TOP SECRET

DCI Update
Terrorist Threat Review
3 July 2001
Latest Assessment

✈️ We continue to believe that threat is genuine

- Possibly indicates that targets are US official installations (ships, embassies, military bases)

✈️ Attacks are planned for the Persian Gulf area. Within the Gulf area, **Saudi Arabia** is the most likely venue

also

operations outside of Gulf
We are passing all leads for immediate follow-up.
Terrorism
Terrorism

TOP SECRET
--- Indicating ongoing operational planning by the Bin Ladin network.

**Attack Threat Real - In late stages on Peninsula**

- Multiple attacks likely
- Mass casualty bomb - Probable MO against U.S. facilities

**Bottomline:**
- Multiple attack preps in late stages or complete
- Attack decision made
- They're waiting us out....looking for a vulnerability
- Can expect little additional warning

---

**TOP SECRET**
Senior Executive Intelligence Brief
6 February 2001

Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing

The discovery of multiple terrorist plots shows an energized international "jihad movement" is raising the threat to US interests, particularly in the Middle East and Europe. Usama Bin Ladin remains the most influential figure in the movement, which includes Egyptian and North African terrorist groups and mujahidin fighting in areas such as Chechnya, Kashmir, and Central Asia.

- The newly detected plots represent the most significant spike in the network's terrorist activity since the time of the millennium.

- The investigation into the Cole bombing points to the involvement of Yemeni and Saudi jihadists with varying ties to Bin Ladin.

- The network also has benefited from a sharp increase in mujahidin recruitment since the resumption of the conflict in Chechnya in 1999, which exposed a new generation of militants to terrorist techniques and extremist ideology through training at al-Qa'ida-run camps in Afghanistan.

- Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover, is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks.

(EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs) (EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs) (EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs) (EO 12958 1.4(e)<25Yrs) (EO 12958 3.5(c))
Persistent Threat Despite Disruptions

The arrest of operatives and the seizure of explosives and other materials are setbacks for the cells but the threat from the network remains.

— CIA is monitoring reports that other elements of the Sunni extremist network are planning attacks.
Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates as of 11 March 2004

**AA Flight 11 Hijack Team:**

**Muhammad Atta (team leader/pilot):**
Full Name – Muhammad al-Amir Awad al-Sayed Atta

**Abdelaziz Alomari:**
Full Name – ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-‘Umari

**Wael al-Shehri:**
Full Name – Wa’il Muhammad ‘Abdallah al-Shehri

**PROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:** 5-April-2012

EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)
Walid al-Shehri:
Full Name – Walid Muhammad Abdallah al-Shehri

Salam al-Suqami:
Full Name – Uthman bin Muhammed 'Abd al-Rahman al-Suqami
UA Flight 175 Hijack Team:

Marwan al-Shehhi (team leader/pilot):
Full Name – Marwan Yousef Muhammad Rashid Lebrab al-Shehhi

Ahmed al-Ghamdi:
Full Name – Ahmad Salih Sa’id al-Kurashi al-Ghamdi
Fayez Ahmad:
Full Name - Fayez Rashid Ahmad Hassan al-Qadi Banihammad

Hamza al-Ghamdi:
Full Name - Hamza Salih Ahmad al-Hamid al-Ghamdi
Mohand al-Shehrri:
Full Name – Muhammad Fuyiz al-Shehrri

AA Flight 77 Hijack Team:
Hani Hanjur (pilot):
Full Name – Hani Salih Hasan Hanjur
**Khalid al-Mihdhar**
Full Name - Khalid Muhammad 'Abdulrahman al-Mihdhar

**Nawaf al-Hazmi**
Full Name - Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi
Majid Muqid:
Full name: Majid Muqid Mash'an bin Mawqid 'Awfi

Salim al-Hazmi:
Full name – Selim Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi

UA Flight 93 Hijack Team:
Ziad Jarrah (team leader/pilot):
Full name – Ziad Samir Jarrah
30 June 2000

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TERRORIST THREAT ADVISORY

Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks

Summary (U)

Recent reporting indicates that a terrorist cell directed by Usama Bin Ladin is preparing an attack on the US and is conducting attacks in different countries.
Bin Ladin's previous attempts to target US interests in the region, and presumed desire to retaliate for the disruption lend credibility to the threat.
Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Laden for Now

The Taliban leadership is allowing Usama Bin Laden to remain in Afghanistan despite UN sanctions aimed at persuading the group to give him up. It is doing so because it needs Bin Laden’s money and fighters to wage its civil war and because Taliban leaders say an ethnic Pashtun tribal code requires them to protect guests.

CIA analysts judge that Taliban leaders would surrender Bin Laden only after a Taliban victory in Afghanistan and in exchange for diplomatic recognition and reconstruction aid. The Taliban would seek to deny engaging in a deal, however, to save face and to avoid a backlash from its Afghan and Pakistani supporters and from Arabs sympathetic to Bin Laden.
SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
23 May 2001

Terrorism: Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot

or civilian plan to kidnap US diplomats

The conspirators, who want to force the release of "blind sheik" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held prisoners, may opt to hijack an aircraft or storm a US Embassy.

have considered taking hostages--possibly including hijackings--to force concessions, and al-Qa'ida is reported to have trained personnel in kidnapping techniques.
TEXT: NOTICE: THIS IS A CORRECTED VERSION OF A REPORT WITH THE
SAME HEADING WHICH WAS ORIGINALY ISSUED DTG 16 MAY 01. A CORRECTION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADJUST THE DISSEMINATION LISTS

A CALL-IN TO THE U.S. EMBASSY VOLUNTEERED THAT A GROUP PRESENTLY IN THE UNITED STATES PLANNING TO CONDUCT A TERRORIST OPERATION INVOLVING THE USE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES.
NOTICE: THIS IS A CORRECTED VERSION OF A REPORT WITH THE SAME HEADING WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY ISSUED DTG 16 MAY 01. A CORRECTION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADJUST THE DISSEMINATION LISTS.

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM A CALL-IN TO THE U.S. EMBASSY
A group presently in the United States plans to conduct a terrorist operation involving the use of high explosives.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: 

SUBJECT: Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan

1. The policy community currently is reviewing U.S. policy toward Sudan.

state of relations with the Sudanese government

the poor
SUBJECT: Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan

There is no indication that Sudanese involvement with terrorism has decreased in the past year. But the US government may actually play into the hands of the Sudanese, by allowing their "tactical retreats" vis-à-vis support to terrorism.
NEAR EAST: UAE: Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances

Analytic Perspective

If the UAE halted flights of the Taliban-controlled Ariana Airlines to Dubai and Sharjah, Bin Ladin's cash-flow would be at least temporarily disrupted. Bin Ladin has come to rely on cash shipments aboard Ariana flights from the UAE as a key method of obtaining spendable funds.

Ariana Airlines, Afghanistan's only commercial air carrier, is running out of foreign destinations. India on 23 August agreed to halt Ariana flights to Amritsar. Ariana's flight to Jeddah most likely is only for the transport of hajj pilgrims. In the UAE, Ariana accounts for a scant share of the cargo transiting Dubai and Sharjah airports. So halting these flights would have little economic impact on the emirates.

Closing of Ariana's UAE offices would force them to find alternative - and most likely less secure - carriers, routes, and methods for moving Bin Ladin's cash. The money changers might be forced to hire third-country airlines, private aircraft, and possibly fly the cash to Pakistan for overland delivery to Afghanistan - a slower and riskier method.

Dubai is a key financial center where hard currencies are readily available and traded for the Afghan and Pakistani currencies used by Bin Ladin and the Taliban.
Afghanistan's antiquated banking system, with hard currency constraints and few international contacts, is ill suited to accommodate such transactions.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
RELEASE DATE:
25-April-2012
IRAQI DELEGATION MEET WITH USAMA ((FRuns LAIBI)) IN ABU DHABI.

ARRANGED FOR A MEETING WITH USAMA (SIMI MAHDI) THROUGH AN EGYPTIAN FRIEND, DR. AHMAD ZAKAHI.

3. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES WITH ANTI-UNITED STATES (U.S.) ISLAMIC EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DIST: 14 JULY 1997

COUNTRY: PAKISTAN/INDIA/AFGHANISTAN/INTERNATIONAL

SUBJ: TERRORISM: ACTIVITIES OF BIN LADIN'S IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND INDIA

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-April-2012
USAMA (BIN LADIN)’S EGO: AL QA'IDA
PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN SERVE AS A REGIONAL BASE AND TRAINING CENTER FOR ISLAMIC ARMY ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING ISLAMIC INSURGENCIES IN TAJIKISTAN, THE KASHMIR REGION, AND CHECHNYA.

3. THE ISLAMIC ARMY HAD A CAMP IN PAKISTAN.

The purpose of the camp was to train and recruit new members, mostly from Pakistan. When training was completed, recruits were interviewed by Bin Laden before being selected for different assignments. If Bin Laden needed expertise, such as a fighting unit, which he did not have in Sudan, he simply brought it from camps either in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
As al-Qa'ida's chief financial manager, Sa'id acquired a reputation as frugal, and tight with money.
TO:  DIA WASHINGTON DC, CIA WASHINGTON DC, 
DA WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, OMD WASHINGTON DC, 
CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAP WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, 
SECRET SERVICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC/ OIPR/, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, 
ZEN/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA NATIONAL HQ, 
USCINCENT INTELCEN MACDILL AFB FL, COMUSNAVCENT,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-APRIL-2012

SECRET
SECRET

DIST: 13 FEBRUARY 1997
COUNTRY: SUDAN/Egypt

SUBJ: TERRORISM: POSSIBLE ISLAMIC ARMY FOREKNOWLEDGE OF AN "EGYPTIAN OPERATION" AND LOGISTICAL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED FOR THE ATTACKERS

PRIOR TO THE JUNE 1995 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HUSNI ((MUBARAK)) BY THE EGYPTIAN AL-GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA (IG) IN ETHIOPIA, USAMA ((BIN LADEN)) DISCUSSED MOUNTING AN OPERATION AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.
SECRET

SIN LADIN

MOVE FORWARD WITH THE EGYPTIAN PLAN
SUDANESE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (NIF), HOWEVER, LEARNED OF THIS AND REQUESTED THAT BIN LADIN REFRAIN FROM ESTABLISHING SUCH A GROUP, BECAUSE THE NIF SUPPORTED SADDAM. THE NIF WAS CONCERNED THAT SADDAM WOULD LEARN ABOUT THE ISLAMIC ARMY IRAQI ISLAMISTS AND THAT THIS WOULD DAMAGE NIF-IRAQI RELATIONS. BIN LADIN AGREED.

BIN LADIN PROVIDED SOME ASSISTANCE TO THE KURDS, HOWEVER.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DIST: 31 JANUARY 1997
COUNTRY: SUDAN/IRAN

SUBJ: TERRORISM: COOPERATION AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN'S ISLAMIC ARMY, IRAN, AND THE NIF

SHORTLY AFTER THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, OPERATIVES TRAVELED TO SOUTHERN LEBANON TO RECEIVE TRAINING IN EXPLOSIVES FROM HIZBALLAH.

IRAN ALSO BEGAN TRAINING INDIVIDUALS...
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-April-2012
DIST: 31 JANUARY 1997
COUNTRY: SUDAN/IRAN
SUBJ: TERRORISM: ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN, IRAN, AND THE NIF

Eventually an agreement was reached to collaborate politically and militarily. The primary goal of this collaboration was to confront Israel and the United States, while the secondary goal was to undermine Arab regimes which supported Israel and the United States.
AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED,

EXPERIENCE FROM HIZBALLAH AND IRAN SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO NEW NATIONS/EXTREMIST GROUPS WHO LACK THIS EXPERTISE. THIS WOULD THEN ALLOW ISLAMIC ARMY MEMBERS TO GAIN THE NECESSARY EXPERIENCE IN TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

DELEGATION VISITED TEHRAN, IRAN, REPEATEDLY TO MEET WITH IRANIAN OFFICIALS. ALSO MET SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES OF LEBAANESE HIZBALLAH.
SUBJ: TERRORISM: USAMA BIN LADIN'S ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE URANIUM

SUMMARY: ISLAMIC EXTREMIST FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADIN REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE URANIUM AND ALLEGEDLY MAY HAVE BEEN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF MOUNTING OPERATIONS WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. BIN LADIN'S ISLAMIC ARMY LEARNED THAT A FORMER COUNTRY MINISTER WAS SELLING URANIUM. AFTER EXAMINING THE MATERIAL, THE ISLAMIC ARMY REPORTEDLY CONCLUDED A DEAL TO PURCHASE IT.

([BIN LADIN) 'S ISLAMIC ARMY ADVISED THAT THE ISLAMIC ARMY HAD LEARNED THAT A FORMER COUNTRY MINISTER WAS SELLING URANIUM. NOTED THAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED TO DETERMINE IF IT WAS TRUE, AND IF SO, CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE TO OFFER PLACED ON THE URANIUM]....
SECRET

WE WERE WILLING TO PAY THE ASKING PRICE AFTER INSPECTION OF THE PRODUCT

CONTAINED A CYLINDER
Uranium had been examined and been proven to be of good quality.

Bin Laden was exploring the possibility of mounting operations with weapons of mass destruction.
TO: NIMA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC, DIRNMA,
SECSTATE WASHDC//INR/DS/TA/SCT//, DIA WASHINGTON DC,
DA WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC,
CSAF WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, SECRET SERVICE/ID/,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OJPRA//, DEA WASHDC//CJ//,
DOEHQ//IN///, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, FAA NATIONAL HQ,
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, US CUSTOMS SERVICE W.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DIST: 30 APRIL 1997
COUNTRY: SOMALIA/SUDAN

SUBJ: TERRORISM: USAMA BIN LADIN'S ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA AND SUDANESE NIF SUPPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-APRIL-2012
4. THE NIF ASSISTED THE ISLAMIC ARMY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN SOMALIA.
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<th>TRIBES IN SOMALIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>ISLAMIC ARMY TRAINED</td>
<td>TRAVELED TO SOMALIA</td>
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8. ISLAMIC ARMY MEMBERS WERE SENT TO SOMALIA, WITH THE NIF'S KNOWLEDGE AND ENCOURAGEMENT, IN ORDER TO KILL U.S. TROOPS, INCITE VIOLENCE AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL, AND UNDERMINE THE SUCCESS OF THE U.S. MISSION.
SUBJ: TERRORISM: USAMA BIN LADIN'S LINKS TO A SOUTHERN YEMENI GROUP

USAMA (BIN LADIN) WAS IN CONTACT WITH A GROUP OF SOUTHERN YEMENIS WHO CARRIED OUT OPERATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY. A MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY SHURA COUNCIL.

THIS GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 1992 ATTACK TARGETING U.S. FORCES IN ADEN. RECIPIENTS OF TRAINING FOR THIS OPERATION IN SUDAN.

1992 ATTACK ON HOTELS IN ADEN, YEMEN, IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE TARGETED. THE U.S. MILITARY WAS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE IN SOMALIA.
SUBJ: TERRORISM: FATWA ISSUED IN 1992 BY USAMA BIN LADIN’S ISLAMIC ARMY TO ATTACK U.S. MILITARY IN SAUDI ARABIA.


BIN LADIN STATED THAT “THE WEST IS EVIL BUT THE HEAD OF THE SNAKE IS AMERICA. IT IS THE HEAD OF THE SNAKE WE SHOULD SMASH.”
THE SHURA COUNCIL OF USAMA (bin Laden)'s Islamic Army consisted of a variety of members who represent Islamic extremists groups or cells world-wide. These groups operate both autonomously and as Islamic Army participants.
10 March 2003

Al-Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths

10 March 2003

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25 April 2012
Al-Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths

Key Findings (U)

While based in Sudan from 1992-96, al-Qa'ida was transformed from an only partially realized idea to an international organization ready to operate on its own. A major factor in this development was the education al-Qa'ida members received working with officials of Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) to strengthen Sudan—some reporting says to build an international jihad infrastructure.

