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PTQ2793

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ACTION SA-00

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	A-00	CA-01	CCO-00	CG-00
	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	L-00	M-00	AC-01	NEA-00
	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
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P 121054Z DEC 01 (ZDS)
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1817
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

RELEASED IN FULL

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 006738

CORRECTED COPY (PARAGRAPH NUMBERING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2011
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, IN, PK
SUBJECT: THE KASHMIR EQUATION POST-SEPTEMBER
11

REF: A) ISLAMABAD 06686 B) ISLAMABAD 06705

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(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WENDY CHAMBERLIN, REASON
PARA 1.5 B

1. (S) SUMMARY. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR PURSUING A
REALISTIC COMPROMISE ON KASHMIR HAVE EMERGED SINCE
SEPTEMBER 11. WE SEE SIX STRONG REASONS TO PROCEED,
AND THREE - NONE A SHOWSTOPPER - THAT SIGNAL CAUTION.
END SUMMARY

2. (S) TODAY, PAKISTAN IS MORE RIPE FOR COMPROMISE OR
NEW THINK ON KASHMIR THAN AT ANY POINT SINCE THE
MILITANCY BEGAN BECAUSE OF:

A) PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF'S STRONG LEADERSHIP. HE HAS THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 APR 2011 200800198

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STRENGTH AND APPARENTLY THE VISION TO CHART A NEW COURSE. WITH THE MILITARY BEHIND HIM, THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN DISARRAY, AND A MAJORITY OF PAKISTANIS SUPPORTING HIS MAJOR POLICIES (ACCORDING TO A PD-COMMISSIONED POLL), MUSHARRAF'S POLITICAL FLANKS LOOK SOLID. AT THE AGRA SUMMIT, HE MET PM VAJPAYEE'S PITCH FOR NEW THINK BY DROPPING PAKISTANI INSISTENCE ON A UN-MANDATED PLEBISCITE AND BY INJECTING THE WILL OF THE KASHMIRI PEOPLE INTO WHAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN A STRICTLY INDO-PAKISTANI FRAMEWORK. HIS VOLTE FACE ON THE TALIBAN SHOWS HE CAN DRAMATICALLY REVERSE LONG-STANDING PAKISTANI POLICY WHEN FACED WITH COMPELLING CHOICES AND OPPORTUNITIES. SINCE HE TOOK POWER, MUSHARRAF HAS RECOGNIZED THAT PAKISTAN'S TOP PRIORITY IS ECONOMIC REBIRTH, AND HE APPARENTLY UNDERSTANDS THAT REBIRTH IS NOT SUSTAINABLE UNLESS KASHMIR IS RESOLVED.

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B) THE DISARRAY OF KASHMIR EXTREMIST STAKEHOLDERS.

-- IN THE MILITARY, MUSHARRAF HAS REPLACED WITH PROFESSIONALS AND MODERATES THE PRO-JIHADIST GENERALS AT ISI AND ELSEWHERE WHO SUPPORTED OR WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN AIDING THE KASHMIR MILITANCY.

-- JIHADISTS, INCLUDING THE MAIN FIGHTING OUTFITS, ARE LYING LOW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, WITH SOME OF THEIR LEADERS UNDER HOUSE ARREST OR OTHER RESTRICTIONS. THE GOP IS ALSO CRACKING DOWN ON EXTREMIST SECTARIAN GROUPS AND MADRASSAHS WHICH SUPPORT JIHAD, AND FROZE THE FUNDS OF AT LEAST ONE KASHMIRI GROUP, THE EXTREMIST JAISH-MOHAMMED. NEVER A FORCE AT THE POLLS, THE RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS TURNED OUT TO BE SOMETHING OF A PAPER TIGER BY FAILING TO TURN OUT LARGE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOP'S SUPPORT FOR OEF.

C) EVOLVING DOMESTIC ATTITUDES. PAKISTANI INSTITUTIONS HAVE INCULCATED INTO PAKISTANIS THE CONVICTION THAT KASHMIRIS ARE BRUTALIZED BY INDIANS BECAUSE INDIA IS IMPLACABLY HOSTILE TO THE REALITY OF AN ISLAMIC PAKISTAN. SUSPICIONS OF INDIA RUN DEEP, BUT THERE IS SOME NEW WILLINGNESS BY PAKISTANIS (SINCE THE LATE 1990S) TO ADMIT THAT MOST KASHMIRIS ACTUALLY WANT INDEPENDENCE, NOT ACCESSION TO PAKISTAN, THAT PAKISTAN PAYS AN ENORMOUS ECONOMIC AND DOMESTIC PRICE FOR FUELING THE MILITANCY, AND THAT INDIA IS NOT ON THE VERGE OF QUITTING KASHMIR OR DISINTEGRATING LIKE YUGOSLAVIA. THESE PAKISTANIS (MID-LEVEL GOP OFFICIALS

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"HONORABLE" WAY OUT. BENAZIR BHUTTO, LEADER OF
PAKISTAN'S BIGGEST POLITICAL PARTY, RECENTLY CALLED FOR
LEAVING KASHMIR TO THE KASHMIRIS, ENDING CROSS-BORDER
MILITANCY, AND RESUMING MORE NORMAL TRADE AND OTHER
RELATIONS WITH INDIA. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SHE MEANT
IT OR HAD SOME OTHER AGENDA, THIS IS EVIDENCE OF
CRACKS DEVELOPING IN THE GOP'S TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO
KASHMIR. FINALLY, THE SPEED OF THE TALIBAN'S DEFEAT
HAS REDOUNDED TO THE PRESTIGE OF THE U.S. AND MUSHARRAF
FOR PRAGMATICALLY SUPPORTING OEF.

