donations, and diversions from non-governmental organizations (NGOs); a portion of the funding is derived from legitimate religious contributions.

Saudi Arabia for the bulk of its fundraising for several years...

Since 9/11, Riyadh has responded to a number of US requests to staunch the flow of funds...these actions, coupled with donors' fears of US and international actions, have led to a drop in money flowing from Saudi Arabia to al-Qa'ida...
SAMA—Saudi Arabia's central bank and chief financial enforcement agency—oversees Saudi banks efforts to freeze and seize terrorist-linked assets.
Scope Note (U)
Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations

A Major Source of Terrorist Funds

- Consider Saudi Arabia a key base of financial support.
- Most of the money originates from wealthy individuals, fundraisers who solicit smaller donations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- The Kingdom has a conservative and developing country standards—an affluent populace inclined to bestow large grants on Islamic missionary groups to fulfill their religious obligation to contribute to charity and the propagation of Islam.
- As a result, a portion of the income that al-Qa'ida and other groups count on is derived from legitimate religious contributions, where the donor is either unwitting, misled, or inclined to look the other way.
- Financiers, however, knowingly donate funds to al-Qa'ida and are witting that the money finances terrorist activity.

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorism Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to [blank].
Key Financial Base for Al-Qaeda

Bin Ladin's network relied on Saudi Arabia for the bulk of its fundraising for several years.
Since 9/11, Riyadh has responded to a number of US requests to staunch the flow of funds to terrorists from the Kingdom. These actions, coupled with donors' fears of US and international actions, have led to a drop in money flowing from Saudi Arabia to al-Qaeda.
Appendix A

Collection Efforts

US and Coalition efforts to identify donors and fundraisers will continue to be key to sustaining progress on terror finance and curbing the tens of millions of dollars of Saudi donations.

Collecting against or disrupting conduits such as banks and NGOs will also be critical to identifying donors and crippling the financial networks supporting al-Qa'ida.