- Al-Qa'ida left Sudan with an independent ability to establish and operate training camps.
- While in Sudan, al-Qa'ida developed relations with every noteworthy Islamic extremist group.
- Intelligence reporting on contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida included senior Iraqi officials and suggests the contacts culminated in Iraq's provision of explosives training to al-Qa'ida.
- Al-Qa'ida received funding from wealthy backers and the international jihad they supported.
The contacts and capabilities al-Qa'ida members established in the Sudan period give them a flexibility that may help the group find creative and replicable ways to compensate for the loss of its safehaven in Afghanistan.
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Scope Note (U)  

This paper was written in response to a request to review information on al-Qa'ida's years in Sudan, 1992-96, with the benefit of hindsight, to identify key issues or threads of reporting whose importance may not have been apparent then or which may need additional exploration. Although the paper addresses al-Qa'ida's relationship with the Sudanese Government and National Islamic Front officials, it also considers other activities al-Qa'ida was able to pursue because it had safehaven in Sudan or because of connections its members made while in Sudan.
Al-Qaeda in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths

Terrorist University, 1992-96

While based in Sudan from 1992-96, al-Qaeda was transformed from an only partially realized idea to an international organization ready to operate on its own. The National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan—which seized power in a coup in 1989—welcomed al-Qaeda and other extremist groups during the 1990s largely because these groups shared Khartoum’s interests in promoting pan-Islamic unity, toppling moderate Arab governments deemed hostile to Islamist movements, and countering Western influence in the Islamic world. Hassan al-Turabi, the NIF’s leader and Khartoum’s primary ideologue until his fall in late 1999, considered his primary goal to be the creation of an Islamic state inside Sudan, but he eagerly seized opportunities to cultivate like-minded foreign groups for a variety of reasons.

- A variety of reporting indicates Turabi and other NIF leaders used such contacts primarily to raise and distribute money, develop recruits, provide cover for intelligence activities, and promote their Islamist agenda throughout the Arab world.

- Turabi formed and led the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) in 1991 as the public face of his foreign outreach efforts. Attendees at PAIC meetings throughout the 1990s included PLO, HAMAS, and Hizballah; Iraqi, Afghan, Libyan, and Iranian Government representatives; Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and various individuals and groups advocating extremist and militant Islamist agendas.

With the help of the NIF, al-Qaeda solidified its formal structure, learned or enhanced key skills, and made the contacts necessary to become a self-sufficient international terrorist organization. Al-Qaeda also contributed money, labor, and material to building up Sudan’s physical infrastructure.

Sudanese officials also may have worked alongside al-Qaeda members to acquire weapons on the international gray arms market.

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorism Center’s Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and may be directed to:
Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Radiological (CBRN) Programs

Al-Qa'ida and Sudan also shared the goal of producing chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear or radiological weapons.

• Al-Qa'ida also attempted to acquire nuclear materials—probably falling victim to scams—and revealed the presence of EMPTA, a known precursor used in the production of VX. EMPTA is the route by which Iraq planned to produce VX for its chemical weapon program according to its declaration to the United Nations.

• Al-Qa'ida procurement officer Abu Hajir al-Iraqi had good ties—not further specified—to Iraqi intelligence, according to Wali Khan, an al-Qa'ida associate convicted in 1996 for his participation in the Manila Air conspiracy.

• Both Bin Ladin and Iraq had connections to Sudan's Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant, which was destroyed by US strikes in August 1998. Bin Ladin may have been connected through his financing.
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<th>Financial Infrastructure</th>
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<td>family money and connections also aided Bin Ladin in establishing and building up his own businesses in Khartoum. Bin Ladin's businesses included a tannery, construction firms, and agricultural interests.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Relations With Other Groups and States</th>
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<tr>
<td>Through meetings, training, and other activity, the NIF facilitated contacts in Sudan, some of which had first been forged in Afghanistan, between al-Qa'ida members and nearly every noteworthy Islamic extremist group.</td>
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<td>* Turabi's PAIC served as one forum for groups to meet from 1991 through its dissolution in 2000.</td>
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<td>* al-Qa'ida had established cooperative relationships by 1996 with at least 20 Sunni Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia, as well as with elements of the Saudi opposition. This cooperation entailed generating funding, smuggling routes, training, and, in some cases, terrorist operations.</td>
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<td>al-Qa'ida had established relations with other Islamic extremists as well, largely in Africa and Asia.</td>
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<td>al-Qa'ida began running training camps at Bin Ladin's farms and other facilities in Sudan.</td>
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|  |
• Al-Qa'ida and Sudan helped set up arms smuggling networks.

• Both al-Qa'ida and the NIF continued relations with Afghan leaders.

• Al-Qa'ida had already supported terrorist operations—through funding, planning, or direct participation—by at least eight of these groups before 1996. For example, al-Qa'ida leaders have publicly admitted to supporting operations in Yemen in 1992 and Somalia in 1993.

• Suggests al-Qa'ida supported assassination attempts by allied groups against leaders it deemed un-Islamic, such as Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia.
Bin Laden continued to support anti-Saddam Iraqis, however, such as the Iraqi members of al-Qa'ida, and through them, Iraqi Kurdish groups such as the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan.

- Iraq also probably used the PAIC as a conduit to contact Islamic groups and states.

While Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Bin Laden differ ideologically, we judge that the Iraq-al-Qa'ida relationship in Sudan showed that both wanted to monitor the other as well as to keep the door open to cooperation.

Iraqi contacts with al-Qa'ida included senior Iraqi officials, suggesting movement toward cooperation at some level. These contacts culminated in Iraq's reported provision of explosives training to al-Qa'ida.

Iraq sought Sudanese help to establish contacts with Islamic extremist groups, including al-Qa'ida.

Turabi had agreed to influence fundamentalist groups in Sudan on Iraq's behalf. Most likely at Turabi's urging, Bin Laden developed an "understanding" with Saddam that al-Qa'ida would not support any anti-Saddam activities.
Postgraduation: Proven Sustainability Through 2002

connections and capabilities al-Qa'ida developed in Sudan remained strong after they moved to Afghanistan, and many subsequently expanded.
al-Qa'ida's associations with other Sunni extremist groups, those ties have grown since 1996 to include cooperation on terrorist operations.

- Upon returning to Afghanistan in 1996, al-Qa'ida took over almost all of the training camps in the country and refocused their curriculum on terrorist tactics.

- Al-Qa'ida and associated groups still have financial links.
The capabilities and contacts al-Qa'ida forged in Sudan, including with Iran and Iraq, may give it more flexibility in designing creative responses to the loss of its safehaven in Afghanistan.
SUBJ: TERRORISM: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY, AND BIN LADIN'S MOVE FROM AFGHANISTAN TO SUDAN

SUMMARY: DURING THE AFGHAN WAR, USAMA BIN LADIN CREATED THE ISLAMIC EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION AL-QAIDA FROM AMONG LOYAL MUJAHEDIN IN AFGHANISTAN. IN 1989, BIN LADIN MOVED AL-QAIDA TO SUDAN, AT THE BEHEST OF THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT, AND CHANGED THE NAME TO THE ISLAMIC ARMY. OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, BIN LADIN'S ISLAMIC ARMY PRESENCE, AS WELL AS HIS PERSONAL BUSINESSES, CONTINUED TO GROW IN SUDAN. THE NIF AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN PROVIDED A RECEPTIVE ENVIRONMENT AND PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF ISLAMIC ARMY ACTIVITIES. IN RETURN, BIN LADIN PROVIDED INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN THIS COOPERATIVE SETTING, BIN LADIN FURTHER DEFINED THE KORANIC BASIS FOR THE ISLAMIC ARMY AND ITS INTENT TO USE VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE ISLAMIC GOALS.

2. WHEN ISLAMIC EXTREMIST FINANCIER USAMA (BIN LADIN) ESTABLISHED AL-QAIDA DURING THE AFGHAN WAR (EARLY 1980'S), HE SOUGHT TO FORM AN ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION THAT WOULD LAST BEYOND THE WAR'S CONCLUSION.

3. IN 1989, AFTER THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (NIF) CAME TO POWER IN SUDAN, BIN LADIN AGREED TO ESTABLISH HIS AL-QAIDA/ISLAMIC ARMY IN SUDAN, AT THE BEHEST OF THE NIF. AFTER BIN LADIN MOVED TO SUDAN AND SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH A WORLD-WIDE ISLAMIC EXTREMIST NETWORK, THE TERM AL-QAIDA NO LONGER MADE SENSE, SO THE NETWORK WAS RENAMED THE ISLAMIC ARMY.
IN 1991, BIN LADIN ARRIVED IN SUDAN.

THE NIF INDICATED THAT ITS MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN THE SOUTH. BIN LADIN AGREED TO PROVIDE FUNDING FOR THE SUDANESE CIVIL DEFENSE AND TO BUILD THE "CHALLENGE ROAD" FROM KHARTOUM TO PORT SUDAN IN EXCHANGE FOR LAND ON WHICH TO ESTABLISH A CAMP.

BIN LADIN CREATED A COMMITTEE DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH THE ISLAMIC ARMY.

BIN LADIN AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAD ALREADY BEGUN DISCUSSING VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE ISLAMIC GOALS BY THIS STAGE.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DIST: 18 APRIL 1997

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN

SUBJ: TERRORISM: USAMA BIN LADIN'S HISTORICAL LINKS TO 'ABDULLAH AZZAM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-Apil-2012
SUMMARY: DURING THE AFGHAN WAR, USAMA BIN LADIN MET ‘ABDALLAH AZZAM, WHO INFLUENCED HIM (BIN LADIN) TO ESTABLISH A NETWORK TO ENHANCE THE MUIJAHEDIN'S ABILITY TO RECRUIT NEW FIGHTERS.

USAMA ((BIN LADIN)) first traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s with ((ASMARAI)). They had previously known each other in Saudi Arabia and decided to join the fight together.

AAZAAM, AKA WALI KHAN AMIN SHAH, A SAUDI NATIONAL AND ASSOCIATE OF RAMZI AHMED ((YOUSEF)), WHO WAS INVOLVED WITH YOUSEF IN THE JANUARY 1995 PLOT IN THE PHILIPPINES TO BOMB U.S. AIRLINERS. USAMA ASMARAI IS CURRENTLY IN U.S. CUSTODY.)

AZZAM MET WITH BIN LADIN IN AFGHANISTAN. AZZAM KNEW BIN LADIN'S FAMILY AND THAT BIN LADIN HAD SIGNIFICANT SUMS OF DISPOSABLE TINYTIME.

AZZAM CONVINCED BIN LADIN THAT HE (BIN LADIN) HAD THE ABILITY TO CREATE A NETWORK THAT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE MUIJAHEDIN ABILITIES TO RECRUIT FIGHTERS AND OBTAIN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM AROUND THE ISLAMIC WORLD FOR THE WAR EFFORT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, BIN LADIN JOINED AZZAM IN PESHAWAR AND THEY FORMED THE MAKTAB AL-KHILMAT (MK).
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

OPERATION (HCSC)

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-April-2012
Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable

Credible intelligence reporting on the activities of Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization depicts a highly skilled, resilient network with a wide range of methods of attack at its disposal. Al-Qa'ida operatives are trained to conduct bombings, assassinations, standoff attacks, kidnappings, and attacks with crude chemical or biological agents, and the group's extreme interpretation of Islam sanctions the use of these methods against a large pool of US and other targets, including civilians.

- The organization also observes sound operational practices, making use of meticulous contingency planning completed far in advance of an operation.

Intelligence on terrorist plotting discovered over the millennial period also indicates that al-Qa'ida has refined its tactics to cope with security crackdowns and heightened political pressure on Bin Ladin and his Taliban hosts. The organization is improving its operational security.
Operational Doctrine Rooted in Interpretation of Islamic Law

Bin Laden's terrorist operations are grounded in his extreme interpretation of Islamic law, which sanctions attacks against a wide variety of targets worldwide. Qa'ida's most recent fatwa—issued in February 1998 by Bin Laden and leaders of other extremist groups under the banner of his "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders"—is broadly worded, stating that all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military" worldwide. During an interview in December 1998 Bin Laden explained that all US citizens are legitimate targets because they pay taxes to the US Government.

This interpretation broadened and superseded Bin Laden's previous fatwa, which only authorized attacks against Western military targets on the Arabian Peninsula. Bin Laden publicized this decree as a "Declaration of Jihad" in August 1996.

US interests are Bin Laden's primary—but not sole—target. The United States figures most prominently in Bin Laden's public threats, and Bin Laden has characterized the United States as "the head of the snake." Bin Laden's fatwa authorizes attacks against Americans "and their allies," suggesting that he sees the countries of the "Jewish-Crusader alliance" (see box) as a single enemy.

1 Bin Laden's fatwas carry no formal authority outside of his own organization, and many Islamic religious scholars view his justifications for terrorism as simplistic and flawed, failing to address the numerous Islamic injunctions prohibiting violence against innocents—including Christians and Jews, who are traditionally tolerated as "Peoples of the Book." Instead, Bin Laden attempts to appeal to Muslims who are not familiar with the finer points of Islamic jurisprudence but are convinced that their civilization must fend off an assault of Western military power and cultural values. (U)
• Al-Qa'ida members planning terrorist operations in Jordan in December 1999 intended to attack both US and Israeli tourists, and Bin Ladin frequently denounces Israel and the United Kingdom alongside the United States in his public statements.

• Bin Ladin's doctrine tolerates the death of citizens of other countries in his attack, as "collateral damage" or as targets in their own right. In an interview in December 1998, Bin Ladin claimed that the obligation to attack US targets outweighs the risk to innocent civilians, whom he compared to human shields.

• Al-Qa'ida-directed extremists planning attacks in Jordan in late 1999 chose to target Christian religious sites and other areas frequented by US and Israeli tourists.
By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa’ida had established a modus operandi emphasizing careful planning and exhaustive field preparations, which Bin Ladin saw as a prerequisite for spectacular terrorist operations. When asked in a November 1996 interview why his organization had not yet conducted attacks in response to its August fatwa, Bin Ladin replied, “If we wanted to carry out small operations, it would have been easy to do so after the statements, but the nature of the battle requires qualitative operations that affect the adversary, which obviously requires good preparation.”

Much of the advance planning involves the preparation of targeting studies.
The study of the US Embassy in Nairobi—prepared in December 1993—including detailed information—casing was conducted with a camera and included recommendations for possible methods of attack. According to press, local operatives also surveilled the Embassy days before the August bombing, probably to update the 1993 casing report.

Such detailed field preparation may support the process of review and approval of an operation by al-Qa'ida's leadership during the months prior to the East Africa bombings.
Flexible Methods of Attack

Al-Qaeda’s bombmaking expertise has enabled the group to conduct devastating attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

- An explosives manual discusses recipes for numerous explosive compounds, details on manufacturing detonators, handling tips, and methods for obtaining the ingredients.

- Operatives plotting attacks in Jordan over the millennial period had cached several tons of materials to make explosives, including nitric acid, sulfuric acid,

- Al-Qaeda and associated groups have employed a variety of methods for bomb delivery and detonation. Suicide operatives carried out the vehicle bomb attacks against the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

In addition to bombings, al-Qaeda has demonstrated the capability and intent to employ other forms of attack.
authorities arrested a group of al-Qa'ida members attempting to smuggle antitank guided missiles into the kingdom for use against US or Saudi facilities.

- **Assassinations and armed assaults.**

- **Kidnappings.** views hostage taking as a legitimate tactic under certain conditions.

- **Chemical and biological attacks.** that Bin Ladin's organization is interested in acquiring unconventional weapons—particularly chemical or biological agents—and possesses at least a rudimentary capability to employ them in attacks. In a December 1998 interview, Bin Ladin called the acquisition of these weapons a "religious duty" and noted, "How we would use them is up to us."
Appendix A: The East Africa Bombings

The near-simultaneous bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on 7 August 1998 concluded almost a full year of preparations involving operatives throughout al-Qa'ida and the resources of a potent local network. The attacks inflicted a heavy toll—over 200 dead and thousands injured—and demonstrated that Bin Ladin is willing to sacrifice a well-developed local infrastructure to strike at the United States.