D) USG ENTREE. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE AT LEAST THE
KASHMIR MILITANCY BEGAN IN 1990, THE U.S. HAS STRONG
AND IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN.
BOTH COUNTRIES VALUED THE U.S. AS A CHANNEL OF
COMMUNICATION TO THE OTHER AND, AS NEEDED, TO URGE
REGIONAL RESTRAINT, BUT NOW THEY HAVE MUCH TO LOSE FROM
SQUANDERING U.S. PARTNERSHIP.

E) NEW FOCUS ON TERRORISM. PAKISTANIS ARE APPREHENSIVE
THAT AFTER AFGHANISTAN THE ANTI-TERRORISM FOCUS WILL
SHIFT TO KASHMIR AND THAT NEW PRESSURE WILL BE EXERTED
ON PAKISTAN TO THE BENEFIT OF INDIA. THERE IS A
GROWING REALIZATION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S
TOLERANCE FOR CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM HAS CHANGED
FOREVER, WHICH IS ONE REASON EXTREMIST GROUPS ARE NOW
MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE AND ARE REPORTEDLY UNDER GOP
PRESSURE TO CURTAIL THEIR MORE VISIBLE ACTIVITIES IN
PAKISTAN.

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ACTION SA-00

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	A-00	CA-01	CCO-00	CG-00
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	DS-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	H-01	TEDE-00
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	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
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P 121054Z DEC 01 (ZDS)

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1818
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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 006738

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH NUMBERING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2011
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, IN, PK
SUBJECT: THE KASHMIR EQUATION POST-SEPTEMBER 11

F) TIMING. THE LULL IN FIGHTING AND CROSS-BORDER
ACTIVITY BECAUSE OF SNOW MAKES WINTER A CALMER BACKDROP
FOR KASHMIR TALKS. ALSO, PAKISTANI POLITICKING IS
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LIKELY TO REMAIN QUIET UNTIL THE ELECTORAL SEASON
STARTS IN JULY.

3. (S) THERE ARE ALSO REASONS FOR CAUTION.

A) POLITICAL DRAG. THE GOP VIEWED ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE TALIBAN AS AN EMBARRASSING STRATEGIC
ACCOMMODATION, SO DROPPING THEM IN FACE OF COMPELLING
CIRCUMSTANCES WAS COMPARATIVELY EASY. HISTORY,
EMOTION, AND POLITICS MAKE KASHMIR A MUCH TOUGHER CASE.
ACCORDING TO THE PD-SPONSORED POLL, 63 PERCENT OF
PAKISTANIS APPROVE OR STRONGLY APPROVE OF THE GOP'S
SUPPORT FOR KASHMIRI "SEPARATISTS." THE GOP WILL BE
SENSITIVE TO ALLEGATIONS IT IS SUCCUMBING TO USG
PRESSURE AS A CONDITION FOR THE BENEFITS OF OUR NEW
RELATIONSHIP. ALSO, IF THE ELECTORAL SEASON THIS
SUMMER GETS CLOUDY, THE GOP COULD BE AVERSE TO ANY BOAT
ROCKING THAT THREATENS THE OCTOBER HAND-OVER TO
CIVILIAN RULE.

B) THE MILITARY. THOUGH SOME PARTS OF THE MILITARY MAY
BE OPEN TO REAPPRAISAL, MUCH OF ITS IDENTITY AND
MISSION ARE TIED UP IN KASHMIR AND THE COLD WAR WITH
INDIA. POST HAS ARGUED THAT A PROPERLY STRUCTURED
BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND THE EXPANSION OF
THE PAF'S F-16 INVENTORY WOULD HELP PROFESSIONALIZE AND
REORIENT THE MILITARY (REFTELS), BUT THIS POTENTIAL HAS
YET TO BE REALIZED.

C) INDIA. THE GOI REMAINS STRONGLY AVERSE TO DIALOGUE

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WITH PAKISTAN ON KASHMIR, AND A PUE UNCLASSIFIED

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KASHMIR THAT IS NOT IN SOME WAY SUPPORTED BY INDIA
WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSING TO THE GOP AND DIMINISH
THE CHANCES FOR SUBSEQUENT RISK-TAKING ON KASHMIR.

4. (S) ENCOURAGINGLY, ALL OF THE REASONS NOT TO PURSUE
A KASHMIR SETTLEMENT NOW COULD PROBABLY BE MANAGED.
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF OUR VICTORY IN AFGHANISTAN,
STRONG USG SUPPORT FOR A KASHMIR PEACE PROCESS WOULD
GIVE THE GOP ENOUGH MANEUVERING ROOM FOR (MUSHARRAF'S)
STRONG LEADERSHIP TO EXPLOIT. THE MILITARY, THE KEY
PLAYER ON KASHMIR, MIGHT BE AT LEAST NEUTRALIZED BY
POSITIVE POLITICAL MOMENTUM AND NEW RESOURCES AND
SUPPORT FOR PROFESSIONALIZING THEIR FORCES AND
STRATEGIC OUTLOOK. PERSUADING INDIA TO ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT PAKISTAN IS A PLAYER IN RESOLVING THE KASHMIR
DISPUTE COULD BE OUR TALLEST HURDLE.

5. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

CHAMBERLIN

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