Early Activities of the East Africa Cell: A Foundation for Terror

- Abu 'Ubaydah al-Panjshiri was in frequent contact with the cell until his death in a May 1996 ferryboat accident on Lake Victoria, according to press.

The cell used its presence in Kenya to case potential targets and acquire explosives for terrorist attacks.

Top Secret
• The cell had obtained explosives, possibly through local arms trafficking networks, years before the bombings. The US indictment of several of the bombing suspects charges that a local cell member in 1996 displayed TNT and detonators acquired in Tanzania.

• Bin Ladin warned in a late May interview that the results of his jihad "would be visible within weeks."

• Between May and July, al-Qa'ida operatives in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam rented safehouses and purchased the trucks that they later used as bomb vehicles, according to press.

• Nairobi cell members completed the last preparations for the attack during the first week of August, including a final casing of the Embassy and the departure from East Africa of all al-Qa'ida operatives not directly involved in the attacks.
Operations "Holy Ka'aba" and "al-Aqsa Mosque"
The day after the bombings, a London-based Arabic newspaper received three faxes claiming responsibility for the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam attacks—codenamed "Operation Holy Ka'aba" and "Operation al-Aqsa Mosque," respectively—on behalf of the "Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places," a previously unknown group. Quoting from Bin Ladin's February fatwa, these letters claimed that three suicide bombers conducted the bombings in retaliation for the presence of US troops on the Arabian Peninsula and US support to Israel.
Appendix B: Bin Ladin's Role in the Anti-US "Millennial" Plots

In December 1999, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Jordan and Canada uncovered separate networks preparing to conduct near-term, anti-US attacks.

The plotters in Jordan planned to time their first attacks to coincide with millennial New Year's celebrations.

Jordan

Jordanian authorities arrested members of the cell was planning to kill US and Israeli citizens with bombs and automatic weapons at a variety of tourist-related sites, including the SAS Radisson Hotel in Amman.

al-Hijazi, a senior Bin Ladin lieutenant, accompanied three operatives to Afghanistan for six months of terrorist training at al-Qa'ida camps.

- The cell accumulated a large arms cache, including several tons of chemicals used to make explosives.
Canada

The 14 December arrest of Algerian extremist Ahmad Ressam at the US-Canadian border uncovered preparations for additional anti-US attacks. Ressam—a former Montreal resident who had trained at Bin Ladin's camps in Afghanistan—was attempting to smuggle over 100 pounds of explosives and timing devices into the United States.
Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities

Ariana Afghan Airlines—Afghanistan's national carrier—provides the Taliban with unspecified profits from its legitimate passenger, cargo, and charter services and has facilitated activity by terrorists and narcotics traffickers.

The airline conducts international and domestic air operations carrying passengers and cargo on scheduled and charter flights and is frequently used for military purposes:

- The airline has scheduled service to India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and at least six domestic locations. Ariana officials hope to expand the international flight network to Europe and the Far East.

- Ariana transports troops and supplies within the country as part of the Taliban’s effort to win the civil war.

- Most of the airline's revenue is probably generated by its cargo and charter activity.
The airline has been utilized by terrorists and drug smugglers to conduct operations.

- Terrorist financier Usama bin Laden has chartered Ariana aircraft to transport personnel and supplies.
Afghanistan’s National Airline

Ariana Afghan Airlines—Afghanistan’s national carrier—was founded in Kabul in 1955 with financial help from the Indian firm Indamer. Indamer—headed by American Peter Baldwin—owned 49 percent of the airline, while the Afghan Government held the other 51 percent. A year later, Afghanistan signed the Air Transport Development Project Agreement with the United States and, soon after, Pan American Airlines bought Indamer’s shares; Ariana boasted a strong international reputation in the 1970s because of that association. The name Ariana was dropped in 1985, when Bakhtar Afghan Airlines took over the company to become the new national airline, but was eventually restored in 1988. (U)

The Taliban took operational control of Ariana coincident with its capture of Kabul in late September 1996 and retains *de facto* ownership. Since that time, the airline has added to its fleet, looked to expand its international flight network, and facilitated activity by terrorists and narcotics traffickers.
Ariana conducts international and domestic commercial air operations carrying passengers, cargo, or mail. The airline is the only scheduled carrier known to be licensed for operation in or to Afghanistan, although planes operated by international organizations—the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations, and others—do conduct flights there.

- The airline has scheduled Boeing 727 service from Kabul to Amritsar, India thrice weekly and to Dubai and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia once a week, according to an aviation industry publication. The flights to Amritsar are mainly for the transport of consumer goods, according to a variety of sources. US Embassy
reporting suggests the Jeddah leg was stopped at the behest of the Saudi Government for at least a short time beginning in October 1998.

Ariana conducts cargo service to Sharjah, UAE.

- The airline occasionally conducts charter service to Frankfurt on behalf of a German nongovernmental organization, according to press and US Embassy reporting, and has conducted flights to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj.

- Ariana has an extensive domestic network with flights going to Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Khowst, and Mazar-i-Sharif, according to press and US diplomatic reports.

Ariana is looking to expand its international connections:

- Arrangements for service to Urumchi, China and Ashgabat, Turkmenistan have apparently been made but have yet to be implemented, according to US Embassy and press reporting, because the airline has not yet met safety and other unspecified conditions mandated by the Chinese and Turkmen governments.

- Ariana officials would also like to establish regular destinations in Europe—possibly Frankfurt, London, or Paris—and Uzbekistan, according to aviation industry reports.
Like any airline, Ariana requires maintenance and spare parts for its fleet to conduct operations. To remedy this situation, the airline has turned to various sources:

- Ariana had a technical support contract with Air France when the Taliban took over its operations; however, the agreement was being re-negotiated in June 1997 because it had become too expensive for Kabul, according to a US Embassy report. Press reporting from early 1999 suggests the relationship has been sustained, albeit to an unknown degree. The same Embassy reporting indicates that Ariana was looking into the possibility of establishing a technical relationship with Brussels-based Sabena in mid-1997, most likely if the deal with Air France fell through. More recently, other press reporting indicates an aircraft service agreement was signed with the Amman-based airline Royal Jordanian.

- Press reporting indicates talks on spare parts acquisition were initiated between Ariana and Boeing in mid-1998. At least two deliveries—including one in early February 1999—have apparently resulted from the negotiations.

- A technical support agreement signed in October 1996 with Pakistan provided Ariana with a temporary operational and maintenance base at Karachi, according to press reporting. The contract had not been utilized.
much as of mid-June 1997, according to US Embassy reporting, but the airline was looking to use it more later that same year to order parts.

- Ariana’s international flight plan is based on projections of cargo—not passenger—demand, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. As of late 1996, the airline’s cargo service was reportedly generating a “substantial” profit and additional routes were being evaluated to ensure future earnings.
Overflight Fees

The Taliban also receives a considerable amount of money from fees collected for overflights of Afghanistan by foreign aircraft. According to press reporting:

- Each overflight incurs a fee of $400, which is calculated by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Up to 80 aircraft were overflying the country each day as of early May 1999, thus earning the Taliban about $11.7 million annually if the pace of flights continues. The number of flights over Afghanistan may increase if the current civil war ends, as the country straddles the shortest air route between Western Europe and East Asia.

- The overflight fees are banked in Switzerland and held in trust for spending on civil aviation requirements deemed necessary by the IATA. Spending for military purposes is strictly forbidden. Some of Afghanistan’s money was recently used to complete short-term infrastructure projects—the installation of satellite-based phone, fax, and telex and aeronautical mobile and fixed services for the air traffic control center—at Kabul International Airport to bring its equipment up to international standards. Other funds are slated for terminal repairs. (U)

Illicit and Other High-Interest Activity

Since late 1996, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, the Taliban military, and the Taliban’s supporters have used Ariana to conduct operations:

- Terrorist financier Usama bin Laden has frequently chartered an Ariana Boeing 727 to move supplies and personnel between Afghanistan and the UAE.

- Individuals belonging to an Islamic extremist group flew the carrier from Afghanistan to the UAE in 1997.

- Heroin and opium are frequently smuggled from Afghanistan aboard Ariana aircraft.
Ariana is used extensively for military purposes, according to US diplomatic reporting, as Taliban officials have made clear that the first priority for the airline should be doing its part to help Kabul win the current civil war. The carrier is frequently tasked to transport troops and supplies within Afghanistan.

Money transported on the carrier from the UAE to Afghanistan.
Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities

(29 July 1999)

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Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities

(29 July 1999)

Distribution:

Internal
Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States
Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States

Key Findings (U)

Travelers associated with various terrorist groups—including Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad—are tapping into global alien smuggling networks to abet their movements around the world, including to the United States. The extremist groups typically rely on the alien smuggling industry for:

- **Documents.** They solicit help from document vendors who cater to illegal migrants to receive genuine—though fraudulently obtained—passports, visas, and other identification documents from corrupt officials.

- **Logistics.** They pay smugglers to make travel, lodging, and other logistical arrangements, and to pay off corrupt officials who ensure that organization members can slip through various travel and security checkpoints.

Against a backdrop of strong continued demand for global illegal migration—including to the United States—and an inability of many countries to fortify their immigration regimes, opportunities for extremists to sustain or expand linkages to alien smuggling networks and to slip into the flows probably also will grow.

- **Most countries outside the developed world**—especially in or near fraudulent document centers that abet terrorist movements—remain ill equipped to effectively monitor their borders largely because of under-funded and poorly trained immigration regimes.
Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States

Terrorists Tap Into Alien Smuggling Networks

Though the vast majority of US-bound alien smuggling activity abroad is geared to serve migrants looking for a better life, occasionally such networks abet the movement of extremists, including those looking to enter the United States illegally.

Terrorists and suspected associates are tapping into fast-growing, alien smuggling networks around the world.

- Alien smugglers have abetted the travel of members or affiliates of more than a dozen extremist groups—including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).

Key Areas of Support: Documents and Transportation (U)

Alien smugglers help extremists—wittingly or unwittingly—by providing false documentation and facilitating transportation, particularly through Latin America but also in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

To procure key documents and use routes where corrupt officials can guarantee safe passage.

Such links between alien smuggling and the movement of extremists underscores the dimensions of the national security threat associated with the extensive alien smuggling infrastructure that supports US-bound illegal migrants.

This assessment was prepared by the Office of Transnational Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to...
document versions private vehicles—through fraudulently obtained passports, visas, and other official documents obtained from corrupt officials. smugglers make travel, lodging, and other logistical arrangements and pay off corrupt officials who secure passage through various checkpoints.
Continued Threats to Security

Against a backdrop of strong continued demand for global illegal migration—including to the United States—and an inability of many countries to fortify their immigration regimes, opportunities for extremists to sustain or expand linkages to alien smuggling networks and to slip into the flows probably also will grow.
Most countries outside the developed world—especially in or near fraudulent document centers that abet terrorist movements—remain ill equipped to effectively monitor their borders largely because of poorly funded and trained immigration regimes.
Bin Ladin To Exploit Looser Security During Holidays

Jordanian authorities last week arrested Bin Ladin operatives with plans to bomb tourists attending millennium celebrations in Jordan. Bin Ladin last week said he will carry out anti-US attacks and urged anti-US operations in targets in Yemen or Saudi Arabia.

In addition, the Intelligence Community's assessment of Bin Ladin's infrastructure raises the possibility of attacks in Europe, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Enhanced Political Cover for Attacks

Statements and actions in the past few months by extremists have given Bin Ladin greater deniability in the event of an attack. Bin Ladin over the past year has tried to placate the Taliban by portraying himself publicly as a mere instigator of terrorism.
A senior Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya member with longstanding ties to Bin Ladin last month publicly warned that a repeat of the 1997 Luxor massacre is likely.

Recent public expressions of support for Bin Ladin in Afghanistan and Pakistan—the result of UN sanctions and fears of US missile strikes—will help insulate him from Taliban retaliation for attacks. Sanctions on Afghanistan may heighten the Taliban's reluctance to confront Bin Ladin by increasing the group's dependence on his worldwide network for fundraising and military procurement.
Title: SOUTH ASIA: Afghanistan: Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Laden

SOUTH ASIA: Afghanistan: Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Laden:

Usama Bin Laden's public call late last month for violence against Americans has

caused fissures between senior Taliban officials over whether to continue to give Bin Laden safehaven.

Omar previously has expressed dissatisfaction with Bin Laden's high visibility, but the Taliban to date has given no indication it plans to expel the terrorist financier.

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Title: Caucasus: Terrorist Threat to US Interests

Caucasus: Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus

Chechens associated with Ibn al-Khattab - a Chechnya-based mujahedin leader planning to kidnap

- Khattab - a close ally of Usama Bin Laden - controls terrorist training camps in Chechnya and funds them in part with revenue from kidnappings, according to press reports.

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TO: IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE, STATE RCII/INR/DSIIA/, SSO DIA/DSO-CSR/, JOINT STAFF, DA IDHS, ONI, CNO, SSO NCIS/ATAC/0932/, CMD/CIC/CICII/, SSO USAF, SSO NAIC, SSO AIA, SSO NGIC/HCS/, SSO REDSTONE, SSO SOIC, NCIA QUANT, CDRLWA, JWAC/J2/, DIRNSA, TREAS DEPT, SSO DOE, FRI/JSN/NSD/CTED/.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: DATE: 25-April-2012
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJ: TERRORISM: SANITIZED VERSION OF THREAT REPORT

AS OF LATE AUGUST 2001, THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT AN INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH AL-QA'IDA WAS CONSIDERING MOUNTING TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE ON THE TIMING OF POSSIBLE ATTACKS OR ON THE ALLEGED TARGETS IN THE UNITED STATES.
Update
Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat
14 July 2000
Inspected Air Force UAVs

→ Mid-August is deployment target date
DCI Update
Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat
7 July 2000

Must credit INTELWIRE.com
Must credit INTELWIRE.com

TOP SECRET

Strategy

طةFocused response

– corroborating threat information

– disrupting terrorist planning/logistic support
During the millennium threat our response was global based on:

- the concern that al Qaidah cells worldwide had order to attack on 31 December
- confirmed evidence of massive planning against targets in/near Jordan
- arrest of operative with explosives inside US

With the current threat, we do not yet have confirmation that attack is imminent, but do have escalating and independent indicators of attack planning.
Engaging Masood

- Taliban summer offensive just started
- Direct engagement with Masood will enhance our ability to report on UBL (via Masood) and increase retaliation options if/when we are attacked by UBL
EXDIR UPDATE

Islamic Extremist Update

5 April 2000
Uzbek Initiative

in Tashkent
Budget Concerns

- CT supplemental still at NSC-OMB level
- Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections
- Due to budgetary constraints... CTC/UBL will move from offensive to defensive posture
EXDIR UPDATE

Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat

6 March 2000
Northern Afghanistan Deployment

- Maintain momentum with Masood on UBL and UBL Lieutenant capture options
- Continue dialogue with Masood
Islamic Extremist
Update
3 April 2000
Uzbek Initiative

→ to Tashkent as follow-on to

visit
Initiated collection efforts directed against UBL
+ Initiated contact with Masood's
FUTURE

Visit to Washington contacts with Masood

- Courtesy visit with
- Courtesy visit with NSC (Clarke) & DOS (Sheehan)
DCI UPDATE

Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat

18 February 2000
POTUS Threat

➔ UBL elements in Pakistan reportedly plan to attack POTUS plane with ?? missiles if he visits Pakistan
UPDATE

Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat

7 January 2000
What Did We See

- Significantly increased activity
- Clear evidence of planning/preparations for attacks
- The Millennium celebration likely intended to be the “kick off” for a possible period of extended terrorist attacks
- The terrorists delayed their plans due to extensive disruption operations conducted by FBI, CIA, and foreign services

Because of the disruption operations... we have bought time... weeks... months... but no more than one year
What are We Doing

➡️ DCI message
   - Thrust of DCI Message... "It ain't over"

➡️ Increase in DO and DI personnel working the Islamic Extremist issue

➡️ C/CTC seeking supplemental in funding

➡️ Relook at the Afghan situation
   - Masood
   - Targeting UBL
   - Targeting UBL lieutenants
Millennium Threat

interrelated threats:

- Evidence UBL has planned multiple attacks.
- Possibility that extremist groups may use millennium opportunities to conduct violence.
Millennium Threat: UBL

Strong likelihood UBL planning multiple attacks for New Year’s time frame:

- Disrupted UBL cell in Jordan was planning attacks on tourist sites on 31 December.
Millennium Threat: UBL
planned
multiple attacks on US targets before and on 1 Jan 2000.

- Individual with likely GIA ties arrested 14 December transporting 132 lbs explosives, bomb materials from Canada to United States.
Millennium Threat: UBL

Extremists reportedly plan to bomb US targets in Yemen & Saudi Arabia

17 DEC 99 TOP SECRET 0001586
Millennium Threat: UBL

Countering the Threat:

- Pursuing other UBL operatives

17 DEC 99

TOP SECRET

0001587
Millennium Threat: UBL

17 DEC 99

TOP SECRET

0001588
Millennium Threat: UBL

- Pursuing Abu Zubaida

- MON approved; plan being devised for targeting lieutenants.
Millennium Threat: UBL

- Plans progressing to work with Masood.
- Identification of targets for disruption; each has been tasked to the field.
celebrations offer unique opportunities for violence on the part of any terrorist group.

- Extensive tourist travel, large crowds, overburdened security.
- Potential for extensive media coverage.
Millennium Threat: CTC Actions

- Full-court press on UBL disruptions,
Millennium Threat: CTC Actions

- Connectivity to CIA and other Y2K centers and to key State, NSA, DoD, and CIA offices and watch centers.
Millennium Threat: CTC Actions
Millennium Threat: CTC Actions

- Strategy: triage for threat information, terrorist methods rapid dissemination of information.
  - CTC linguists
  - FBI linguists.
  - additional linguists from DoD.
- Task Force up and running at HQs.
DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1:

Production of the

Usama Bin Laden Situation Reports ("UBL Sitreps")

The UBL Sitreps were originally prepared at the DCI's request for distribution limited to the DCI and other senior Agency officials. At some point, the DCl, either on his own initiative or in response to a request from the APNSA, asked that a version be sent to the White House on 24 December 1998.

for distribution to Mr. Berger, Mr. Podesta, and Mr. Clarke.

from Monday through Friday.

was not prepared for the period from 24-27 January 2000.

Beginning in approximately August 2000, the Sitreps were sent less frequently once a week.

The last UBL Sitrep was sent on 16 January 2001.
DDCI
UBL UPDATE
29 October 1999

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-April-2012
Masood Expedition

Team Arrives in Panjshir
A UBL attack against US interests could occur at any time or in any place.

It is unlikely that the CIA will have prior warning about the time or place of any such attack.
Threat Assessment

We are concerned that an attack could occur in the future.

Once UBL's approval is given, this organization could launch an attack with no additional warning.
Threat Assessment

- 7 August - Anniversary of the Africa Bombings
- 20 August - Anniversary of the retaliatory missile strike against the camps

UBL has shown no interest in marking anniversaries, especially the Christian calendar. This understanding has "propaganda" value or attacking on the same date.
Disrupting UBL Operations
Problems with Capturing UBL

GOOD FI REPORTERS... BUT UNLIKELY TO CAPTURE UBL DUE TO RISKS INVOLVED

NEED TO IDENTIFY NEW GROUP TO UNDERTAKE CAPTURE OPERATION
TODAY - Disrupting UBL Operations

CURRENT OPERATIONAL REALITIES

DISRUPTING UBL OPERATIONS

TOP SECRET
FUTURE - Disrupting UBL Operations

Operational Objectives

Increase FI & IA capabilities within Afghanistan
UBL Update

20 July 1999
Disrupting UBL Operations
Disrupting UBL Operations

4/10/02

TOP SECRET
Disrupting UBL Operations
Disrupting UBL Operations
New Developments
New Developments

- Will be deployed to assist

- Team of senior, proven, experienced officers
- Highly motivated & goal oriented

4/10/02
IC Issues

✦ NSA
  - Trying to move forward... but still balky/bureaucratic
  - Bi-weekly meetings instituted to improve communications

✦ DoD/JCS/CENTCOM
  - Working with ADCI/MS
IC Issues

- FBI
  - FBI adding ___________ to TFL
  - Excellent cooperation with FBI/HQS and at the working level with FBI/NYFO

4/10/02  TOP SECRET
Looking Ahead

getting resources devoted to the target

♦ Need to find officers
Looking Ahead

✦ Staffing Problems
   – Will be tackling staffing requirements
Alec Station Resources
Must Do Some Fundamental Rethinking
Rethinking
Disrupting Operations

4/10/02 TOP SECRET
Rethinking Capturing UBL

Not Capable of Mounting a UBL Capture Operation or Ambush

FI Reporters on-the-ground reporters in Afghanistan

4/10/02 TOP SECRET
Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes To Keep al-Qa'ida Functioning

Sustaining its remaining cadre probably costs al-Qa'ida much less than the $30 million per year that we estimated it spent before 11 September. Al-Qa'ida no longer pays roughly $20 million per year to the Taliban in exchange for operating in Afghanistan.

Al-Qa'ida’s core concern probably is keeping the senior leadership safe.

Al-Qa'ida members probably pay numerous bribes to police and border authorities and is generous to individuals providing refuge and travel assistance.

Al-Qa'ida’s other major expense is terrorist operations.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 25-April-2012
TO: PRIORITY DIRNSA, SECSTATE WASHDC, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAP WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, SECRET SERVICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC/CIPR/, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEN/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA NATIONAL HUB

TOT: 271727Z JAN 97

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
25-April-2012

25JAN1997 / Page 1
DIST: 27 JANUARY 1997

USAMA ((BIN LADIN))’S ISLAMIC ARMY ISSUED A SERIES OF FATWAS, MOST OF THEM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

A) ONE FATWA STATED THAT IT WAS LEGAL UNDER ISLAMIC LAW FOR THE ISLAMIC ARMY TO FIGHT U.S. FORCES ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.

B) ANOTHER DECLARED THAT THE ISLAMIC ARMY COULD ATTACK U.S. FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA. THIS FATWA IS BASED ON PASSAGES FROM THE KORAN WHICH STATE "FIGHT ALL OF THEM AS THEY FIGHT ALL OF YOU."

C) ANOTHER STATED THAT THE ISLAMIC ARMY COULD ATTACK FORCES IN SOMALIA.

IT WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF ISLAMIC LAW IF NONCOMBATANT U.S. CITIZENS WERE KILLED PURSUANT TO ISLAMIC ARMY ATTACKS ON U.S. FORCES.
C05403598

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(e)<25Yrs
EO 12958 3.5(c)

TO: DIRNSA, SECSTATE WASHDC, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA
WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC
WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, SECRET SERVICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH
DC/OIPR/, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEN/DEPT OF
TRANSPORTATION, FAA NATIONAL HQ, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, JICPAC
HONOLULU HI, USARPAC INTEL PT SHAFER HI, CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR
HI, PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-April-2012
2. As of Early 1996, the Following Was the Structure of Usama (Bin Laden)'s Islamic Army.

A. Commander-in-Chief: Bin Laden

B. The General Shura Council:

Shura Council Members Are Appointed by Bin Laden.

- Madani al-(Tayyib)
- Abu 'Ubayda al-(Banshiki)
- (Abu Hajir al-'Iraqi), aka Mawdouh (Salim);
- Abu Hajir al-'Iraqi managed Bin Laden's overseas financial dealings, purchases, and investments.
C. THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMITTEES OVERSEEN BY THE SHURA COUNCIL:

- POLITICAL AND SHARIA COMMITTEE
- FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE - MADANI

AL-TAYYIB IS THE OVERALL SUPERVISOR FOR THIS COMMITTEE AND IS
<table>
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<th>INFORMATION COMMITTEE</th>
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MILITARY COMMITTEE - ABU 'UBAYDA AL-HANSIRI IS THE OVERALL LEADER OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.
TO: PRIORITY DIRNSA, SECSTATE WASHDC, DIA WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC, CNR WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, SECRET SERVICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR//, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEM/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA NATIONAL NO. USCENTE RN INTEL/CH MACDILL AFB

APPCL0RED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 25-April-2012


4. WHEN AN ISLAMIC ARMY-SPONSORED OPERATION OR POLICY ISSUE IS PROPOSED, THE SUBJECT IS BROUGHT BEFORE THE SHURA COUNCIL. THE SHURA COUNCIL DISCUSSES THE MATTER WITH BIN LADIN PRESENT. BIN LADIN MAKES HIS DECISION ON THE MATTER.

5. THE POLITICAL AND SHARIA COMMITTEE THEN STUDIES THE DECISION TO ENSURE IT IS IN KEEPING WITH ISLAMIC LAW.
How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network

Usama Bin Ladin is the ultimate decisionmaker in the organization he calls al-Qa'ida or the “Base.” He is directly involved in the planning of terrorist operations and oversees those in his group responsible for terrorism even when he is one step removed from the details.

- Bin Ladin is the commander or “amir” of al-Qa'ida—members pledge loyalty to him personally—and chairs a leadership council that makes policy decisions. His deputy Muhammad Atif appears responsible for managing day-to-day activities, including terrorist operations.

- Al-Qa'ida on paper is structured like a global criminal syndicate or mini-state, with political, financial, administrative, legal, military, security, and intelligence components.

- We have identified several senior leaders of al-Qa'ida, other key personnel, and several operational hubs. Bin Ladin's lieutenants in Afghanistan pull the strings that move terrorist, military, and political operatives worldwide—both those who have sworn personal loyalty to Bin Ladin and members of closely allied groups.

Al-Qa'ida's wide network in some 60 countries, as well as its ties to like-minded groups, enables it to conduct more than one major terrorist operation simultaneously and adapt readily to change.

- Al-Qa'ida develops relationships with sympathetic groups and individuals through its own religious, military, and terrorist training programs in Afghanistan, assistance to Islamic insurgent movements in various countries, and exploitation of contacts in certain Islamic relief organizations.
Bin Ladin at the Helm (U)

Bin Ladin is al-Qa'ida's amir, an Arabic Islamic term for "commander," and he founded the organization to bring together non-Afghan veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviets to promote worldwide Islamic jihad activity, including terrorism. Reporting suggests he involves himself directly in overall planning for terrorist operations and makes the final decisions. He appears to leave many day-to-day operational details to his deputy Muhammad ‘Atif—also known as Abu Hafs the Egyptian.

- ‘Atif plays a central role in coordinating the activities of Bin Ladin operatives abroad.

The Bureaucracy for Terrorism (U)

Al-Qa'ida has a complex organizational structure, with Bin Ladin or his deputy preside over the deliberations of a shura (advisory) council called the Leadership Council, which makes major operational and budgetary decisions with the amir having the deciding vote.

This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to...
The Executive Council manages several committees, notably including a Military Committee that handles training of "jihad youth" and combat operations.
Khalid Fawwaz, Bin Ladin's senior representative in London until his arrest last September, maintained contact and handled media placements, including Western journalists' interviews.

Bin Ladin's statement, or "fatwa" (Muslim legal opinion), last February that announced the formation of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" reflects his long-term effort to unite Islamic extremist groups under his banner. Only a few groups signed the statement, but he has built informal alliances with a variety of Islamic militant organizations and mujahidin worldwide, with al-Qa'ida as a nexus for varied forms of cooperation.¹

Cooperative arrangements. Allied groups share some members with al-Qa'ida, receive funding from it, and allow al-Qa'ida members to use their facilities and contacts. Bin Ladin can call upon these groups for logistical support and, in some cases, assistance with terrorist operations. These groups include mujahidin organizations and Islamic extremist groups—such as the Somali al-Ittihad al-Islami, Chechen insurgents, and the Yemeni Islamic Jihad—in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
al-Qa’ida provides members of its network training, safehaven, moneymaking opportunities, access to arms and illicit material, publishing and media facilities, communications, transportation, documentation, technical support, intelligence, counterintelligence, and liaison with other groups.

In addition to support from other groups, Bin Ladin taps into the resources of some international Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for financial and logistical support. Employees of a few NGO branch offices have diverted resources to benefit Bin Ladin and his associates.

Bin Ladin exploits these NGO ties to channel funds and obtain cover employment and travel assistance for his associates.
An Organization Designed for Flexibility (U)

Al-Qa'ida’s command structure, combined with its web of international alliances, serves Bin Ladin well in conducting terrorist operations abroad sufficiently for the organization to undertake more than one terrorist operation simultaneously. The posting of key Bin Ladin personnel, like Fawwaz, in dispersed locations with good communications with elements in several countries also enhances the network's ability to regroup quickly if Bin Ladin is again compelled to move his headquarters.
Subject: How Bin Laden Commands a Global Terrorist Network
Subject: How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network

Distribution:
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Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State

National Security Council
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1 - Daniel Benjamin, Director of Counterterrorism
1 - The Honorable Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
1 - Richard A. Clarke, Special Assistant to the President and National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism

Major General Donald Kerrick, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
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1 - VADM Vern E. Clark, Director, J-3 Operations
1 - BG, Richard Comer, Deputy Assistant Secretary Missions & Policy, SOLIC

Keith Hall, Director, National Reconnaissance Office
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>LTG Patrick M. Hughes, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>RADM Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Naval Intelligence</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Frederick Smith, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA</td>
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<td>Dale Watson, Deputy Assistant Director for Terrorism</td>
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*Federal Bureau of Investigation*
National Security Agency

1. LTG Kenneth Minihan, Director

Secret Service

1. Director, USSS

Department of Justice

1. Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
The Honorable Douglas Feith  
Under Secretary of Defense  
for Policy  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301-2000  

Dear Mr. Secretary:

(U) After reviewing the actual CIA source documents you cite in your 27 October letter to the SSCI and comparing the information contained in these source documents against your "Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003)", we have found instances where additions, deletions and/or source document clarifications are required for accuracy and our concurrence with the use of the information. These requirements are outlined in detail by entry number in the enclosure.

(U) Should you wish to discuss this further, please contact me or [omitted] of my staff at [omitted].

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Shamla K. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure
Requested Modifications

to
"Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida
Connections (1996-2003)"
1. LOCATION OF THE TARGET FROM THE STREET.

2. THE STREET LOCATED IN FRONT OF THE TARGET.

MOI STREET AND HAILE SELASSIE AVENUE ARE AMONG THE MOST CROWDED STREETS IN THE MIDDLE OF NAIROBI WHERE THE TRAFFIC MOVES CONTINUOUSLY (FROM 0800 HOURS UNTIL LATE AFTER SUNSET).

4. THE ROADS LEADING TO THE LOCATION:

IT IS EASY TO GET THERE BY ANY KIND OF TRANSPORTATION OR ON FOOT.

5. DESCRIPTION OF THE LOCATION FROM OUTSIDE:

A) IT IS A SIX-STORY BUILDING AS FOLLOWS:
   - UNDERGROUND
   - GROUND FLOOR
   - FOUR UPPER FLOORS

B) THE BUILDING IS SURROUNDED BY A FENCE MADE OF STEEL BARS ABOUT 3 METERS HIGH. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE FENCE AND THE BUILDING IS ABOUT 2.5 METERS, AND THE LAND IS COVERED BY FLOWERS AND GRASS. THERE ARE NO TREES THERE.

C) ADJACENT TO THE STEEL FENCE IS A SIDEWALK FOR PEDESTRIANS. IT CAN GET AS NARROW AS 3 METERS OR AS WIDE AS 12 METERS. ON THE EDGES OF THE SIDEWALK THERE ARE METAL POLES BLOCKING TRAFFIC FROM APPROACHING THE EMBASSY.
THERE ARE TWO ENTRANCES TO THE BUILDING:

1. THE MAIN ENTRANCE, MADE OF GLASS AND LOCATED ON MOI STREET. THERE ARE SIX STEPS AND A GLASS DOOR. THE WIDTH OF THE ENTRANCE IS NINE METERS. ADJACENT TO THE EDGE OF THE ENTRANCE (ABOVE THE FIRST THREE STEPS)
Afghanistan and Pakistan remain key training and logistic centers for Sunni Islamic militants. Various Sunni Islamic extremist groups use well-established systems of interrelated—and sometimes overlapping—safehouses and training facilities in these two countries.

One Peshawar-based nongovernmental organization (NGO)—the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or Service Organization—appears to play a key role in facilitating the training and travel of Islamic extremists.

World Trade Center and Manila-Based Plots. Many of the individuals convicted of bombing the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 were recruited through the al-Kifah center in Brooklyn—a branch of the MAK—according to press reports. The alleged mastermind of the plot, Ramzi Yousef, left Peshawar for New York six months before the bombing.
Maktub al-Khidamat (MAK) (U)

Abdullah Azom founded the MAK as the Services Office for Afghanistan in 1985 to support the recruitment and movement of volunteers to fight in the war in Afghanistan. He was killed by a car bomb in Peshawar in 1989. His followers have continued to pursue his stated goal of bringing about Islamic government worldwide through violence.

During the Afghan-Soviet war, MAK established several offices.

Logo for the Al-Kifah Center in Brooklyn, New York (U)
The MAK may be sponsoring one of the mujahidin units in Bosnia.

MAK's magazine, *Al-Jihad*, told readers to send $100 to the Emirate's Bank in Peshawar to sponsor a mujahidin in Bosnia.

In another article in its magazine, MAK stated that it had tried to open a school in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, to attract Arab volunteers for the struggle in Kashmir.
Information we have about this Afghanistan-Pakistan-centered network highlights the growing capabilities and worldwide reach of Sunni Islamic extremist groups.

The bombing of the World Trade Center and the Manila-based plots against US interests involved individuals from several countries from different Islamic extremist groups.
RESPONSE TO DCI DOCUMENT REQUEST NUMBER 52, ITEM 2

The Commission asked that we produce "all tapes, transcripts, and documents relating to interagency audio or video teleconferences that the CIA initiated, facilitated, or otherwise participated in on the morning of September 11, 2001, relating to the hijackings of September 11." For purposes of the request, you defined "morning" as between 0830 and 1200 hours EDT on September 11, 2001.

We have no tapes or transcripts to produce in response to this request.

The only document we have that relates to any such teleconference is a small portion of a "timeline" of 11 September Events put together by the chief of the Counterterrorist Center on September 11, 2001. The only portion of the timeline that relates to two video teleconferences—the entries are reproduced below, verbatim:

0940: DDCI John McLaughlin, C/CTC Cofer Black attend SVTC with NSC Special Assistant to the President for Transnational Threats, Dick Clarke. A conference call at 1100 is planned with the President, who is aboard Air Force One. Discussion on what we know vs. what is speculation. Consequence Management and Investigation is urged into action by all present. FAA reports that it has closed all airports and directed flights to land at the nearest airport. Rumors continue to be reported, including first report that another plane has crashed into the Pentagon.

* * * * * *

1115: DCI takes conference call from the President aboard Air Force One DDCI, C/CTC, DDO, DDJ present for call. Discussion centers around other likely targets, possible other hijackings or kidnappings of senior officials. C/CTC sums up that M.O. points to al-Qa'ida sponsored action, and that we will know more soon. DCI agrees.
Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution

Editor
Michael Warner

CIA History Staff
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC
2001

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
25-April-2012
Foreword

In May 2001, President George W. Bush directed that the Director of Central Intelligence commission the first in-depth study of the nation’s Intelligence Community in three decades. The panels appointed by DCI George Tenet will soon provide him, and the President, with their findings about the shape of the changing international order and the ability of the Intelligence Community to respond to the national security challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century.

After the panels present their findings, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, in conjunction with the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, intends to sponsor a conference to examine the transition required of the Intelligence Community. Panelists and attendees will strive to gain a clearer idea of what in our new era constitutes “intelligence” to policymakers, diplomats, commanders, and law enforcement officials. Conferees will also examine the ways in which the components of the Intelligence Community have adapted since the Cold War and the areas where change is still needed.

What is the future of “central” intelligence? The creators of the CIA in Congress and the White House believed that the reforms accomplished by the National Security Act of 1947 would minimize problems that had lulled the nation’s vigilance before Pearl Harbor. The centralization implied in the Truman administration’s directives and the National Security Act never fully occurred, however, mainly because of the limits on DCI powers codified in that very Act. As the Cold War recedes into the past and a new world order emerges, it is important to understand why intelligence was centralized in the form it was, and to explore differing views about its future. The assault on New York’s World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon in Washington bring this question into very sharp focus.

Michael Warner of the CIA History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence has compiled a set of key declassified laws, executive orders, NSCIDs, DCIDs, and policy documents guiding the role and growth of the central intelligence function from 1945 to 2000. As a member of the staff that assisted in the preparation of the NSPD-5 report, Dr. Warner observed at close hand the ways in which the assumptions and charters of the Intelligence Community have endured over the decades and the fates of various attempts to modify them. His draft introduction to this volume informed the work of the NSPD-5 staff, and I commend it to students of the Intelligence Community for its scope and its insight.

Admiral David E. Jeremiah, United States Navy (Retired)  September 2001
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19. George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1, *The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the US Intelligence Community*, 19 November 1998 .................................................. 145

vi
Historical Perspective

"...what have appeared to be the most striking successes have often, if they are not rightly used, brought the most overwhelming disasters in their train, and conversely the most terrible calamities have, if bravely endured, actually turned out to benefit the sufferers."

Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire*, Book III, 7

The explosions at Pearl Harbor still echoed in Washington when President Harry Truman and Congressional leaders passed the National Security Act of 1947. A joint Congressional investigation just a year earlier had concluded that the Pearl Harbor disaster illustrated America’s need for a unified command structure and a better intelligence system. Indeed, the President and many of his aides rightly believed that the surprise attack could have been blunted if the various commanders and departments had coordinated their actions and shared their intelligence. With that thought in mind, the creators of the National Security Act attempted to implement the principles of unity of command and unity of intelligence, fashioning a National Security Council, a Secretary of Defense, a statutory Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Central Intelligence Agency.

In almost the next breath, however, the National Security Act made important concessions to the traditional American distrust of large military establishments and centralized power. The Act (among other qualifications) ensured that the Joint Chiefs would not become a Prussian-style “General Staff,” created an independent air force, and insisted that the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would have no law enforcement powers. The Act also decreed that the intelligence divisions in the armed services and the civilian departments (what came to be called the “Intelligence Community”) would remain independent of the CIA.

Since 1947 Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs) have served within the bounds of this ambiguous mandate. They have had the responsibility of coordinating national intelligence collection and production without a full measure of the authority they needed to do so. Many Presidents and Congresses—not to mention DCIs—have expressed their frustration with this ambiguity and have assumed that the solution to the dilemmas it created lay in concentrating more power in the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. This centralizing impulse has prompted various reforms to increase the Director’s ability to lead the Intelligence Community. For years these attempts were made by the National Security Council (NSC) through a series of NSC Intelligence

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Directives. In the wake of "the time of troubles" for the Intelligence Community in the mid-1970s—marked by investigations into questions about excesses and accountability—three Presidents issued successive executive orders aimed at one goal: rationalizing American intelligence and increasing the DCI's power. Since the end of the Cold War, Congress itself has taken up the task, repeatedly amending the intelligence sections of the National Security Act.

The various regulations and amendments, however, have not fundamentally altered the "federalist" intelligence structure created in 1947. Strong centrifugal forces remain, particularly in the Department of Defense and its Congressional allies. Indeed, the case for centralization seems to be countered by historical illustrations of the perils of excessive concentration. In actual practice, the successful end to the Cold War and the lack of any national intelligence disasters since then seem to militate in favor of keeping the existing structure until some crisis proves it to be in dire need of repair.

Reform After World War II

The Agency began its statutory existence in September 1947—its creation ratifying, in a sense, a series of decisions taken soon after the end of the Second World War. That conflict ended in the summer of 1945 with Washington decisionmakers in broad agreement that the United States needed to reform the intelligence establishment that had grown so rapidly and haphazardly during the national emergency. Nevertheless, when President Truman dissolved the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in September 1945 he had no clear plan for constructing the peacetime intelligence structure that he and his advisers believed they needed in an atomic age. President Truman wanted the reforms to be part and parcel of the "unification" of the armed services, but the overhaul of the military that the President wanted would take time to push through Congress. In the interim, he created a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) to screen his incoming cables and supervise activities left over from the former OSS.

In early 1946, the White House authorized CIG to evaluate intelligence from all parts of the government, and to absorb the remnants of OSS's espionage and counterintelligence operations. Initially these disparate components of the new CIG

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2 Shorthand reference to "the Agency" is commonly used, and is used herein, as synonymous with CIA. "Community" has long been used, and is herein, to denote the totality of US executive branch organizations that produce and provide foreign intelligence to US policymakers and military commanders.


4 President Truman's 22 January 1946 directive establishing CIG is reprinted in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1996) [hereafter cited as FRUS], pp. 178-179. The first DCI, Sidney Souers, recalled in 1954 that he had been part of the collective effort (leading to CIG's establishment) to create "a central intelligence agency" that would ensure that national security policymakers "all would get the same intelligence—in contrast to the system that had prevailed, where the OSS would give one bit of intelligence to the President and not any to the secretaries of the military departments and the State Department, who had some responsibility to advise the President." Quoted in
shared little in common except an interest in foreign secrets and a sense that both strategic warning and clandestine activities abroad required "central" coordination. Indeed, these two missions came together in CIG almost by accident. Under the first two Directors of Central Intelligence, however, CIG and the Truman administration came to realize how strategic warning and clandestine activities complemented one another.

Meanwhile, the military "unification" issue overshadowed intelligence reform in Congressional and White House deliberations. In mid-1946 President Truman called again on Congress to unify the armed services. That April, the Senate's Military Affairs committee had approved a unification bill that provided for a central intelligence agency, but the draft legislation had snagged in the hostile Naval Affairs committee. Perhaps with that bill in mind, Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in May agreed among themselves that a defense reorganization bill should also provide for a central intelligence agency. President Truman the following month sent Congress the result of the Secretaries' accord (with modifications of his own), repeating his call for lawmakers to send him a unification bill to sign.

The administration's judgment that a central intelligence agency was needed soon firmed into a consensus that the new Central Intelligence Group ought to form the basis of this new intelligence agency. Indeed, CIG continued to accrue missions and capabilities. Oversight of the CIG was performed by a committee called the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), comprising the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, joined by the President's chief military adviser, Admiral William Leahy. National Intelligence Authority Directive 5, issued on 8 July 1946, provided the DCI with the basic implementation plan for the broad scope of powers envisioned in President Truman's charter for CIG. Indeed, it was NIAD-5 that created the real difference between OSS—an operations office with a sophisticated analytical capability—and CIG, a truly (albeit fledgling) national intelligence service authorized to perform strategic analysis and to conduct, coordinate and control clandestine activities abroad.

NIAD-5 represented perhaps the most expansive charter ever granted to a Director of Central Intelligence. It allowed CIG to "centralize" research and analysis in "fields of national security intelligence that are not being presently performed or are not being adequately performed."7 NIAD-5 also directed the DCI to coordinate all US foreign intelligence activities "to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed." The National Intelligence Authority through this directive ordered the DCI to conduct "all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its

7 National Intelligence Authority Directive number 5, 8 July 1946, reprinted in FRUS, pp. 391-392.
possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security."

In NIAD-5, the National Intelligence Authority determined that many foreign intelligence missions could be "more efficiently accomplished centrally" and gave CIG the authority to accomplish them. This in effect elevated CIG to the status of being the primary foreign intelligence arm of the US government. This mandate did not, however, give CIG the controlling role in intelligence analysis that DCI Hoyt Vandenberg had sought. The NIA's authorization was carefully phrased to allay fears that the DCI would take control of departmental intelligence offices; the Cabinet departments were not about to subordinate their own limited analytical capabilities to an upstart organization. In addition, NIAD-5 did not force a consolidation of clandestine activities under CIG control. Indeed, the Army defended the independence of its Intelligence Division's own collection operations by arguing that NIAD-5 gave CIG control only over "organized" foreign intelligence operations.

National Security Act of 1947

Congress initially paid scant attention to the new Central Intelligence Group. Indeed, CIG had been established with no appropriations and authority of its own precisely to keep it beneath Congressional scrutiny. As CIG gained new authority in 1946 and the White House gained confidence in its potential, however, a consensus emerged in Congress that postwar military reforms would not be complete without a simultaneous modernization of American intelligence capabilities.

The budding consensus even survived the death of the Truman administration's cherished unification bill in 1946. Ironically, prospects for unification only brightened when the opposition Republicans subsequently swept into control of the Congress in that year's elections, taking over the committee chairmanships and displacing powerful Democrats who had made themselves (in Harry Truman's words) "the principal stumbling blocks to unification."8 With the President's goal of military modernization suddenly in sight, the White House firmly told DCI Vandenberg that enabling legislation for CIG would remain a small part of the defense reform bill then being re-drafted by the President's aides, and that the intelligence section would be kept as brief as possible in order to ensure that none of its details hampered the prospects for unification. 9

8 Harry S Truman, Memoirs, Volume II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1956), pp. 46-47.
9 Admiral Forrest Sherman, a member of the White House team that drafted the bill, later told the House Committee on Expenditures that he and his colleagues feared that a detailed CIA section would prompt Congress to seek similar levels of detail in the armed services' sections of the bill, forcing a re-opening of the drafting process and possibly encumbering the draft with controversial specifics. See Lyle Miller's declassified draft, "Legislative History of the Central Intelligence Agency—National Security Act of 1947," Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Legislative Council), 25 July 1967, p. 72.
This tactic almost backfired. When President Truman sent his new bill forward in February 1947, the brevity of its intelligence provisions had the effect of attracting—not deflecting—Congressional scrutiny. Members of Congress eventually debated almost every word of the intelligence section, and made various adjustments. Ultimately, however, Congress passed what was essentially the White House’s draft with important sections transferred (and clarified in the process) from Truman’s 22 January 1946 directive establishing CIG—thus ratifying the major provisions of that directive. Thus the Central Intelligence Agency would be an independent agency under the supervision of the National Security Council; it would conduct both analysis and clandestine activities, but would have no policymaking role and no law enforcement powers; its Director would be confirmed by the Senate and could be either a civilian or a military officer.

What did Congress believe the new CIA would do? Testimony and debates over the draft bill unmistakably show that the lawmakers above all wanted CIA to provide the proposed National Security Council—the new organization that would coordinate and guide American foreign and defense policies—with the best possible information on developments abroad. Members of Congress described the information they expected CIA to provide as “full, accurate, and skillfully analyzed”; “coordinated, adequate” and “sound.” Senior military commanders testifying on the bill’s behalf used similar adjectives, saying the CIA’s information should be “authenticated and evaluated”; “correct” and based on “complete coverage.” When CIA provided such information, it was believed, the NSC would be able to assess accurately the relative strengths and weaknesses of America’s overseas posture and adjust policies accordingly.

Congress guaranteed CIA’s independence and its access to departmental files in order to give it the best chance to produce authoritative information for the nation’s policymakers. CIA was to stand outside the policymaking departments of the government, the better to “correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security.” Although other departments and agencies would continue to handle intelligence of national importance, the Agency was the only entity specifically charged by the Act with the duty of producing it. To assist in the performance of this duty, the DCI had the right to “inspect” all foreign intelligence held by other agencies, as well as the right to disseminate it as appropriate. If the DCI happened to be a military officer, then he was to be outside the chain of command of his home service; this would help him resist any temptation to shade his reports to please his superiors. Finally, the Agency was to provide for the US Government such “services of common concern” that the NSC would determine could more efficiently be conducted “centrally.” In practice, this meant

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10 Quoted in Miller, “Legislative History,” pp. 40, 45, 47, 48, 50.
11 Sec. 102(d)3. The phrase came from President Truman’s 22 January 1946 directive establishing CIG; see FRUS, p. 178. The original pages of the intelligence section of the National Security Act of 1947 are reproduced in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 131-135.
12 The Act was amended in 1953 to provide for a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) with the stipulation (since removed) that the positions of DCI and DDCI must not “be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status.”
espionage and other clandestine activities, as well as the collection of valuable 
information from open sources and American citizens.

Having approved the placement of these authorities and activities under one head, 
Congress in 1947 expected that CIA would provide the best possible intelligence and 
would coordinate clandestine operations abroad. Congress also implicitly assumed that 
the executive branch would manage CIA and the Intelligence Community with these 
purposes in mind. After fixing this course in the statute books, Congress stepped back 
and left the White House and CIA to meet these expectations. This was how Congress 
resolved the apparent contradiction of creating “central intelligence” that was not 
centrally controlled. The institution of central intelligence would henceforth steer 
between the two poles of centralization and departmental autonomy.

Not Only National But Central

Congress passed the National Security Act on 26 July 1947 and President Truman 
immediately signed it into law. The act gave America something new in the annals of 
intelligence history; no other nation had structured its foreign intelligence establishment 
in quite the same way. CIA would be an independent, central agency, but not a 
controlling one; it would both rival and complement the efforts of the departmental 
intelligence organizations. This prescription of coordination without control 
guaranteed friction and duplication of intelligence efforts as the CIA and the 
departmental agencies pursued common targets, but it also fostered a potentially healthy 
competition of views and abilities.

The National Security Council guided the Intelligence Community by means of a 
series of directives dubbed NSCIDs (the acronym stands for National Security Council 
Intelligence Directive). The original NSCIDs were issued in the months after the passage 
of the National Security Act. Foremost was NSCID 1, titled “Duties and

13 Ludwell Montague believed the term “Intelligence Community” made its earliest documented 
appearance in the minutes of a 1952 meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. For the sake of 
consistency the term Intelligence Community is used throughout this essay, even though the size and 
composition of the community has changed and now includes several large entities that did not exist when 
the National Security Act was passed in 1947. For example, of today’s 13 intelligence organizations in the 
community, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
Office and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency are among the eight intelligence organizations that 
come under the Department of Defense. The only independent agency (that is, not part of a policy 
department) is CIA. For the 1952 usage of the term, see Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell 
Smith as Director of Central Intelligence: October 1950—February 1953 (University Park, PA: 

14 At the time the Act went into effect, the intelligence agencies of the US government comprised the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Intelligence Research 
(State), the Intelligence Division (Army), the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Directorate of Intelligence 
(Air Force), and associated military signals intelligence offices, principally the Army Security Agency and 
the Navy’s OP-20-G.
Responsibilities," which replaced NIAD-5 and established the basic responsibilities of the DCI and the interagency workings of the Intelligence Community.15

NSCID 1 did not re-write NIAD-5, but instead started afresh in the light of the debate over the National Security Act and the experience recently gained by the new CIA. Where the earlier document had authorized the DCI to coordinate "all Federal foreign intelligence activities" and sketched the initial outlines of his powers, NSCID 1 had to work within the lines already drawn by Congress and precedent. The Director who emerged from NSCID 1 was more circumscribed in his role and authority than previously. He was now to "make such surveys and inspections" as he needed in giving the NSC his "recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities." Nonetheless, the DCI was—in keeping with Congress’ implicit intent in the National Security Act—a substantial presence in the intelligence establishment. NSCID 1 gave the DCI an advisory committee comprising the heads of the departmental intelligence offices, and told him to "produce" intelligence (but to avoid duplicating departmental functions in doing so). The type of intelligence expected of him and his Agency was "national intelligence," a new term for the information that the National Security Act called "intelligence relating to the national security."16 The DCI was also to perform for the benefit of the existing agencies such "services of common concern" as the NSC deemed could best be provided centrally. The NSC left the particulars of these responsibilities to be specified in accompanying NSCIDs (which eventually numbered 2 through 15 by the end of the Truman administration in 1953).17

Under this regime, DCIs were faced with contradictory mandates: they could coordinate intelligence, but they must not control it. Since the prohibitions in the statute and the NSCIDs were so much clearer than the permissions, every DCI naturally tended to steer on the side of looser rather than tighter oversight of common Intelligence Community issues. Because of this tendency to emphasize coordination instead of control, CIA never quite became the integrator of US intelligence that its presidential and congressional parents had envisioned. The DCI never became the manager of the Intelligence Community, his Agency never won the power to "inspect" the departments’

15 All versions of NSCID 1 have been declassified and are available at the National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263 (CIA), NNS-263-91-004, box 4, HSHC-5-00.
16 NSCID 3 (13 January 1948) defined national intelligence as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment." Its opposite was "departmental" intelligence, which NSCID 3 defined as intelligence needed by a department or agency "to execute its mission and discharge its lawful responsibilities;" see FRUS, p. 1109. Executive Order 11905 in 1976 retained "national intelligence" but changed its opposite to a phrase used in President Nixon’s 1971 letter, "tactical intelligence" (which the executive order did not further define, apart from saying that the DCI shall not have responsibility for it). E.O. 11905 also added the overarching term "foreign intelligence," defining it as information "on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations or their agents."
17 It bears noting that the NSCIDs endorsed the NIA’s 1946 assignment of the two main missions (strategic warning and the coordination of clandestine activities abroad) to the DCI and his Central Intelligence Group. In particular, NSCID 5 (12 December 1947) reaffirmed NIAD-5 in directing that the DCI "shall conduct all organized Federal espionage operations outside the United States...except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies." See FRUS, p. 1106.
operational plans or to extract community-wide consensus on disputed analytical issues, and CIA never had authority over all clandestine operations of the US Government.

Revisions and Oversight

This federalized intelligence structure did not satisfy the White House. Indeed, presidents from Dwight Eisenhower through Richard Nixon sought to adjust the NSCIDIs to improve the functioning of the Intelligence Community, primarily by pushing successive DCIs to exert more control over common community issues and programs. President Eisenhower paid particular attention to this issue, approving in 1958 the first major revisions of NSCID I. The September 1958 version of the revised directive added a preamble stressing the need for efficiency across the entire national intelligence effort, and began its first section by declaring “The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States....”

The September 1958 version of NSCID 1 also added a section on “community responsibilities” that listed the duties of the DCI to foster an efficient Intelligence Community and to ensure the quality of the intelligence information available to the US Government. It also emphasized to the existing departments and agencies their responsibilities to assist the DCI in these tasks. To this end, the new NSCID I created the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), a panel chaired by the DCI—with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (the DDCI) representing CIA—to coordinate a range of cooperative activities through a network of interagency committees. USIB soon built a sophisticated set of procedures, prompting former CIA Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick in 1973 to declare that “the USIB structure provides the community with probably the broadest and most comprehensive coordinating mechanism in the history of any nation’s intelligence activities.”

In 1971 President Nixon turned to the topic of intelligence reform and issued a directive that precipitated the first major revision of NSCID 1 in over a decade. In the spirit of President Eisenhower’s earlier initiatives, Nixon authorized a full-dress study of Intelligence Community cooperation, with an emphasis on cutting its costs and increasing its effectiveness. A committee headed by James Schlesinger of the Office of Management and Budget recommended major reforms, among them a greater role for the DCI in managing the Intelligence Community. President Nixon directed the adoption of many of these recommendations in a 5 November 1971 letter to the cabinet secretaries and senior policymakers who oversaw the community’s far-flung components. The NSC issued a revised NSCID 1 in February 1972 to disseminate the new guidance to the community.

The new version retained much of the earlier text, while adding that the DCI had “four major responsibilities.” He was to plan and review all intelligence activities and spending, submitting annually to the White House the community’s overall “program/budget”; to produce national intelligence for the President and policymakers; to chair all community-wide advisory panels, and to establish intelligence requirements and priorities. In addition, the 1972 NSCID 1 established several objectives to guide the DCI in discharging these responsibilities. He was to seek the attainment of greater efficiency, better and more timely intelligence; and, perhaps most of all, “authoritative and responsible leadership for the community.” The provision for DCI authority (albeit limited) over the Intelligence Community budget was new and significant; henceforth all subsequent directives governing the community would place at least one of the DCI’s hands on the collective purse strings.

The years that followed the issuance of the 1972 version of NSCID 1 witnessed dramatic changes in the policy dynamic surrounding the Intelligence Community. For several reasons—many of them related to the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, but including Agency misdeeds under earlier administrations as well—Congress began to impose itself directly on CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community in the mid-1970s. The White House responded to the new mood in Congress by acting to protect what it defended as the exclusive prerogatives of the executive branch. Republican and Democratic Presidents had long been content to delegate the chore of overseeing the community to the National Security Council, but President Gerald Ford, concerned that Congress would re-write the statutes undergirding the Intelligence Community, intervened with an executive order that supplanted the earlier NSCIDs.

Executive Order 11905 (18 February 1976) retained much of the language of the 1972 NSCID 1, but added much else as well. Most prominently, it established a lengthy list of restrictions on intelligence activities, which ran the gamut from a prohibition on the perusal of federal tax returns to a ban on “political assassination.” E.O. 11905 also revisited the traditional ground covered by the now-obsolete NSCID 1 series, assigning “duties and responsibilities” to the DCI and the various members of the Intelligence Community.

President Ford’s executive order did not diverge noticeably, however, from the earlier listings of the DCI’s duties. These were now to be: acting as “executive head of the CIA and Intelligence Community staff;” preparing the community’s budget, requirements and priorities; serving as “primary adviser on foreign intelligence,” and implementing “special activities” (i.e., covert action). Indeed, E.O. 11905 encouraged the DCI to devote more energy to “the supervision and direction of the Intelligence Community.” In this spirit, it revived an Eisenhower administration idea and urged the DCI to delegate “the day-to-day operation” of CIA to his Deputy Director for Central Intelligence.

President Jimmy Carter superseded E.O. 11905 with his own Executive Order 12036 barely two years later. The new order retained basically the same (albeit reordered) list of duties for the DCI in his dual role as manager of the Intelligence
Community and head of CIA. It also revamped the old United States Intelligence Board, expanding the list of topics on which it was to advise the DCI and renaming it the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). Where E.O. 12036 differed from preceding directives was in tasking the DCI to oversee the Intelligence Community budget. President Ford’s executive order had created a three-member committee, chaired by the DCI, to prepare the budget and, when necessary, to reprogram funding. Under the new provisions of E.O. 12036, however, the DCI now had “full and exclusive responsibility for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget.” These combined powers were somewhat less sweeping than under E.O. 11905, but more concentrated in now being vested in the DCI alone. He would issue guidance to the community for program and budget development, evaluate the submissions of the various agencies, justify them before Congress, monitor implementation, and he could (after due consultation) reprogram funds.

President Ronald Reagan in his turn replaced the Carter directive with Executive Order 12333 (4 December 1981), which remains in effect today. The new order deleted provisions for the NFIB and other boards, allowing the DCI to arrange interagency advisory panels as he needed (DCI William Casey quickly reinstated the NFIB on his own authority). This was, however, almost the only enhancement of the DCI’s power in an executive order that otherwise stepped back slightly from the centralization decreed by President Carter. Specifically, E.O. 12333 diluted DCI authority over the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget that E.O. 12036 had briefly strengthened. Where Carter had explicitly made the DCI the manager of the NFIP budgeting process, Reagan instead outlined a leading role for the DCI in developing the budget, reviewing requests for the reprogramming of funds and monitoring implementation. The change was not dramatic, but it was significant.

Management of the Intelligence Community by executive order during this period did not forestall increased Congressional oversight. In the 1970s both houses of Congress had created permanent intelligence oversight committees and passed legislation to tighten control of covert action. With the renewed polarization of foreign policy debates in the 1980s, both Republican and Democratic officials and lawmakers sought to “protect” intelligence from allegedly unprincipled forces that might somehow co-opt and abuse it to the detriment of the community and the nation’s security. Responding to these concerns, Congress further toughened the new regulatory, oversight, and accountability regime to check the powers and potential for abuses at CIA and other agencies. Congress ensured permanence for these changes by codifying them as amendments to law, particularly to the National Security Act of 1947.

By the late 1980s, Congress’s increased oversight role (and its new appetite for finished intelligence) prompted then-DDCI Robert Gates to comment publicly that CIA “now finds itself in a remarkable position, involuntarily poised nearly equidistant

20 The panel had been created by E.O. 11905, which titled it the “Committee on Foreign Intelligence”; it comprised the DCI (chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
between the executive and legislative branches.\textsuperscript{21} Not until the 1990s, however, did these changes significantly affect the "duties and responsibilities" of the DCI and the Intelligence Community.

Into a New Era

For the duration of the Cold War, the White House kept nudging successive Directors of Central Intelligence to do more to lead the Intelligence Community. DCIs more or less tried to comply. The statutory and institutional obstacles to centralization, however, proved daunting. Each DCI held budgetary and administrative sway only over the Central Intelligence Agency; the much larger budgets and staffs of the intelligence agencies in the Department of Defense (and their smaller cousins in other departments) remained firmly under cabinet-level officials who saw no reason to cede power to a DCI. Faced with this reality, DCIs had tended to let their community coordination duties suffer and to concentrate on the management of the CIA. Congress had intended a different course, however, and in the 1990s the legislative branch began its own campaign to encourage greater coordination in the Intelligence Community.

The end of the Cold War saw a subtle shift in Congressional attitudes toward intelligence. With the political need for a "peace dividend" acutely felt, Congress and the White House oversaw a gradual decline in real defense spending that affected the Intelligence Community as well. Declining defense budgets soon meant relatively declining intelligence budgets, which in turn put a premium on cost-cutting, consolidation and efficiency. Similar concerns had surfaced during the debate over the creation of CIA (when demobilization, not the incipient Cold War, was still the primary consideration in defense budgeting).\textsuperscript{22} To many members of Congress in 1992—as in 1947—the answer seemed to lie in increased authority for the DCI, who in turn could motivate a leaner, more agile Intelligence Community.

Congress in the 1990s partially supplanted E.O. 12333 with a series of amendments to the National Security Act. Those amendments were occasionally prescriptive (like the prohibitions added in the 1980s), but often they mandated various acts by the DCI. The intelligence-related passages of the National Security Act—which had hardly been amended at all before 1980—grew from 22 pages of text in the 1990 edition of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's \textit{Compilation of Intelligence Laws} to 48 pages in the 2000 version.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22} Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "Why Was the CIA Established in 1947?," \textit{Intelligence and National Security} 12 (January 1997), p. 30.
\textsuperscript{23} Unless otherwise noted, all amendments to the National Security Act cited herein are published in the several editions (1993, 1998, or 2000) of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's \textit{Compilation of Intelligence Laws}.
Foremost among these amendments was the Intelligence Organization Act of 1992. Inspired by the reforms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accomplished in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the legislation—for the first time in a statute—specified the roles (as opposed to the duties) of the Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI was to serve as head of the Intelligence Community, as principal intelligence adviser to the president, and as head of the CIA. As principal intelligence adviser he was to provide the nation’s senior policymakers, commanders, and lawmakers with “national” intelligence that was “timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based on all sources.” As head of the Agency he was to collect and evaluate intelligence (particularly from human sources), and to perform services of common concern and “such other functions and duties” as had been suggested since 1947. As head of the Intelligence Community he was to develop the Community’s budget, to advise the Secretary of Defense in the appointments of chiefs for the military’s joint intelligence agencies, to set collection requirements and priorities, to eliminate unneeded duplication, and to coordinate the community’s relationships with foreign intelligence services.

The Intelligence Organization Act also codified the DCI’s budgetary powers as described in E.O. 12333, considerably strengthening their provisions. The act decreed that the budgets of the various components of the Intelligence Community could not be incorporated into the annual National Foreign Intelligence Program until approved by the DCI, and required all agencies to obtain DCI approval before reprogramming any NFIP funds. In addition, the Act gave the Director something new: a carefully limited authority to shift funds and personnel from one NFIP project to another (provided he obtained approvals from the White House, Congress, and the affected agency’s head).

Events at mid-decade lent new urgency to the unfinished task of modernizing the Intelligence Community. At CIA, the arrest of Aldrich Ames and the spy scandal that ensued led to bipartisan calls for reform of the Agency. The subsequent Republican takeover of Congress in the 1994 elections seemed to provide an opportunity for sweeping changes in the community as a whole. Finally, the re-ordering of national priorities after the end of the Cold War had meant substantial budget cuts for the US

24 The Intelligence Organization Act was passed as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1993. Much of its text came from S. 2198, introduced by Sen. David L. Boren (D-OK) and titled the “Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992.” S. 2198 proposed a “Director of National Intelligence” to head the Intelligence Community; subordinate to this new officer would be the newly-styled “Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community,” 102d Congress, 2d Session, 1992, p. 2. The companion bill in the House of Representatives was HR. 4165, which offered a milder version of the DNI proposal. See also Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994 [2d ed.]), pp. 286-287.

25 The Goldwater-Nichols Act is widely credited with adding coherence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure—another creation of the National Security Act of 1947—which had long been viewed as fragmented and less effective than it should have been in advising the commander-in-chief. Among other reforms, Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, naming him (as opposed to the Joint Chiefs as a body) the principal military adviser to the President, clarifying his place in the national chain of command, giving him a Vice Chairman and improving the Joint Staff. See Ronald H. Cole et al., The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Joint History Office], 1995), pp. 25-38.
military, resulting in reduced budgets and lower personnel ceilings for the Intelligence Community. While military and intelligence resources had been reduced in early 1990s, however, Washington committed American forces to several, major overseas deployments in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caribbean.

The White House responded to the new situation by re-ordering intelligence priorities. The burgeoning military deployments demanded ever more tactical intelligence support, and President William Clinton issued a 1995 presidential order (PDD-35) instructing the Intelligence Community to provide it. Explaining his directive at CIA headquarters a few months later, he emphasized that the Community's first priority was to support "the intelligence needs of our military during an operation." Commanders in the field needed "prompt, thorough intelligence to fully inform their decisions and maximize the security of our troops." Since the military spent most of the 1990s deployed in one peacekeeping operation after another (often with more than one taking place at a time), the result of the commitment in PDD-35 was a diversion of shrinking national, strategic intelligence resources to growing, tactical missions.

Congress took a little longer to respond. In 1995 Congressional and outside critics coalesced in no fewer than six separate panels to study the US intelligence effort and recommend reforms. Almost all of the reports published by these groups endorsed a greater degree of centralization and enhanced authority for the Director of Central Intelligence. The wide variance in the size and scope of the study groups—which

27 President William J. Clinton, address to the US Intelligence Community, delivered at the Central Intelligence Agency's headquarters, 14 July 1995.
29 The lone dissenter was the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence's report, overseen by Georgetown political scientist Roy Godson and Harvard historian Ernest May. Its authors concluded: ...the failure of centralization efforts can be seen as reflecting the reasonable needs of the various components of the national security bureaucracy. In any case, the centralized model was probably better suited to the Cold War, with its emphasis on "national" level intelligence about the Soviet strategic nuclear threat, than to the present period when departmental, regional, and tactical intelligence requirements have exploded and gained new urgency. [See pp. xiv-xv.]
ranged in stature from academic colloquia to the presidentially-appointed "Brown-Aspin" commission—seemed to highlight their basic agreement on this issue. The Brown-Aspin commission report perhaps expressed the feeling best. After considering arguments for decentralization, the report cited President Truman's disgust with the bureaucratic rivalry that "contributed to the disaster at Pearl Harbor" and concluded that "returning to a more decentralized system would be a step in the wrong direction." The report declined to suggest alterations in "the fundamental relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense," but nonetheless urged a strengthening of "the DCI's ability to provide centralized management of the Intelligence Community."30

Congress heeded the conclusions and the recommendations of these several reports when it drafted the Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996. That Act, among its other provisions, required the Secretary of Defense to win the concurrence of the DCI in appointing directors for the National Security Agency, the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Under the Act, the DCI would also write (for the NSC) annual performance appraisals of these three agencies.31 The Act also gave the DCI several new aides (nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate) to assist in managing the Intelligence Community: a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, as well as Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence for Collection, Analysis and Production, and Administration. It also enhanced the DCI's role as an adviser to the Pentagon's tactical and inter-service intelligence programs, strengthened his limited ability to "reprogram" money and personnel between national intelligence programs and created a sub-committee of the NSC to establish annual priorities for the Intelligence Community.

Congress did not, however, resist the shift of national means to tactical ends. The shift of intelligence resources toward support for military operations worried officials and observers of the Intelligence Community. Indeed, DCI Robert Gates complained as early as 1992 that cuts in the defense budget were forcing the military to trim tactical intelligence programs and pass their work on to the "national" intelligence services.32 PDD-35 seemed to make the situation even more acute. More than one appraisal in the year after its issuance warned that "support to the warfighter" could demand a disproportionate share of intelligence efforts; a Congressional study even blamed PDD-35, in part, for this development.33 Nevertheless, these worries remained on the margins of the debate for several more years.

The Twentieth Century Fund's report did not discuss the DCI's responsibilities or the centralization issue, although a "Background Paper" by Allan E. Goodman (bound with the report) implicitly endorsed greater powers for the DCI; see p. 78.

32 Testimony of Robert Gates on 1 April 1992 at the Joint Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community," 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1992, p. 108.
33 For expressions of official and outside concern, see House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century," 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 1996, p. 245. See also the joint comment by Morton I. Abramowitz and Richard Kerr in Richard N. Haass, Project Director for the
Contradictory Impulses

The net effect of the changes made both by the White House and by Congress under both Republican and Democratic majorities was to urge the DCI to exercise more control over the Intelligence Community while limiting his freedom to allocate "national" intelligence resources among competing priorities. Members of Congress collectively seemed impatient with executive branch implementation of reforms to streamline and motivate the community during a long decade of shrinking real defense budgets. At the same time, however, no Congress seriously considered forcing the various civilian and military agencies into a unitary system with a Director of Central Intelligence (or whatever the title) transformed into a true intelligence czar. The executive branch neither assisted nor resisted this congressional impulse to enhance the DCI's authority and the centralization of the Intelligence Community. In effect, however, the White House's aforementioned actions with regard to intelligence were anything but neutral.

The contradictory impulses affecting the Intelligence Community showed in the way the executive and legislative branches together crafted a 1996 law, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Act, which created the Department of Defense agency of that name out of components from CIA and Defense. While this marked a diminution of the DCI's direct control over imagery analysis, the NIMA Act took pains to preserve DCI authority to prioritize assignments for "national imagery collection assets" and to resolve conflicts among competing priorities. The net effect was ambiguous; the DCI and the CIA lost actual, day-to-day control over an important component of the Intelligence Community, but gained a statutory voice in the nation's employment of that component.

In 1998 DCI George Tenet issued a reconstituted series of Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs), led by a new DCID-1/1, titled "The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the US Intelligence Community." DCIDs had traditionally not been issued as policy statements; they had essentially been implementing documents for the policies established in the NSCIDs (and later in the executive orders). DCID 1/1 stayed well within this tradition, but provided an important reference for the entire community by arranging and citing in one document the key passages of Executive Order 12333 and the amended National Security Act.

The preface to DCID 1/1 stated that it was only intended to be "illustrative." Indeed, readers were directed to the citations "for controlling language." This spare format perhaps conveyed a message more powerful than its authors realized. The DCI's new-found ability to cite so many passages of the United States Code to buttress his authority meant that his powers had grown substantially since its meager beginnings in


34 See Section 1112 of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act, which was passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; Compilation of Intelligence Laws (2000).
January 1946. The fact that a DCI felt the need to cite all those passages for the edification of Intelligence Community colleagues, however, suggests that his authority still had far to go.

The blurring of the divide between “national” and “tactical” intelligence seemed at decade’s end to provide unclear portents for the future of the DCI’s authority. By 2000 the earlier warnings were widely seen to have been accurate. A high-level study commission recently has complained that declining intelligence resources, combined with increased demands for “warning and crisis management,” have resulted in:

...an Intelligence Community that is more demand-driven. ... That demand is also more driven by military consumers and, therefore, what the Intelligence Community is doing is narrower and more short-term than it was two decades ago.35

Another commission, reporting its findings on the National Reconnaissance Office, found in PDD-35 a lightning rod for its criticism:

There appears to be no effective mechanism to alert policy-makers to the negative impact on strategic requirements that may result from strict adherence to the current Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-35) assigning top priority to military force protection. That Directive has not been reviewed recently to determine whether it has been properly applied and should remain in effect.36

The Elusive Vision of Central Intelligence

Today, intelligence remains the only area of highly complex government activity where overall management across departmental and agency lines is seriously attempted.37

Ten years past the end of the Cold War and five since the spate of reform proposals in 1996, this observation by the Brown-Aspin commission seems to remain valid. The Director of Central Intelligence is nominally stronger now; new laws and amendments have augmented his power to lead the Intelligence Community. Nevertheless, the community remains a confederated system, in which the DCI has leadership responsibilities greater than his responsibilities. The system seems roughly balanced between the need for central direction and the imperative to preserve departmental intelligence autonomy. If that balance perhaps appears to be less than optimal, there nevertheless is no obvious imperative to correct it in any fundamental way. Indeed, the 2001 report of the blue-ribbon “Commission on National Security/21st Century”

35 Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security, p. 82.
37 Commission on Roles and Missions, Preparing for the 21st Century, p. 47.
Century” (the Hart-Rudman commission) recommended “no major structural changes” in the management of the Intelligence Community and noted that “current efforts to strengthen community management while maintaining the ongoing relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense are bearing fruit.”38

The members of Congress who passed the National Security Act of 1947 had wanted the new Central Intelligence Agency to provide policymakers the best possible information and to coordinate clandestine operations. They assumed that the President’s intelligence officer—the Director of Central Intelligence—would accomplish these objectives, and left the executive branch to its own initiative for the next four decades. This was how Congress resolved the dilemma of having a “national” intelligence system that was not centrally controlled. Succeeding presidents oversaw the Intelligence Community through a series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives and executive orders, which recognized the gap between coordination and control and encouraged DCIs to do more to bridge it and to manage America’s intelligence efforts. After the Cold War ended, however, Democratic and Republican Congresses grew impatient with the executive branch and urged that intelligence be done centrally. Nonetheless, no Congress grasped the nettle of sweeping reform, either to decentralize the system or to give the DCI command authority over military intelligence and the departmental intelligence offices. At the same time, the executive branch’s insistence on using declining resources first and foremost to support military operations effectively blunted the Congressional emphasis on centralization by limiting the wherewithal that DCIs and agency heads could devote to national and strategic objectives.

This ambiguity is likely to endure for the same reasons it arose in the first place: no one can agree on what should replace it. Reform faces the same obstacles that Harry Truman and his aides encountered in 1945. Everyone has a notion of how reform should be implemented, but everyone also has a specific list of changes they will not tolerate. The mix of preferences and objections produces a veto to almost every proposal, until the one that survives is the one policymakers and legislators dislike the least. Ambiguity is also likely to keep alive the durable idea—born from the Pearl Harbor disaster—that the axiomatic principles of unity of command and unity of intelligence can best be served through an increased centralization of US intelligence efforts.

America’s national security framework forces such ambiguities on policymakers and commanders for good reasons as well as bad. The great economic and military strength of America and the comparative material wealth of its Intelligence Community has provided a certain latitude for experimentation—and even duplication of effort—in the service of higher, political goals. In such a context, a decentralized Intelligence Community may be the only kind of system that can maintain public and military support for an independent, civilian foreign intelligence arm in America’s non-parliamentary form of government, where it is possible for the two major political parties to split control over the executive and legislative branches of government. Decentralization assures the Pentagon of military control over its tactical and joint intelligence programs. It also

38 Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security, p. 83.
assures members of Congress of both parties that the President's chief intelligence adviser cannot acquire a dangerous concentration of domestic political power or monopolize the foreign policy advice flowing into the White House. Thus we are likely to live with the de-centralized intelligence system—and the impulse toward centralization—until a crisis re-aligns the political and bureaucratic players or compels them to cooperate in new ways.
Office of Inspector General

Inspection Report

THE AGENCY'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT
Directorate of Operations

25-April-2012

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REPORT BY
THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
ON
THE AGENCY’S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT

OCTOBER 1994

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Our inspection, which was conducted from 1 March 1994 to 30 June 1994, found that CIA and the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) have had significant counterterrorist mission successes. The counterterrorist program has been most effective when the collection target was well defined—an organized group, a specific event, or an individual terrorist. The most significant weakness of the program was an extremely limited ability to provide timely warning of impending terrorist attack. The difficulty in penetrating terrorist groups is the principal cause of this weakness.

CTC is an effectively managed, mature Center performing its mission as intended. Customers give CTC high marks for expertise and responsiveness.

Relationships with some key FBI field offices and legal attaches are negatively affected by poor professional relationships between CIA and FBI field officials stemming from personal and professional experiences. These relationships hamper the counterterrorist efforts of both agencies. Page 8 includes an advisory regarding this issue.

CIA officers working in the counterterrorist program do not receive systematic training in the range of skills required to provide effective support to law enforcement agencies.

Our recommendation for required training is intended to reinforce the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force recommendations.

The main challenge for the Agency is to adapt its strategy, resources, and organization to new trends in terrorism—a rising threat from radical religious or ethnic nongovernmental groups and an increased presence of terrorist organizations in the United States. On the basis of our research, we believe CTC and the DO are currently engaged in addressing that challenge.
Trends

This inspection of the CIA's counterterrorist program comes at a time of significant transitions in worldwide terrorist groups. The threats posed by some state-sponsored terrorists and some leftwing terrorist groups have declined. At the same time, threats from radical religious, ethnic, and nongovernmental terrorist groups have increased. These latter groups, often very small, close knit, and deadly are extremely difficult to penetrate.

The fact that terrorists have struck in the United States and have the potential to strike here again profoundly affects intelligence priorities and objectives. The World Trade Center bombing and the alleged plot to blow up other facilities in the New York City area brought terrorism home to the United States and to the CIA. Those events, and subsequent discovery of the extent of terrorist elements resident in the United States, reemphasized the priority of the CIA counterterrorist mission--and complicated it.

The trends also require Agency and Center management to simultaneously shift target priorities, increase penetrations of terrorist organizations, enhance and improve support to law enforcement agencies, change Counterterrorist Center (CTC) organization to reflect the new priorities, improve the use of information management technologies, and accomplish all of these changes within the context of severe budget and personnel constraints.

CTC management is currently engaged with the Intelligence Community in adjusting target priorities and changing CTC organization to reflect those new priorities. The Congress is considering

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providing resources to go with the additional tasks.

**Agency Resources**

The Counterterrorist Center (CTC) is the main counterterrorist element for the Agency and for the Intelligence Community. The Chief of CTC serves as DCI Center Manager, Community Issue Coordinator in his role in the Needs Process, National Intelligence Officer, and, in most cases, crisis manager. CTC is a worldwide, multifaceted operational and analytical unit.

Although CTC is central, other CIA elements are actively involved in counterterrorist programs. The DO area divisions, DS&T, open-source, imagery, and signals intelligence.

**Program Effectiveness**

We measured the effectiveness of the Agency's counterterrorist program against four criteria:

- Mission objective achievements.
Mission Objectives. CIA has had notable successes measured against its mission objectives. Terrorist capabilities have been minimized and, indirectly, by helping law enforcement agencies bring terrorists to justice—a World Trade Center bomber and hijacker.

Customer Evaluations. During this inspection we discussed the effectiveness of CIA support with a wide range of external customers in the policy and law enforcement communities. CTC was the key element to which most of the customers related as playing a significant role. We also discussed CTC's support with customers within CIA.

External Customers. Generally, external customers were extremely pleased with Agency support. Praise for the program covered many different services from White House-level policy support, to effective Intelligence Community leadership on resource and collection issues, to tactical support to law enforcement agencies. Most of the praise was directed at CTC and, particularly, at its senior managers for their responsiveness to customers, for their expertise on terrorist issues, and for their Community leadership. Also received praise and, in several
cases, awards from the FBI for their counterterrorism support.

Internal Customers. Internal customers--particularly stations and bases abroad--reported excellent support from CTC. Interviews with case officers serving in field stations indicated that CTC answers its mail promptly. It
provides sound operational support and initiatives, in most cases. Highly valued by stations for their contributions to maintaining critical liaison relationships.

A few internal customers, particularly station officers, expressed reservations about the effectiveness of some CTC operational recommendations. They said that CTC desk officers do not have a sufficient grasp of local operational realities and that their recommendations reflected that fact. A few station officers also indicated that, in their view, CTC was sometimes too aggressive.

We did not evaluate the specific cases about which internal customers expressed concern. We did discuss both criticisms with senior CTC managers. They told us that, in their judgment, the quality of CTC operational recommendations is sometimes adversely affected by the Center's having too few officers. With regard to CTC pressing stations, senior CTC officials commented that aggressiveness is appropriate to the Center's mission and what is expected of CTC by policymakers.

Support to Law Enforcement Agencies. Agency components support the Secret Service, FBI, Department of Justice, and other law enforcement and regulatory agencies. The main efforts involve support to the Secret Service and the FBI. During the inspection, both the Secret Service and the FBI had officers assigned to CTC.

CTC supports the Secret Service in both its protective responsibilities and in its special investigation. Several Agency elements--CTC and many stations--support FBI counterterrorist efforts.

Secret Service. The Secret Service (USSS) reports excellent Agency support for both its protective
According to senior Secret Service managers, CIA reporting was essential in 15 of the Secret Service's major protective cases in the past two years.

Senior Department of Justice officials also report good support from the Agency on counterterrorism issues and an excellent, but limited, personal involvement with CTC. They have concerns about counterterrorism support from CIA that parallel issues considered in the draft report of the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force.

Senior Justice Department officials indicate that, in their view, CIA needs to improve its handling of criminal information. While they did not cite cases involving terrorism, they did refer to as examples of problems that could have been avoided with appropriate training and foresight by Agency officers.
They also expressed a generalized concern about the Agency's slipping into law enforcement activities in its close support to law enforcement agencies.

FBI. Relationships with the FBI are a more complex matter. We interviewed officers and conducted interviews relating to CIA-FBI relationships. The data from our interviews indicate that, generally, CIA support to the FBI was effective on counterterrorist matters. In the case of the World Trade Center bombing, CIA support was particularly helpful.

At the same time, data from the inspection, including interviews with senior officials in FBI and CIA field elements, indicate that the effectiveness of support to FBI counterterrorist programs is overly dependent on the status of personal relationships. Some relationships are excellent; others are not. In addition, our interviews indicated that the prevailing view among FBI field officers and some Department of Justice officials working on counterterrorism is that the CIA withholds information that the FBI needs for its counterterrorist efforts.

In one interviews with CIA officers revealed that the FBI would not tell the CIA station what terrorist groups it was concerned about. In another, indicate that mistrust adversely affects information sharing and cooperation on counterterrorist programs. If poor cooperation leads to a failure to provide information that
could have been used to preempt a terrorist incident in the United States, the results could be tragic.

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI--AN ADVISORY:**

- Poor professional relationships between CIA and FBI personnel serving at some key US and foreign posts adversely affect the counterterrorist programs of both agencies and require the attention of the top managers of both agencies.

- The perception among FBI and Department of Justice personnel that CIA is withholding information the FBI needs to fulfill its counterterrorist mission also affects critical relationships between the Agency and the FBI.

- Similarly, some CIA field personnel perceive that they are not receiving information from FBI field offices required to fulfill their counterterrorist mission.

Training. Interviews of CTC officers and their managers demonstrate that CIA employees are not provided the systematic training they require for effective support to law enforcement agencies. Some officers are experienced and have absorbed on-the-job training. Others are neither experienced nor trained. As the Joint Task Force concluded, compromising a source or damaging the prosecution of an alleged terrorist because a CIA officer was not aware of the requirements for supporting law enforcement agencies are real and serious risks. Interviews with officials in the law enforcement community indicate that they see evidence of inadequate training of CIA officers in their work with CIA on counterterrorist matters.

To ensure effective support to law enforcement agencies, all Agency officers working on terrorism need
legal awareness training. The recent addition has helped make some additional time available for training, which is now provided.

We suggest these current efforts be strengthened by the systematic, formal training the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force proposes in its draft report. The costs of this training would depend mainly on the time CIA and other officers would devote to taking or teaching the course(s).

TRAINING FOR SUPPORTING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES—AN OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATION

Findings

- Agency officers are not systematically receiving training in supporting counterterrorist efforts of law enforcement agencies.
- Our interviews with CIA officers and with knowledgeable officials in the law enforcement community provide clear evidence that, as a result of insufficient training, many Agency officers at Headquarters and in field stations do not fully understand the legal impact their activities may have on the subsequent conviction of a terrorist and are unclear about law enforcement's legitimate role abroad.

Operational Recommendation: That all appropriate Agency personnel engaged in supporting law enforcement agencies' counterterrorism efforts receive legal awareness training as proposed in the draft report of the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force.
CTC--Elements of Success

CTC is recognized within the Agency, the Intelligence Community, and the Policy Community as an effective DCI Center. In interviews, focus groups, surveys, and briefings, CTC employees and customers told the team of their high regard for the Center, its product, and its management. We found no significant substantive issues relating to the management of CT programs at the Agency level. DO Area Divisions and field stations accept and by all evidence work effectively with CTC. Within the Community, CTC has provided effective leadership for both budget and collection resources. We believe, on the basis of our research and information from interviews, that this record is a reflection of the leadership that a well-run, firmly established, widely accepted DCI Center can provide for an Agency program and for the Intelligence Community. Our data also suggest that this record is a reflection of the quality and skills of current senior CTC managers.

The elements of CTC's mission and management success can be identified and should be remembered as positive lessons learned for other DCI centers.

Mission Clarity. We found clarity concerning CTC's mission in the Center, the Agency, and in the Community. In the management survey, 99 percent of the CTC staff agree that they understand the Center's missions and functions. Our data also indicate that CTC management has kept CTC
employees and CTC customers well informed about mission and functions.

In the DO. The Center is administered within the Directorate of Operations where the operational mission is paramount and the Directorate is designed to support the mission. CTC supports DO area division efforts effectively and, in turn, draws on them for support.

DI-DO Integration. In CTC we found operational and analytic activity effectively integrated. Our interview data indicate that the work of DI analysts is highly valued by the operations officers in the Center, especially those analysts involved in operations support. The analysts and operations officers both report that the analysts have adequate access to DO operations traffic to allow them to work effectively, and conversely operations officers have access to DI data bases.

Community Center. Judging from our interviews with CT Community participants, we believe CTC has effectively projected its role as an Intelligence Community center. Officials with whom we met in the Intelligence and Policy Communities acknowledged CTC's central and coordinating role on counterterrorism issues including budget, crisis management, analytical work, and some operational efforts. Comments from a focus group composed of officers working in CTC on rotation from other counterterrorism community agencies underlined the fact that they were well integrated into the operations of the center. This group also agreed that CTC provides "value added" in terms of expertise and the synergistic effects of an integrated center.

Responsive. The Inspection Team found that policy customers, operational elements of other agencies, and CIA operations officers in the field regard the Center as responsive to their needs. Focus groups and interviews with
CTC officers reveal that prompt response is considered to be important and a source of some pride in CTC.

...With a Few Problems
Against this background of strong leadership and engaged program management, our individual interviews, focus groups, and survey data brought a few problems to our attention.

Resources. Some Directorate CT efforts do not appear to be in concert with current Agency priorities. The size of the Agency's effort appears disproportionate to the current threat.

Reorganization. In interviews and focus groups, a significant number of CTC employees complained that they had to rely on five months of rumors for information about the reorganization of the Center. They also lamented that CTC management did not seek out the views of the working-level officers, as had been done in a recent reorganization of

Gender. Responses to the management survey revealed a perception among about 25 percent of female officers in CTC that their professional opportunities were limited by their gender. Female officers pointed to the all-male management structure of the Center and the fact that all senior managers in the Center are male. They also said that they did not have an opportunity to apply for management jobs in the process of selecting officers was not open. The concerns of female officers appear to warrant CTC management attention, particularly in the process used to select CTC managers. Interviews with managers indicated that the selection process was not open, and a review of the current management structure of the
center confirms that all managers in 

are male.

Career Issues. The management survey, focus groups, and interviews with managers and staff officers indicated a widespread concern about the adverse impact of service in CTC on the careers of its officers.

In the opinion survey and personal interviews, the overwhelming majority of CTC employees told us that they found working in CTC to be challenging and personally rewarding. However, in the opinion survey, only 35 percent of employees agreed that their home office or career service recognized the value of their work in CTC and rewarded it.

Furthermore, we were told by both managers and employees that perceptions about the impact of service in CTC on employees' careers discouraged some well-qualified employees from serving in CTC. In the course of interviews, managers, operations officers, and analysts had told us of persons who had turned down offers of positions in CTC because of concerns about adverse effects on their careers.

The causes of this concern appear to vary by directorate. Some CTC managers and staff officers point to specific cases of deserving DI officers on rotation to CTC who were not promoted because they had not done traditional DI long-term research papers. Senior CTC managers, however, do not believe that long papers were the issue in those cases.

In the DO, the concern has two origins. First, among DO officers, service in CTC may delay opportunities to serve abroad because many area divisions require a headquarters tour before assignment overseas. Officers assigned to CTC, most of whom are engaged in training, are disadvantaged by precepts designed for
officers assigned engaged primarily

In order to understand the facts underlying the perception that service in CTC may hinder an officer's career progression, we interviewed senior DI managers and reviewed promotion data.

Senior DI managers we interviewed believe that the DI officers are being evaluated fairly and promoted equitably. They indicated that the rotational panel chaired by the A/DDI is specifically charged with resolving disputes between home and rotational offices.

Data on DI and DO promotion rates for officers serving in CTC. With regard to DI officers, the data indicate that promotion rates for DI officers serving in CTC are essentially the same as for DI officers serving in their home DI offices.

We also interviewed senior DO managers and developed data concerning promotion rates. The Deputy Director for Operations recently determined that, despite his earlier efforts to secure additional officers for the Center, none were provided. Therefore, he recently directed assignment of officers to the Center in the coming months. The need for repeated direct action by the DDO is one of the best indicators of the strength of perceptions and the depth of the problem.

The data indicate that officers are disadvantaged by service in CTC. officers do not receive promotions at a rate comparable to their colleagues in the DO as a whole. In order to be receiving promotions at the same rate as other officers, should have received promotions during the last four years. Instead, they received
The data do not provide information about the reasons for the shortfall in promotions. However, our interviews indicate that limited opportunity for service overseas and

The individual competitiveness of the officers serving in CTC is also a plausible contributing factor.

The perception that officers are disadvantaged by service in CTC is supported by the promotions data. Compared with promotion rates across the DO, promotion parity for CTC officers would have been promotions during the last four years, while were granted. The deviation from parity in CTC promotion rates compared with DO promotion rates is likely to be accounted for by the fact that precepts do not adequately cover the activities of officers serving in CTC.

We discussed the issue of promotions with CTC management. They indicated that the A/DDO has recently become aware of the disparity of precepts affecting CTC officers. He has directed a group to review precepts and to make necessary changes.

The data however, indicate that officers received a somewhat higher rate of promotions than their counterparts in other DO offices. Promotion parity for officers would have been promotions during the last four years. In fact, officers were promoted. During the same period, promotion parity for officers would have been while promotions were granted.

Information Systems

CTC responsibility for information management systems includes several internal systems and the Community On the basis of briefings we received and our interviews with CTC officers, we believe the internal information systems are
well focused and now meet the requirements of CTC.

In contrast with the internal systems, program has been affected by both management and funding problems. As a result, senior CTC managers responsible for the program acknowledge that the Intelligence Community has underperforming Community system.

Interviews with present and past program managers suggest that the origins of the problem lie, in the first instance, in grudging acceptance of responsibility for developing the system by the DO and CTC. The program concept originated with the Intelligence Community Staff several years ago. The staff decided that CIA should develop and manage the system. Senior CTC managers accept responsibility and are working to provide the resources for an effective program, however, they indicate that they would just as soon not have responsibility!

Compounding CTC's initial reluctant acceptance of responsibility was the fact that, according to our interviews, the DO and NSA insisted on pursuing the development of a compartmented workstation in order to accommodate and control ORCON documents. OIT warned about the perils of developing a compartmented workstation. When its warnings were not heeded, OIT provided minimal support to the project.

Management of resources also contributed problems. Projected cost CIA reduced that In what appears to be a fundamental error, the project scope was increased not decreased Experienced project managers indicated that the decision to expand rather than reduce scope probably was one key reason for the
funding shortfall the program encountered

Another underlying problem flowed from the initial system requirements. The Agency's request for proposal (RFP) did not require the contractor to review, in detail, the project requirements. This oversight permitted the contractor to develop from an ambiguous set of requirements. Given the complexity of developing a state-of-the-art compartmented workstation, experienced project managers indicate that a detailed review should have been required. On the basis of our interviews, it appears that, during the actual development of the system, certain basic program management controls were not established. For example, the impact assessment and requirements management processes were not well controlled. The technical complexity of the compartmented workstation and the lack of requirements analysis made oversight of the technical process both difficult and ineffective.

In December 1992, C/CTC informed the Community that it would have a shortfall in Program. That meeting was followed by a February 1993 memorandum informing the Acting DCI of a shortfall.

CIA management failed to come up with additional funds until after the program manager issued a stop-work order for the program. Only after the program stopped and the contractor team dispersed did CIA find money to continue the program. This inability to decide whether to terminate or continue the program has cost a substantial amount of money and impacted on delivery of services to the counterterrorist community.

was stopped for six weeks while funds were redirected to cover the funding shortfall. CTC now has two additional funding requirements (1) the contractor stop-work costs as described by the contract and (2) the new startup costs to continue the
contract. Before funding interruptions, the developmental activities were performed with a team of contractors. Current plans indicate a development staff of This level of support will impact on what the staff can develop and when the staff can deliver the system.

To improve the management of the project, OIT and CTC changed the project manager during the summer of 1993 and colocated the entire development team during the spring of 1994. The changes were intended to address many of the concerns that had surfaced over the many months of development. The project manager change appears to have been beneficial and helped resolve many of the existing problems. While the management of the program has improved, continued attention from CTC and OIT senior management will be required to ensure that is a success.

Directorate of Operations

The Directorate of Operations has had an active counterterrorist effort establishment of CTC in 1986 consolidated the program. The high priority accorded the counterterrorist effort was reflected

The DO's field stations combined with CTC to form the Agency's counterterrorism action arm.
Table 5

The Counterterrorist Community

Department of the Air Force
Department of the Army
Bureau of Tobacco & Firearms
Capitol Police
Central Intelligence Agency
Coast Guard
Department of Commerce
Customs Service
Drug Enforcement Administration
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Energy
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration & Naturalization Service

Department of Justice
Marine Corps
National Security Agency
National Security Council
Department of the Navy
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Department of Defense
Postal Service
Secret Service
Special Operations Command
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Treasury
US Information Agency
White House Communications Office
White House Military Office
ANNEX II: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The inspection of the Agency's counterterrorist program focused on:

- Overall program effectiveness of the effort as reflected in managerial, operational, and analytical efforts.
- Effectiveness of the management of CTC.
- Status of interrelationships among Agency elements responsible for counterterrorist efforts.
- Status of interrelationships between the Agency and the intelligence and policy communities related to counterterrorist efforts.

The Inspection team began the inspection on 1 March 1994. The final draft was completed in June 1994. The inspection was based on a Terms of Reference reviewed by the Agency's Executive Director, four Deputy Directors, and the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs. The Chief of the Counterterrorist Center reviewed and agreed to the Terms of Reference. C/CTC also agreed that CTC officers would have access to both the Employee Opinion Survey and the Inspection Report.

The information upon which the inspection report and its recommendations are based includes:

- The Employee Opinion Survey includes interviews with CTC staff officers.
- Interviews with 87 consumers of CTC products and services within the intelligence and policy communities—including senior NSC staff and officials from State, the FBI, DOD, DOJ, and USSS.
• Visits abroad during which interviews were conducted and visits to FBI field offices during which were interviewed.

• Review of a substantial amount of documentary material

The Inspection Team

Members of the inspection team were: