04: INTELWIRE Investigative Reports

Al Qaeda Suspect Aafia Siddiqi Diagnosed With Depressive Psychosis

2008-09-11T18:12:00.005-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Al Qaeda suspect Aafia Siddiqui has been diagnosed with depressive psychosis, a disorder which has been used in the past in arguments over whether a defendant is competent to stand trial.

A court-appointed doctor evaluated Siddiqui as suffering from Axis I diagnosis of Depressive Type Psychosis.

During the initial interview, Siddiqui "reported depressed mood, anxiety and ruminative thoughts concerning her son's welfare; poor sleep; and moderate appetite," according to court documents.

During a second interview, Siddiqui "spoke through a blanket she had placed over her body, including her face," according to court records. "She politely reported that she did not wish to speak wth a psychiatrist or a psychologist. She also reported that she did not wish to be medically examined, stating, 'I'm fine; no one cares about me here.'"

9/3/2008: Letter to the court describing Aafia Siddiqui arrest and treatment in detention, injuries, strip-search issues

9/11/2008: Psychiatric Evaluation of Aafia Siddiqui

Depressive Type Psychosis can involve suicidal thoughts and behavior, confusion and delusions. The diagnosis has some history as a basis for a defendant to be declared unfit to stand trial. It is not immediately clear how much of a factor that will be for Siddiqui's defense team.

Behind the Handshake: The Rumsfeld-Saddam Meeting

2008-08-05T17:03:00.003-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Around the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a photo of Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam Hussein began circulating on the Web.

Declassified documents recently obtained by INTELWIRE under the Freedom of Information Act reveal details of the discussion behind the handshake, and how the meeting came to be.

Rumsfeld was appointed special envoy to the Middle East by President Ronald Reagan in November 1983. Rumsfeld was dispatched on a tour of the region shortly thereafter.

In December 1983, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq William L. Eagleton Jr. proposed a meeting between Rumsfeld and Iraqi officials as part of that trip. The Iraqis responded that the proposed timing of the visit "would not be convenient." A schedule change was offered on the condition that Iraq's president would receive Rumsfeld during the trip.

"The Iraqis will be aware that by meeting their scheduling needs he will expect to see Saddam Hussein," the Dec. 7 cable states. "The atmosphere for such a visit should be positive."

State Department Cable, Dec. 7, 1983

A message from President Reagan was drafted for the trip.

"I have become convinced of the important role Iraq can play in helping bring greater peace to the Middle East," Reagan wrote in the Dec. 8 draft.

"The United States strongly desires an end to the Iran-Iraq war. I have no illusions that the many differences between Iraq and the United States can be easily or quickly resolved," the message stated. "However, I am gratified that the dialogue between us, laboriously and patiently nurtured, has improved our understanding of each other.

"The United States stands ready to exchange ambassadors to make formal recognition of this fact whenever you decide that such a step will support the interests of your country. Until then, I want you to know that I attach great importance to continuing and improving our dialogue," the message said.

Coming in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war, the initiative was considered highly sensitive.

"Do not, repeat not, discuss letter outside embassy or with non-American personnel," the cable states.

State Department Cable, Dec. 8, 1983

The presidential message also proposed formalizing relations between the U.S. and Iraq.

I have no illusions that the many differences between Iraq and the United States can be easily or quickly resolved. However, I am gratified that the dialogue between us, laboriously and patiently nurtured, has improved our understanding of each other," the message stated. "The United States stands ready to exchange ambassadors to make formal recognition of this fact whenever you decide that such a step will support the interests of your country."

The Iraqis arranged accommodations for the trip.

State Department Cable, Dec. 10, 1983

In contrast to the friendly tone of the presidential message, a secret cable to Rumsfeld from Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger spelled out U.S. concerns about the ongoing Iran-Iraq war.

"Successful Iraqi disruption of Iranian oil exports could prompt Iran to take reprisals against third countries or shipping in the Strait of Hormuz," the cable stated, strongly urging Iraq to exercise restraint but pointedly and repeatedly refusing to suggest any negative consequence if Saddam failed to do so.

Rumsfeld's visit was presented as an unambiguous sign of support for the Iraqi dictator.

"We are willing to take more symbolic steps in bilateral areas, if Iraq believes these can give any morale boost to war effort or impetus to its diplomatic efforts. Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit could be seen in this (context) and of course, we remain ready to exchange ambassadors with Iraq without preconditions," Eagleburger wrote.

However, such offers were left to Rumsfeld's discretion.

"You should mention symbolic bilateral moves in the context of the war only if you sense that the atmosphere is correct," the cable said.

The cable makes clear that U.S. support for Iraq came without preconditions for good behavior from the Hussein regime.

"We are not making increased U.S. support for Iraq contingent upon Iraqi behavior in the Gulf," Eagleburger wrote.

If that wasn't clear enough, Eagleburger added, "A defeat for Iraq would be a strategic defeat for the U.S. ... We have an interest in Iraq's survival as a strong and independent state that can promote the stable development of its region."

Eagleburger also indicated it would intervene with the Reagan administration's allies in the oil industry to build Iraq's oil exports.

"We are talking with oil industry representatives about their plans for
construction of new alternative facilities for Iraq's oil exports," the cable stated.

State Department Cable (1), Dec. 14, 1983

State Department Cable (2), Dec. 14, 1983

Picture via Sourcewatch

A meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz was held prior to the meeting with Hussein, on December 19, 1983.

State Department Cable, Dec. 20, 1983

The unredacted State Department cable describing the meeting, as released to INTELWIRE, notably omits mention of Rumsfeld discussing Iraqi use of chemical weapons and violations of human rights, points which were described in an earlier FOIA release to George Washington University.

External link: George Washington University National Security Archive

The earlier document, written by Rumsfeld, was not included in the FOIA release to INTELWIRE although it falls within the scope of INTELWIRE's FOIA request.

The meeting with Saddam Hussein took place the following day.

"In his 90-minute meeting with Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein Showed obvious
pleasure with president's letter and Rumsfeld's visit," a summary of the meeting stated.

"Our initial assessment is that meeting marked positive milestone in development of US-Iraqi relations and will prove to be of wider benefit to US posture in the region," the cable stated.

"Iraqi TV photographed Saddam's initial greeting of Rumsfeld and presentation of President Reagan's letter," the cable said.

"Rumsfeld told Saddam US and Iraq had shared interests in preventing Iranian and Syrian expansion," the cable stated. Rumsfeld also expressed interest in "seeing Iraq increase oil exports."

Saddam offered an ironic analysis of the Middle East conflict between Syria and Lebanon.

"(The) US had originally acted with indifference both toward Syrian invasion of Lebanon and toward the (Iran-Iraq) war, for which it decided to 'let this group of lunatics bash each other,'" the cable quoted Saddam as saying. "What ... would have happened to the states of the Gulf and Arabian peninsula if Iraq had not stood fast? No one would have been able to put out the fire. Zionism was in fact encouraging it to burn."

Rumsfeled responded with a lengthy statement largely endorsing Saddam's stated world view.

"Nations, Rumsfeld said, were better off taking long-sighted view and US had to try to take a comprehensive view. Our understanding of the importance of balance in the world and the region was similar to Iraq's."

If Rumsfeld made a direct response to Saddam's statements about "Zionism," it was not recorded. However, he did discuss Israel.

"To the extent there was excessive focus on Lebanon, Rumsfeld continued, it could distract attention from need to address more fundamental problems, such as security of the Gulf and circumstances of the Palestinian people." Rumsfeld added that the U.S. wanted to "promote a fair peace between the Arabs and Israel, one that recognized the circumstances of the Palestinian people."

Rumsfeld also suggested that the U.S. would consider guaranteeing the security of a possible Iraqi oil pipeline through Jordan against attack from Israel.

In another statement filled with retrospective irony, Rumsfeld said "Nations which export terrorism and extremism ought to be recognized as such. People should know that terrorism has a home -- in Iran, Syria and Libya."

State Department Cable, Dec. 20, 1983

Additional documents relating to U.S. support for Iraq during this time frame were obtained as part of the same INTELWIRE Freedom of Information request and will be published soon.

New Documents Tighten Net Around Additional OKBOMB Conspirators

2008-03-20T20:16:00.012-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

A warning about the impending Oklahoma City bombing may have been delivered three days in advance to a white supremacist tied to suspected additional conspirators in the terrorist attack.

Newly released documents reveal a detailed timeline of events that strengthens the case for additional conspirators in the bombing that killed 168 people on April 19, 1995 (timeline).

The new documents also corroborate key testimony from other sources regarding a wider conspiracy. The documents were obtained by Salt Lake City lawyer Jesse Trentadue through the Freedom of Information Act.

The documents were obtained by Salt Lake City lawyer Jesse Trentadue through the Freedom of Information Act (related story).

Mark Thomas, a former Christian Identity minister and Aryan Nations member, pleaded guilty in 1997 to conspiring with the Aryan Republican Army (ARA) bank robbery gang, which was led by white supremacists Richard Lee Guthrie and Peter Langan.

Thomas was staying in Elohim City, a white supremacist compound in rural Oklahoma, just days before the bombing, at the same time as other ARA associates with suspected links to the bombing and at the same time that Timothy McVeigh called the residence where some of the ARA members were staying.

ARA members and associates have long been eyed by journalists and investigators as possible accomplices in the bombing plot.

The ARA's activities were the main focus of the book In Bad Company: America's Terrorist Underground by Mark S. Hamm. The new documents corroborate key claims regarding the ARA's connection to the Oklahoma bombing which were put forth by Hamm. They also corroborate claims made by ARA member Peter Langan in an affidavit given to Trentadue.

As part of an ongoing FOIA lawsuit by Trentadue, the FBI previously stated it could not locate documents linking the ARA to the Oklahoma City bombing. However, the new releases do just that.

An FBI letterhead memorandum dated June 20, 1995, indicates that a female informant cooperating with the FBI and the Pennsylvania State Police implicated Thomas as having advance knowledge of the bombing.

The memorandum reported a conversation with the informant which took place on May 1, 1995. There is no explanation of why the conversation was being reported more than a month and a half after it took place.

The FBI redacted the subject line before releasing it to Trentadue. However, the memorandum is addressed to a case file dealing with the United States Nationalist Party, a white separatist organization.

Read the June 20, 1995 FBI memorandum

Thomas maintained a home in Macungie, which was used as a meeting place for recruiting and gatherings of white supremacist and militia-oriented extremists. A careful comparison of existing documents from Thomas' court case and other documents obtained by Trentadue and by INTELWIRE confirm that Thomas is the subject of the June 20 memo.

According to the informant, a La Salle University college student had gone to Macungie to "house-sit for [name redacted] while [redacted] and his family were in Elohim City, Oklahoma. [redacted name or names] returned to Philadelphia on the day of the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City saying that 'They were warned three days in advance.'"

Mark Thomas and his family were in Elohim City as late as April 17 and traveled back to his farm, arriving some time on April 19, according to "In Bad Company," court records and an April 2007 affidavit given to Trentadue by ARA member Peter Langan.

The new documents corroborate several claims made by Langan in the affidavit.

Affidavit of Peter Langan

Langan said Guthrie (a wanted fugitive at the time) traveled to the Macungie farm in July 1995, just one month after the tip described in the FBI memorandum. According to Langan, two other members of the gang were already present at the farm -- Kevin McCarthy and Scott Stedeford.

This claim is confirmed by court records and some of the newly released documents.

Money raised by Guthrie and Langan was funneled to Thomas, for the purpose of financing domestic terrorism, according to testimony in Thomas' 1997 trial.

The FBI field office in Philadelphia may have suspended its investigation of Thomas around the same time that Guthrie, Stedeford and McCarthy arrived at the farm, according to a June 13, 1995 FBI airtel newly released to Trentadue.

The Philadelphia field office forwarded to headquarters a copy of a May 27, 1995, newspaper article linking Thomas to the bombing. The communication also included information about phone number searches conducted by the field office, apparently in connection with Thomas.

"Philadelphia will conduct no further action in regards to the attached subscriber information, unless directed to do so by" the OKBOMB Task Force, a special unit created specifically to lead the bombing investigation, according to the airtel.

Read the June 13, 1995, FBI airtel

Guthrie remained at large until he and Langan were arrested in January 1996.

Another document newly released to Trentadue says "information has been developed that [redacted name] and [redacted name] were at the home of [redacted name] Oklahoma when OKBOMB subject, Timothy McVeigh, placed a telephone call to [redacted name] residence.

Read the August 22, 1996 FBI teletype

In April 1995, McCarthy and Stedeford stayed at the Elohim City home of Andreas Strassmeir, a German national long associated with the militia movement, according to a June 17, 1996 FBI record previously obtained by Trentadue.

Read the June 17, 1996 FBI FD-302

Strassmeir is another figure suspected of playing a role in the bombing; he has never been charged and currently lives in Germany.

Timothy McVeigh made at least one phone call to Strassmeir prior to the bombing, which was discussed during the trial of Terry Nichols. A second call claimed in the June 17 FD-302 allegedly took place "several weeks" before the bombing.

The verified call was made April 5, according to court records. This corresponds to the period McCarthy and Stedeford were staying with Strassmeir, according to the Aug. 22, 1996 teletype.

According to Langan, Thomas was also present in Elohim City during this time frame.

The teletype states "[redacted] and [redacted] left [redacted] residence on 4/16/95, enroute to Pittsburgh [sic], Kansas where they joined [redacted] and Guthrie. [redacted] did not accompany (them) but rather returned directly to the Philadelphia division."

Based on a careful comparison of the Langan affidavit and court records to the newly released documents, the names in this redacted section likely read:

"[Stedeford] and [McCarthy] left [Strassmeir's] residence on 4/16/95, enroute to Pittsburgh [sic], Kansas where they joined [Langan] and Guthrie. [Thomas] did not accompany (them) but rather returned directly to the Philadelphia division."

The source for the April 16 date appears to be McCarthy, who turned states evidence no later than May 1996 (after being fingered by Guthrie) and became an FBI informant. McCarthy later testified against Thomas in exchange for a minimum sentence.

However, Stedeford and McCarthy did not actually arrive in Pittsburg, where the ARA kept a safe house, until April 20, 1995, according to Langan. Langan described them as "overdue" and said he speculated at the time that they (or other Elohim City residents) may have been involved in the Oklahoma City bombing.

According to Langan, Guthrie told Thomas in July 1995 that McCarthy was Timothy McVeigh's accomplice in the bombing.

"Your young Mr. Wizard took out the Murrah Building," Guthrie reportedly told Thomas, referring to McCarthy.

In 1997, Mark Thomas also became an informant and later that year pleaded guilty to conspiracy for his role in the bank robberies. He was released from prison in 2004.

Langan is currently serving a life sentence in federal prison.

UPDATE: Follow-up Filing Details New Claim Of Prior Warning

Timeline of events in this story

Reconstructed from FBI documents obtained by Jesse Trentadue and other sources as described above.

Early 1995: Aryan Nations minister and ARA accomplice Mark Thomas living in Elohim City, Oklahoma.

April 1, 1995 (approximate): ARA members Scott Stedeford and Kevin McCarthy arrive at the home of Andreas Strassmeir in Elohim City.

April 14-17, 1995 (approximate): Mark Thomas and his family leave Elohim City and head home to Macungie, Pa.

April 16-17, 1995 (approximate): Stedeford and McCarthy leave Strassmeir's home (this claim appears to originate with McCarthy).

April 19, 1995: The Oklahoma City bombing takes place. Around this time, Mark Thomas arrives back home in Macungie, Pa.

April 19, 1995: A college student who had been house-sitting for Thomas before his return tells an FBI informant that "they were warned three days in advance."

April 20, 1995: McCarthy and Stedeford arrive at the ARA's Kansas safe house, later than expected, where they meet ARA member Peter Langan.

May 1, 1995: The informant (above) reveals the claim about the warning to the FBI's Philadelphia field office and the Pennsylvania State Police.

June 13, 1995: The FBI's Philadelphia field office informs FBI headquarters that it intends to drop the investigation of Thomas unless instructed otherwise by the OKBOMB Task Force.

June 20, 1995: More than a month after the informant (above) disclosed the "three days in advance" warning to the FBI, the Philadelphia field office memorializes the conversation in a letterhead memorandum.

July 1995: Guthrie, McCarthy and Stedeford are all staying at Thomas' Macungie farm. During discussions at the farm, Guthrie discovers that McCarthy and Stedeford were connected to the Oklahoma City bombing (according to Guthrie).

Between August and December 1995: Guthrie tells Langan that "McCarthy and Stedeford were a danger to us because of their possible involvement in the Oklahoma City Bombing."

December 1995: McCarthy tells Langan "he and others unspecified did have legal 'liabilities' concerning the Oklahoma City Bombing."

January 1996: Langan and Guthrie arrested.

July 1996: Guthrie apparently commits suicide in prison.

FBI Document: California Resident Who Helped 9/11 Hijackers Was Closely Linked To Saudi Government

2008-02-19T17:19:00.004-05:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

An FBI memo details the phone records of Omar Al Bayoumi, a Saudi citizen who assisted hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi in relocating to San Diego in early 2000. Bayoumi helped them find an apartment and pay their rent and introduced them to people in the local community.

Bayoumi also kept in close contact with his apparent employer, the Saudi government. The exact nature of Bayoumi's employment has remained unclear, but numerous associates suspected him of being a Saudi intelligence officer.

Read the document: 2002-04-15: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Omar Al Bayoumi Contacts With Saudi Government

According to the memo, local mosque members "believed there was always a covert employee of the Saudi Arabian government stationed at the mosque," and that Bayoumi may have been that person.

Bayoumi was "employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S.," the memo states, according to "a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego."

Other FBI interviewees said Bayoumi was "an employee of the Saudi Arabian Government (who) traveled to mosques throughout the world to monitor and observe Saudi citizens for signs of dissident behavior."

Another source said Bayoumi "was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is equivalent to the Federal Aviation Administration," and said he was paid $5,000 a month to be a student.

The memo below details Bayoumi's phone contacts with the Saudi government over slightly less than two months in 2000, around the time the hijackers arrived in San Diego. Phone records revealed Bayoumi called local Saudi officials, including the consulate in San Diego, 34 times. He called Saudi officials in Washington D.C. 141 times in the same period, according to the memo -- more than twice a day on average.

Calls appear to be directed to the Saudi Cultural Mission, the Saudi Education Mission, the Saudi Embassy in Washington, the Saudi Consulate in San Diego, the Saudi National Guard, and the Saudi Islamic Affairs Department.

Although the notation is unclear due to FBI redactions, it also appears Bayoumi called a U.S. Department of State diplomat.

Extensive portions of the document were redacted by the FBI, including substantial portions of FBI interviews with Saudi government officials who had contact with Bayoumi.

INTELWIRE Releases FBI Documents Given To The 9/11 Commission

2008-02-18T15:53:00.006-05:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

INTELWIRE has obtained more than 1,700 pages of FBI documents cited in the end notes of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission.

They reveal a wealth of new details about the hijacker's movements, possible links between the hijackers and the government of Saudi Arabia, and connections to extremist figures in the United States, including blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.

Related story: Document Indicates California Resident Who Helped 9/11 Hijackers Was Closely Linked To Saudi Government

The documents were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. If you are reporting from these documents, please credit INTELWIRE.com and link to this page or preferably to the INTELWIRE.com home page (http://www.intelwire.com).

The package covers a wide variety of topics, including the movements of the hijackers over more than 10 years, people who associated with the hijackers in the U.S., FBI interviews with the victims, transcripts of phone calls to the hijacked flights, intelligence obtained by overseas agencies and much, much more.

Documents are listed here according to the chapter of the 9/11 Report in which they appeared. The package totals more than 1,700 pages and may be the largest online repository of 9/11 source documents on the Web.

Additional FOIA requests were posed to the State Department and CIA. The CIA refused the entire request, which is under appeal; the State Department is still processing documents. Those documents will also be published hereon receipt.

These documents will also be posted individually and chronologically at INTELFILES.com, with descriptive text, and additional comment and analysis as appropriate, over the next several months.

Researchers, authors and documentary producers wishing to license or commission specific research based on these documents can contact INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger through this site. A chronologically ordered package is available to researchers, including multiple copies of documents with different redactions, INTELWIRE analysis of redactions to verify the identities of specific individuals, and broad analysis of contents.

Documents Cited in the End Notes of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission:

Chapter 1: We Have Some Planes

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 2: The Foundation of the New Terrorism

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 3: Counterterrorism Evolves

Part 1

Part 2

Chapter 5: Al Qaeda Aims At The American Homeland

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

Part 12

Part 13

Part 14

Chapter 6: From Threat To Threat

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Chapter 7: The Attack Looms

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 8: The System Was Blinking Red

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

When reporting from these documents, you agree to cite and link INTELWIRE.com as the source.

Related:

9/11 Report End Notes (offsite, opens in new window)

FBI documents cited in 9/11 Report End Notes, Chronological

1995 to 2000

1/1/2001 to 9/10/2001

9/11/2001 (under construction)

9/12/2001 to 12/31/2001 (under construction)

2001 to present (under construction)

Related story:

Document Indicates California Resident Who Helped 9/11 Hijackers Was Closely Linked To Saudi Government

Selected documents from the package:

Hijackers' Timeline

Hijackers' pal Omar al-Bayoumi and the Saudi government

More information on Omar Al-Bayoumi

Still more on Omar Al-Bayoumi

Analysis of 9/11 Hijacker's Cell Model

FBI Report on Conflict Diamonds and Al Qaeda

Summary of Information (1999): Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's Education at American Colleges

Jihadists Add Strong Encryption To Terrorist Toolbox

2008-02-02T08:31:00.000-05:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Al Qaeda-linked militants have rolled out improved security software that provides above-military-grade encryption for terrorists communicating online.

A copy of the software, Mujahideen Secrets 2, was obtained by INTELWIRE and forwarded to Paul A. Henry, Vice President for Technology Evangelism at Secure Computing (www.securecomputing.com), for analysis.

According to Henry, the software is a significant upgrade to an earlier version program used by jihadists. The new software can be used to encrypt chat sessions, as well as e-mail, Web forum postings and electronic communications.

The software can easily be loaded on a USB stick, according to Henry, allowing militants to encrypt communications from otherwise insecure locations such as Internet cafes.

The software is extremely easy to use, Henry said. This is a significant factor, since the computer skills (and general intelligence) of al Qaeda operatives run the gamut from highly advanced to embarrassingly inadequate.

On the higher end of that spectrum, Al Qaeda has traditionally employed fairly sophisticated computer techniques, but until recently, its implementation has generally lagged industry standards.

During the early and mid-1990s, terrorists were early adopters of laptop computers, PDAs, online publishing and digital file archiving. But while their computer habits were savvy, they were usually less than professional-level.

For instance, a laptop computer recovered from Ramzi Yousef in 1995 contained deleted files that were able to be recovered by forensic analysis. Yousef was sophisticated enough to use passwords, but not strong encryption. He removed old and sensitive files, but he didn't know to run a file shredder.

With the new software, Yousef's hard drive would have been a much tougher nut to crack. In addition to its 2,048-bit encryption, Mujahideen Secrets 2 includes a shredder and file and folder encryption.

The move to stronger encryption may have been prompted by security breaches on jihadist Web sites back in September, when the U.S. government and counterterrorism analysts obtained copies of an Osama bin Laden video release before it was widely introduced on the Web. At the time, several key jihadist sites temporarily suspended operations to address the breach.

However, it's unlikely the bulk of those security issues will be solved by strong encryption. While the debut of the software represents a significant and dangerous new development for counterterrorism officials, encryption and straight-up network security do not appear to have been the key factors in earlier breaches. The best encryption in the world won't help if you give away your passwords and encryption keys.

Mujahideen Secrets 2 appears to have been assembled and compiled from both open-source and copyrighted material, according to Henry. The software may be detectable when operating over networks or on targeted machines. This could be useful for counterterrorism professionals tracking terrorist and militant Web usage.

PATCON Revealed: An Exclusive Look Inside The FBI's Secret War With The Militia Movement

2007-10-08T13:22:00.002-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Undercover FBI agents posing as white supremacists gathered alarming intelligence about the militia movement during the early 1990s, according to documents obtained by INTELWIRE.

But FBI headquarters abruptly terminated the undercover operation -- code-named PATCON -- just three months after the disastrous siege at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas.

The timing could hardly have been worse; the networks targeted by the investigation were inflamed to violence by Waco. At least one individual targeted in the investigation -- Andreas Strassmeier -- was later linked to Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. Another target of the investigation was later linked to Eric Rudolph, perpetrator of the 1996 Olympic Park bombing.

PATCON was the centerpiece of an extensive investigation of militia and white supremacist groups in Arizona, Alabama, Tennessee and Texas.

From 1991 to 1993, at least three undercover agents working under the auspices of the FBI posed as members of a fictional white supremacist group seeking closer ties with established organizations.

The targeted groups "advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. government and the establishment of an Aryan nation," according to the documents.

Origins of the investigation

Texas Reserve Milita: Aims and practices

Informants in the Ranks

The PATCON Undercover Operation

Interlocking

Paranoia at the CMA Convention

The Order of Saint John

Names in the documents

The FBI documents linked below describe the PATCON operation as well as the Bureau's efforts to penetrate two secretive extremist groups, the Texas Reserve Militia (TRM), based in the Austin, Texas, area, and the Order of Saint John (OSJ), based in Benton, Tennessee.

Despite the operation's success in gathering intelligence on the militia movement, the PATCON undercover operation was officially terminated on July 15, 1993, six months after the disastrous siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas.

FBI field offices in Baltimore, Knoxville and San Antonio were ordered to shut down the PATCON operation in an FBI teletype, in which FBI headquarters deemed there was "insufficient justification" to continue the investigation. It is not clear from the documents that even one significant arrest resulted from the two-year investigation.

But the very same militia groups targeted by PATCON had been inflamed to violent action after Waco, in a wave of anger that led directly to the Oklahoma City bombing. At least one member of the Texas Reserve Militia -- Andreas Strassmeier -- has been linked to Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.

In 2005, INTELWIRE filed a request with the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act for all documents pertaining to a militia organization called the Texas Light Infantry, one of the names used by the Texas Reserve Militia. After reviewing the records, INTELWIRE filed follow-up requests for records concerning the a group known as the Order of Saint John.

The two FOIA responses contained documents that revealed the PATCON operation. Believing more documents exist, INTELWIRE filed a request specifically for records related to PATCON. Last month, the FBI claimed it was unable to located any such documents -- despite the fact that all the documents cited in this story were provided in response to previous FOIA requests. INTELWIRE is appealing the refusal.

ORIGINS

During the late 1980s, the Texas Reserve Militia was formed by some members of the Texas State Guard, a volunteer state military force intended for use when the National Guard is unavailable. The TRM broke away from the state organization when Texas officials determined they were forming an unconstitutional "private army."

The group was also known as the Texas Light Infantry, the Second Order and The Order. The latter names were inspired by a 1980s neo-Nazi gang that robbed banks and counterfeited money to fund attacks on the government and target ethnicities (external link).

The FBI believed TRM leadership was linked to the original Order and also closely tied to the Aryan Nations white supremacist network based in Idaho (external link). One TRM member reportedly received at least $250,000 in funds from armored car robberies by the original Order, according to the documents.

According to the FBI's case files -- including an FBI letterhead memorandum dated December 21, 1990 -- the TRM conducted monthly paramilitary training courses at a camp in the Austin, Texas, area. The camp provided training in firearms, explosive and guerilla warfare for volunteers from Texas and out-of-state, including skinheads from Las Vegas and Memphis. By the end of 1991, the TRM had about 50 members and a much larger number of informal associates, the documents said.

In or around July 1990, a member of the Texas Reserve Militia threatened to murder two FBI agents with the Austin field office, according to documents obtained by INTELWIRE. The person who threatened the FBI agents "is a major figure in the Aryan Nations," an FBI teletype stated. In response to the threat, the FBI initiated a domestic terrorism investigation against the TRM. Undercover agents were deployed to infiltrate the group, an operation that would later expand into PATCON.

AIMS AND PRACTICES

"Members of the group advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. government and the establishment of an Aryan nation," according to the FBI letterhead memorandum. At TRM training camps, military discipline was enforced and officers were saluted with the Nazi "Heil Hitler" gesture, the memo said.

At one point, the FBI searched the training camp and found one exploded and one partially assembled pipe bomb, the memo said. According to an FBI lab report, the pipe bomb found on the premises was created by a "skilled craftsman" with a high degree of sophistication.

TRM members also trained with firearms, including fully automatic weapons, the documents state.

Undercover agents were dispatched to investigate the group after the threat to murder two Austin-based FBI agents, the documents said. The threat was sparked by the FBI's arrest of an unnamed TRM member on an unspecified charge.

The undercover agents posed as "white supremacists who were willing to commit violence in order to further the white supremacy movement."

Informants were also actively recruited to penetrate the TRM's ranks. During the course of the investigation, mulitple informants provided information about the organization to the FBI.

In one instance, the FBI documented a meeting between TRM members and an Austin-area police officer, during which they discussed keeping the group's activity secret and paying bribes to the police officer to suppress complaints by the training camp's neighbors concerning the group's activities.

A confidential source of the Los Angeles FBI field office revealed that a prominent TRM member had set up a bulletin board network "in which persons with the right code numbers can dial [redacted] phone and enter his computer system and enter the names and addresses of homosexuals who live in the U.S. and Canada. The purpose of the list, according to the source, is to allow action to be taken against those homosexual individuals in the event of a takeover of the United States by the Aryan Nations."

In 1991, authorities authorities discovered a cache of explosives and paramilitary supplies in Alabama. The FBI believed the explosives were linked to the TRM, according to a February 1992 letter from FBI Assistant Director Larry Potts to the criminal investigative division of the U.S. Army.

The explosives were found next to a highway north of Birmingham and included ammonium nitrate, the primary explosive component later used in the Oklahoma City bombing. According to the letter, the material and other items found at the site were intended for a raid on a National Guard convoy.

INFORMANTS IN THE RANKS

Starting some time in 1990, a parade of informants from within the militia movement began talking to the FBI about planned activities by the TRM and other groups. Over the course of several months, the intelligence became alarming and expanded to include other militia groups around the country.

On November 21, an informant told the FBI in Phoenix about a shipment of various explosives, improvised military-style ordinance, detonators and assault rifles (illegally modified to be fully automatic).

The informant told FBI agents that the TRM was joining forces with an organization called the Texas Reenactment Group and that the combined organization would train using "old East German police uniforms which are being obtained by [redacted]." The merger was expected to increase membership of the TRM by at least 200 members. Members would be armed with fully automatic M-1 carbines.

The source said all members of the group "hate the current President, George Bush" and subcribed to conspiracy theories about a "New World Order" (external link).

On January 22, 1992, an informant revealed to the FBI that the TRM leadership had scheduled a meeting with a member of Civilian Material Assistance (CMA), "which started out as an anti-communist group supporting the Contras in Nicaragua, but has recently turned into a racist right-wing white supremacist group."

That meeting had its origins at the November 16-18, 1991, CMA convention in Decatur, Alabama, where a trend toward cooperation by diverse extremist groups began to emerge as a significant potential threat to U.S. domestic security. By the time of the convention, the FBI had infiltrated a number of sources into the mix.

PATCON

In March 1991, the FBI extended its investigation of the TRM into a undercover sting code-named "PATCON."

Details of the PATCON operation were included in a routine request for re-authorization of the TRM investigation. The January 1992 memo from San Antonio-based FBI Agent Daniel Coulson is addressed to Assistant FBI Director Larry Potts.

"During March 1991, a Group 1 Undercover Operation titled PATCON was approved, utilizing three undercover agents, in order to prevent the murder of (two FBI) agents," Coulson wrote, referring to the threat cited above.

PATCON initially targeted the TRM, but in January 1993, the undercover agents were also deployed to penetrate the Order of St. John, according to a follow-up memo from Coulson to Potts.

PATCON undercover agents posed as extremists who financed their activities through armored car robberies, according to an October 1992 teletype.

PATCON was a Group I Undercover Operation. According to Justice Department guidelines, Group I operations must be approved by FBI Headquarters and are used for investigation involving "sensitive circumstances" or significant financial investment.

"Sensititive circumstances" include investigating possible criminal misconduct or corruption by government employees, political and/or religious organizations. They may also describe optations "having a significant effect on or constituting a significant intrusion into the legitimate operation of a federal, state, or local governmental entity."

Group I undercover operations may involve "activity by an undercover employee that is proscribed by federal, state, or local law as a felony or that is otherwise a serious crime" and "activities that present a significant risk of violence, risk of financial loss, or a realistic potential for significant claims against the United States."

One possible factor in the Group I designation involves an investigation of military equipment stolen from Fort Hood, Texas. According to several documents, an active duty soldier at Fort Hood was an associate and possible member of the TRM. PATCON undercover agents tracked and in at least one case purchased some of the stolen equipment.

Another factor is only referenced in short asides among the documents currently released. A October 1992 teletype notes that part of the PATCON budget was reserved "for the purchase of Stinger missiles." Several documents refer to the possible theft and resale of Stingers by militia groups, but details are sparse. It's not clear whether the Stingers actually existed and whether PATCON recovered them.

INTERLOCKING

PATCON was fully operational by the time the CMA convention was held in November 1991.

The convention featured extremist speakers from around the country, most of whom were pursuing some sort of racial agenda. An FD-302 interrogation report dated November 21, 1991, provided an extremely detailed report on the event.

One speaker, described in the documents as a U.S. Marine, addressed the convention on the new cooperative strategy. Before beginning his speech, he requested that all cameras and recorders be turned off.

According to an informant, the Marine discussed a new strategy for the assembled extremists -- "interlocking anti-government groups so that the movement could be ready to fight the government when the government attempts to take over the rights of the citizens." The speaker believed this battle would take place within two years.

According to the informant, "interlocking" would connect extremist groups by "making members of one group members of another group" in order to "increase communication and cooperation among these groups" so that they could unite to violently oppose the government.

"This interlocking procedure ... allows groups with different viewpoints but with the same common antigovernment beliefs to join together," according to the informant.

After the Marine, a member of CMA also spoke about interlocking. One attendee objected to CMA interlocking with "hate groups such as the KKK" and was told that "come compromises had to be made" in order to fight the New World Order, according to the informant.

Another document reveals that CMA and the Aryan Nations were planning to interlock "for the purpose of fighting the U.S. government."

Under the interlocking scheme, "the CMA and the TRM are so closely related that officers in one have equal and dual rank in the other group," according to an informant cited in a December 26, 1991 letterhead memorandum.

PARANOIA AT THE CONVENTION

One member attending the convention attempted to interest people in a modified cannon launcher he had designed for long-range attacks (see story).

Another informant said the cannon's inventor wanted to use the cannon to "lob shells" into the FBI and IRS buildings in Phoenix, Arizona. The inventor was later arrested in relation to this threat, the documents said -- one of the only arrests documented in the case files in relation to any aspect of the investigation.

An informant who attended the convention said the inventor grilled attendees for names and addresses, leading many to suspect he was a government agent.

The informant and another who attended the conference said the attendees were paranoid about government surveillance. Although convention attendees aimed most of their mistrust at each other, they did come close to discovering one member of the FBI's actual surveillance team, according to one informant.

THE ORDER OF SAINT JOHN

A map of the Benton, Tenn., compound used by the Order of St. John, which the FBI penetrated in 1993.

One speaker at the convention, representing a group known as the American Pistol and Rifle Association, coached attendees on tactics for shooting police officers. PATCON agents would follow connections between CMA and the APRA to an armed compound in rural Tennessee.

The Order of St. John, based in Benton, Tennessee, was closely linked to APRA -- to the extent that they appeared to be the same group with adjacent mailing addresses. Both groups were tied to the TRM, according to several FBI documents.

Like the TRM, the Order of St. John also went by "The Order." FBI sources penetrated the group so effectively that they were able to draw maps of the Benton compound.

A PATCON agent met with the leader of the Order of St. John, John L. Grady, at the group's Benton compound in September 1992 and on at least one other occasion, according to an October 1992 teletype and June 1993 memorandum. (Please see notes below regarding allegations against named individuals in these documents.)

Grady told the PATCON agent that some members of the OSJ-linked American Pistol and Rifle Association had been members of the original Order, describing them as "hardcore types and having committed a number of indiscretions for which they were now serving prison terms," according to the documents.

The September 1992 meeting coincided with the APRA's annual conference. Security was tight at the conference, including patrols armed with semi-automatic pistols. The PATCON was told that a large stockpile of weapons was stored at the compound. Speeches were given at the event.

One attendee identified in the October 1992 teletype, was Tom Posey, a leader of the CMA who had been deeply implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal. The PATCON agent was shown five sets of night-vision goggles in the back of Posey's vehicle, according to the document. The agent bought the goggles for $7,500, the document states, and they "appeared to be part of the Fort Hood theft." Curiously, the FBI field office in San Antonio was instructed to check the serial numbers of the goggles "without revealing to Army authorities" that they had been recovered.

A document states that Grady told the undercover agent he was "aware of various law enforcement agency efforts to infiltrate his organization as well as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and that a group called 'Klan Watch' put out a publication which expressed views contrary to Grady." (KlanWatch was a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center.)

On a second visit, the PATCON agent and was "warmly welcomed," according to the memo. He received a tour of the compound, including a library "which contained over 30,000 books on topics ranging from religion to conspiracy."

"Grady talked about the aftermath of the Waco incident and stated that the Davidians shot in the compound had been killed by a Special Forces unit," the memo said. It was later revealed in mainstream media reports that Special Forces officers had been involved in planning the raid, but that was not public knowledge at the time of the visit. The leak of that story was linked to another underground group (external link).

NAMES IN THE DOCUMENTS

INTELWIRE is publishing a representative sampling of more than 2,000 pages of documents relevant to this story, which were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Additional documents will be published in the future, and additional related FOIA requests are in process.

The first batch of documents can be viewed by clicking here.

The documents name several figures in connection with the investigation. It is important to note that in almost every case, the individuals named in the documents have never been prosecuted for the acts alleged in these documents. INTELWIRE does not assert any claim as to the truth of the allegations contained in the documents.

Some individuals whose names are redacted or incomplete in the documents have been identified by INTELWIRE. Additional reports are planned to address this issue and the veracity of the claims made in the documents.

Members of the Texas Reserve Militia identified in the FBI's extensive case files included:

Watt (first name not given), a former member of the Texas State Guard (a legitimate government reserve group) who was described as one of the founders.

Louis Beam, a prominent neo-Nazi with ties to the Aryan Nations and the original Order, who ran an early white supremacist computer bulletin board network and published a newsletter called The Seditionist. (External link)

Someone who claimed to be a former Special Forces member; the person's name was redacted from documents by the FBI.

Associates of the Texas Reserve Militia who are named in the documents include:

John L. Grady, leader of another militia organization known as the Order of St. John. Grady was later linked to Eric Rudolph by prosecutors who tried Rudolph for a 1998 Birmingham abortion clinic bombing (New York Times).

Thomas Posey, leader of a paramilitary group known as Civilian Material Assistance. According to a January 22, 1992 teletype, CMA "started out as an anti-communist group supporting the Contras in Nicaragua, but has recently turned into a racist right-wing white supremacist group."

Another member of the group, described but not named in the redacted documents released by the FBI, was Andreas Strassmeier, a German national who would later be linked to the Oklahoma City bombing.

The son of a prominent German politician and a veteran of that country's army, he moved to the United States from Hamburg in the late 1980s or early 1990s, and established relationships with various racist and anti-government movements around the country. (US v Nichols, 96-CR-68, 12/10/97; In Bad Company, Hamm, pp. 116-117)

Members of the TRM suspected Strassmeier was a government informant, according to published reports. (McCurtain Gazette, FBI document links former Green Beret to McVeigh, bombing, Cash and Charles, Aug 31, 2005)

Shortly before the Oklahoma City bombing, an informant told the ATF Strassmeier was plotting to blow up U.S. federal buildings. The informant also said Strassmeier had traveled to Oklahoma City prior to the bombing.

Right after renting the Ryder truck used in the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh called the Elohim City compound and asked to speak with Strassmeier (US v Nichols). Another informant described at least one additional call (story and documents). After the bombing, Strassmeier fled the country and returned to Germany.

The FBI interrogated Strassmeier by phone in May 1996, but agents did not ask him about his association with the TRM (document).

The documents also name the official responsible for overseeing PATCON from FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. -- Larry Potts, then an assistant FBI director. During his tenure with the FBI, Potts was involved in the 1991 Ruby Ridge standoff and the 1993 Waco siege -- two events that created deep suspicion and hostility among members of the militia movement.

In addition to Strassmeier, several key events and figures encountered in the PATCON investigation overlap with the activities of the Aryan Republican Army, a white supremacist bank robbery gang that has been linked to the Oklahoma City Bombing. Like the Order, the ARA robbed banks with the stated purposes of financing an armed revolution against the U.S. government.

In a 2007 affidavit (story, document), one member of the gang said he suspected Richard Guthrie and other gang members of taking part in the Oklahoma City bombing. In July 1996, Guthrie appeared to commit suicide in prison, shortly before he was scheduled to testify about the ARA's activities (documents).

Shawn Kenney, a member of the gang and an FBI informant, had his criminal record "actively erased," according to an affidavit by former Cincinatti police officer Matthew J. Moning, who investigated the ARA, also known as the Midwest Bank Robbers.

Another FBI informant close to the ARA was Scott McCarthy, according to a 2006 Congressional probe of the bombing (story and full text). The report, written by U.S. Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, claimed the Justice Department was "unwilling to permit" investigators to speak with McCarthy.

Prior to their arrest, ARA members made a videotape outlining a proposed campaign of racial and antigovernment violence. According to a 2002 story in the McCurtain Gazette, two copies of the tape were seized by the FBI in mailing envelopes addressed to Richard Butler of the Aryan Nations and to Louis Beam, who is named in the Texas Reserve Militia documents.

The ARA videotape also threatened terrorist violence against the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, a threat that was later carried out by Eric Rudolph.

This story was updated on October 10, 2007.

Judge Michael Mukasey And A Curious Omission In The Omar Abdel-Rahman Trial

2007-09-17T12:56:00.000-04:00

There's a new posting on the INTELWIRE Weblog concerning Attorney General Nominee Michael Mukasey, the Omar Abdel Rahman trial and al Qaeda spy Ali Mohamed. If you haven't added the blog RSS feed to your favorites, you can find it here.

The Al Qaeda Spy And The New Attorney General Nominee

The Alleged 1994 Assassination Attempt on Osama bin Laden

2007-08-12T21:52:00.000-04:00

Declassified State Department Cable Adds Color To Little Known Sudan Incident

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Legend has it that a team of assassins tried to kill Osama bin Laden in the Sudan in 1994.

But a newly released State Department cable recasts that story as a cry for help gone wrong -- the outcome of a shouting match over Islamic ethics between a murderous Libyan militant and the world's most-wanted terrorist leader.

The assassination story appears to have originated with Ali Mohamed, bin Laden's chief of security through much of the 1990s.

"After an attempt to assassinate Bin Laden, I went to the Sudan in 1994 to train Bin Laden's bodyguards, security detail," Mohammed said when entering his guilty plea for conspiracy in the 1998 East African embassy bombings. The claim was later picked up on by various other media outlets and authors, some of whom claimed the Saudi government has sponsored the attack. Others alleged the attack was carried out by members of Takfir Wal Hijra, a secretive terrorist sect even more radical than al Qaeda.

But a declassified State Department cable, obtained by INTELWIRE under the Freedom of Information Act, offers an alternative view.

The cable includes a deposition allegedly given by one of four men who killed 16 in a shooting massacre at the Thawra mosque near Khartoum, then traveled to Osama bin Laden's home nearby, where the incident took place.

State Department officials could not absolutely vouch for the deposition. The cable said a reliable contact had authenticated it for embassy officials. However, "we cannot tell whether the document is authentic," said the cable's author, U.S. Foreign Service Officer Donald Petterson.

Two of the alleged assassins were killed. Two more were captured, including the alleged ringleader, Mohamed Abdel Rahman al-Khulifi, whose deposition is reproduced in the cable.

Al-Khulifi, a Libyan, said his team had been "assigned" to assassinate the leader of an Islamic sect based at the Thawra mosque. He met with his team in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, a notorious training site used by Iranian-backed Hezbollah.

Al-Khulifi said his team was trained by members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard in the late 1980s, following which they traveled to fight in Afghanistan. They subsequently met bin Laden in Peshawar.

On returning to the Sudan, the mujahideen joined the Islamic movement of Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi, who invited bin Laden to move al Qaeda to the Sudan shortly afterward. The fighters also worked for bin Laden after the move.

The fighters "loved Sheikh Osama, for he has forsaken wealth and easy life and joined jihad and the endeavor to spread Islam," al-Khulifi said. Bin Laden was among the "dearest persons to me," he said.

Al-Khulifi said bin Laden and Turabi told him that members of the Sudanese Ansar al-Sunnar movement were not true Muslims, that they were "spies for the Wahabi ruling family of Saudi Arabian" and "agents for the crusader embassies."

In 1993, bin Laden sent al-Khulifi to Saudi Arabia on unspecified business. When he returned, al-Khulifi said, bin Laden tasked him to assassinate several Sudanese opposition figures who often visited the Thawra mosque.

According to al-Khulifi, the plan proceeded with the support of Sudanese intelligence, which had a close relationship with bin Laden.

The massacre "is an outcome of these services," he said. He said the mosque attack was ordered by Sudanese officials and endorsed by bin Laden.

"After we executed our operation, we ... thought it wise to go to bin Laden," whose house was nearby, al-Khulifi said. "We found bin Laden in a chair in the garden of his house. When he saw me, he said angrily, 'Why did you commit such a crime? That is not what we wanted.'

al-Khulifi defended his actions, saying they had "carried out God's wishes and that we were aware of all consequences."

After this exchange, "bin Laden left the garden and upon entering his house, shouted 'Stop him,'" said al-Khulifi.

"I knew that was an order to get rid of me, so we started shooting and bin Laden's guards did the same. There were three Iranians and an Egyptian called Jabr," al-Khulifi said.

"We killed three of them," he said. "Osama bin Laden went down the basement, where there are hideouts. I know because I used to go to the house," he said. "I was hit by Ahmed the Algerian, a guard of bin Laden I used to know in Peshawar."

Ahmed shot and killed another of the fighters and a wounded a third.

Interestingly, al-Khulifi said the Algerian "was trained by American intelligence until early 1983."

The deposition concludes with a strangely plaintive cry of abandonment, coming as it does from an admitted and unrepentant mass murderer.

"My sheikh accused me of being a killer, and God knows the truth," said al-Khulifi. "I am saying this to relieve my conscience and at the same time to explain what happened so I can die in peace. ... I am convinced now that there are Islamic leaders in Sudan, but that there are no Muslims."

Read the State Department Cable

Analysis: Although the author of the cable stops short of vouching for the deposition, which was circulating informally around Khartoum at the time, I am inclined to believe it's authentic.

If the document was forged for political purposes, it's quite ineffective as a propaganda tool. Although it implicates bin Laden and Turabi, it stops short of personally indicting Turabi as the author of the attack and casts bin Laden ambiguously, with his statement of moral dismay concerning the massacre.

So it doesn't serve the political purposes of those who would oppose bin Laden and Turabi (such as the victimized sect). But neither does it clear them, laying the attack pretty explicitly at the feet of the Sudanese intelligence.

Given the ambiguities about responsibility and considering the plethora of extraneous detail, the document has a strong ring of truth. Nevertheless, it should be treated with caution. INTELWIRE is continuing to investigate this incident.

List of Al Qaeda Members, As Of July 27, 2007

2007-07-20T20:59:00.000-04:00

INTELWIRE Sourcebook: List of Al Qaeda Members
INTELWIRE Sourcebook (Compact): List of Al Qaeda Members

INTELWIRE Publishes 'Al Qaeda In America' Sourcebook

2007-07-18T20:56:00.000-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

INTELWIRE has released the Al Qaeda In America Sourcebook, the first volume in a series documenting al Qaeda's terrorist sleeper network in the United States.

The latest INTELWIRE Sourcebook presents more than 430 pages of court records and intelligence documents about al Qaeda sleeper agents in the United States, including American citizens Ali Mohamed, Wadih El Hage, Jose Padilla, and more. It also includes an exclusive, never-before-published analysis of al Qaeda's American sleeper network by INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger.

These primary sources are required reading for journalists, counterterrorism professionals, academics and independent researchers. The volume is also accessible to general readers.

The contents of this wire-bound collection were selected and compiled by INTELWIRE.com's J.M. Berger, lead researcher of the cable TV documentary on Ali Mohamed, National Geographic Presents: Triple Cross: Bin Laden's Spy In America.

Preview Table of Contents.

Click here to buy

Full Text: July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Al Qaeda Threat To U.S. Homeland

2007-07-17T13:18:00.002-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has released
a summary of the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of
al Qaeda's current threat to the U.S. Homeland. The full text
of the NIE is reproduced below.

Key Judgments We judge the
US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat
over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic
terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by
their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued
effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their
capabilities. We assess that greatly increased worldwide
counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have
constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US
Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the
Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These
measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United
States since 9/11.

We are concerned, however, that this level of international
cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and
perceptions of the threat diverge.

Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist
threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to
plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni
communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its
capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated
key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a
safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although
we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United
States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11,
we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put
operatives here.

As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in
a heightened threat environment.

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its
capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation
with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that
al-Qa’ida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and
capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its most visible
and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a
desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its
association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to energize the
broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to
recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland
attacks. We assess that al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting
is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic,
and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass
casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic
aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population. The group is
proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive
devices, and is innovative in creating new capabilities and
overcoming security obstacles.

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to
acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it
develops what it deems is sufficient capability.

We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks
outside the United States in the past, may be more likely to
consider attacking the Homeland over the next three years if it
perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the
group or Iran. We assess that the spread of
radical—especially Salafi—Internet sites,
increasingly aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the
growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western
countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the
West’s Muslim population is expanding, including in the
United States. The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement
of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United
States— who are becoming more connected ideologically,
virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist
movement—points to the possibility that others may become
sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence
here as legitimate. We assess that this internal Muslim terrorist
threat is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe, however.
We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often
referred to as “single-issue” groups by the
FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the next three years
given their violent histories, but we assess this violence is
likely to be on a small scale. We assess that globalization
trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable
even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with
one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize
resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized
terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist
plotting in this environment will challenge current US defensive
efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. It will
also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at
the local level relate to strategic threat information and how
best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of
legitimate interactions.

U.S. Secretly Met With Followers of Blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman Before Controversial Visa Application

2007-06-14T15:16:00.000-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Followers of Omar Abdel Rahman made overtures to U.S. diplomats one year before the radical sheikh entered the United States on a visa approved by a CIA agent.

During several meetings with diplomatic officers at the U.S. embassy in Cairo, members of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) provided extensive details about the operations of one of Egypt's most notorious terrorist organizations.

Initiated by al-Gama'a, the meetings were aimed at creating a dialogue with the U.S. in the hopes of eventual, unspecified cooperation. The initiative was based on a perception that the U.S. enjoyed similar cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Less than four years after the approach, an al-Gama'a terror cell led personally by Abdel-Rahman bombed the World Trade Center in New York City.

The 1989 meetings are described in secret cables from the U.S. embassy in Cairo, which were declassified and released as part of a Freedom of Information Act request by INTELWIRE.

THE APRIL 1989 MEETING

Click here for document (PDF)

An April 25, 1989 cable from the Cairo embassy describes several meetings between unidentified "embassy officers" and a self-proclaimed member of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. The name of the member is redacted, as are several other sections of the cable.

Signed by U.S. ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner, the cable is addressed to several other U.S. embassies and to U.S. intelligence services and military posts. It was classified as "secret."

Known as the "blind sheik," Rahman was considered the main spiritual guide for both al-Gama'a and al-Jihad, otherwise known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad. At the time of the meeting, Rahman was under detention in Egypt but was expected to be released shortly.

In meetings with embassy officials, the member said al-Gama'a and al-Jihad were, in fact, the same organization. Historically, the two groups have had overlapping membership and agendas. Today, they are considered separate organizations, and Al-Gama'a has renounced the use of violence.

The member estimated al-Gama'a membership as between 150,000 and 200,000, a figure which the embassy suspected was exaggerated.

The member said he was part of al-Gama'a Shura Council while he was in prison, between September 1981 and October 1988. He said his specialty was organizing protests and demonstrations. The member disputed government characterizations of al-Gama'a as "secret" and "violent" and disavowed attacks that had been attributed to the group.

The member provided printed material concerning Rahman and al-Gama'a beliefs and goals. He said the group found the government of Saudi Arabia to be "the best Islamic government today" but faulted Saudi King Fahd for failing to take a hard line against Iran.

However, the member said, Rahman met with an Iranian delegation in Pakistan during the autumn of 1988 and was "favorably impressed."

Rahman also traveled to the United States in 1988 to speak a conference, the member said. The "blind sheikh" traveled to the U.S. yearly, the member said, on trips supported by Saudi Arabia.

Embassy officials were skeptical about some of the claims made by the member and recorded their suspicions concerning his motives, as well as questioning whether his approach to the embassy had the blessing of his superiors in al-Gama'a.

Embassy officials noted that their skepticism "leaps instantly from the fact that he has revealed much more than we would have considered prudent."

THE MAY 1989 MEETING

Click here for document (PDF)

In May, embassy officials met with "a young lawyer of 'The Islamic Group' (or Jihad as it is called by the government)." The meeting came after "repeated recent contacts" between al-Gama'a and U.S. diplomats, the cable states.

The May cable is addressed only to the Secretary of State, the consul in Alexandria and the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C. It is signed by Wisner and classified "secret" and "department only."

The lawyer repeated the figure of 150,000 to 200,000 members and reiterated other key points from the April cable. Embassy officers believed this figure included a loose group of "sympathizers" and did not "represent an Islamic revolutionary vanguard."

He claimed "he was informing us about his group as a result of a 'change in thinking' within the group."

Al-Gama'a was "concerned about the 'radical and violent image' of the group presented by the government," according to the lawyer.

The laywer said an individual, whose name was redacted, "had persuaded them that U.S. diplomats were 'sincere,' so they decided to present this 'true picture' directly to" embassy officers. It's not clear whether this is a reference to the individual described in the April cable, or whether that individual and the lawyer are the same person.

The cable states:

"[redacted] had told us separately that [redacted] had opined that the government was not persecuting the Muslim Brotherhood because the U.S. was 'supporting' the Muslim Brotherhood against the more radical Islamic trends. On this widely accepted conspiratorial premise, the 'Islamic Group' may be making its own bid for outside support."

An embassy officer told the lawyer that "the U.S. does not intervene in internal affairs nor support any group of any sort against the government of Egypt."

Among the points and claims made by the lawyer:

Members of al-Gama'a are "unified in a single ideology, though there are different 'styles' of action from region to region."

Members can directly contact other members across Egypt.

Omar Abdel-Rahman was described as the mufti of the group, or alternatively as its emir. The former title is a religious position, the latter implies some degree of operational control. However, a separate individual was identified as the chief operational leader. The name of that person is redacted.

The 11 members of al-Gama'a Shura Council were named by the lawyer, but the names were redacted from the cable before its release by the State Department.

The lawyer characterized other known Egyptian Islamist groups as having been disbanded or largely imprisoned, including Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Takfir Wal Hijra. Later reporting suggests this claim was significantly inflated.

The Muslim Brotherhood was seen by al-Gama'a as part of the "governing establishment."

Al-Gama'a members "reject the concept of 'takfir,'" i.e., condemning opponents such as the government as infidels who may be attacked with impunity.

The lawyer claimed the Egyptian government had "pinned" the name Jihad on al-Gama'a in order to blame the group for attacks on Christians. The laywer denied al-Gama'a had any role in attacking Christian interests in Egypt.

The laywer accused the Muslim Brotherhood of "playing games" and acting out of personal and property interests.

"Local groups of Islamic youth exist around the country," according to the lawyer. "Because they lack proper religious guidance, they do crazy things" which are then blamed on al-Gama'a. However some of these youth are also members of al-Gama'a, he conceded.

Sayyid Qutb and his books are the group's primary ideological inspiration, particularly his anti-secular (and anti-American) tract "Milestones on the Road."

The cable concludes with a reference to a follow-up cable describing the organization's ties to foreign governments. However, the follow-up cable was not included in this FOIA release.

THE 1990 VISA

In May 1990, approximately one year after the second meeting in Egypt, Omar Abdel Rahman obtained a visa to enter the United States (Time Magazine, May. 24, 1993). The visa was issued in by the U.S. embassy in Khartoum, Sudan.

Rahman's name had been placed on a terrorist watchlist that should have kept him out of the United States. Embassy officials said the visa was issued in error and began an investigation of the embassy official who approved the passport.

That official turned out to be an officer of the CIA (New York Times, July 14, 1993). According to the Times, the CIA officer was working as a consular official as part of his official cover and did not act on behalf of the CIA. Officials described the event as a "coincidence," according to the Times.

Rahman traveled from Sudan to Pakistan, then entered the U.S. in July 1990. He was subsequently indicted and convicted for leading a cell of terrorists in New York City responsible for the World Trade Center bombing and a thwarted "Day of Terror" plot in which several New York landmarks were targeted for simultaneous truck bombings.

INTELWIRE has obtained more than 1,400 pages of declassified U.S. State Department documents concerning Egyptian radical groups. For more information about INTELWIRE research services, please contact J.M. Berger.

Yahya Al-Libbi: A Leader Who Could Revitalize Al Qaeda

2007-05-30T22:33:00.000-04:00

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Yahya al-Libbi may be the next Osama bin Laden.

In fact, he might be a better bin Laden than Osama ever was.

Al-Libbi is a top al Qaeda operative captured by the Pakistanis in 2002. He was transferred to U.S. custody and subsequently escaped from a U.S.-run prison in Bagram, Afghanistan in 2005.

His much-touted escape catapulted him to the top ranks of al Qaeda's visible leadership.

Al-Libbi has produced more videos than Ayman Al-Zawahiri over the last year. He looks increasingly impressive with each appearance.

His most recent release, this week, highlighted his strengths and may point to an elevated operational role within al Qaeda's "corporate" nexus.

The message was directed toward Saudi Muslims and contained a harsh criticism of the Kingdom's corruption and moral laxity.

While that refrain has been repeated like a drumbeat by jihadi propagandists for decades, several aspects of his recent media releases bear scrutiny.

Al-Libbi is an extremely charismatic speaker. He looks good on camera -- young, strong and handsome -- and his voice is strong and clear, with very distinct enunciation. He effortlessly conveys a sense of physical competence, and the success of his prison break speaks for itself -- every statement he makes as a free man is inherently a slap in the face to the United States.

There's no contest at all between al-Libbi and Zawahiri on the charisma front. It's like comparing Bill Clinton to Dick Cheney. What's more impressive is how al-Libbi stacks up against bin Laden.

While bin Laden is known for possessing powerful charisma in person, he's a soft-spoken orator who mumbles. His camera presence has always been frail, even in his younger days, and his military experience is limited (though it has taken on legendary qualities).

Al-Libbi scores better than bin Laden for content as well as delivery. Bin Laden is a wonk for the details of Islamic history and jurisprudence. While his intelligence is evident during such dissertations, his religious scholarship has never been highly regarded. Furthermore, his speeches tend to be rooted in the minutiae of the past.

It's not that bin Laden doesn't focus on current affairs and modern problems. Rather it's a question of balance and pacing. His pronouncements deliberately evoke antiquity. Today's grievances are grounded in a long, long history. They emanate from that history and are, in turn, woven into it.

This backward-looking tendency can resonate with Arab audiences, who share bin Laden's long view on history. But these days, Al Qaeda is becoming more and more international -- its recruit base spans Europe and the Americas and is particularly strong in Al-Libbi's home base of North Africa.

Those audiences may be significantly more receptive to Al-Libbi's pragmatic here-and-now orientation. His most recent message on Saudi Arabia provides an excellent case in point.

Although al-Libbi references history and the scholars of Islam, the message continually returns to a focus on recent events -- Saudi and Arab cooperation with the United States, the corruption of regimes that claim to be Muslim and the encroachment of U.S. influence in the Arabian peninsula.

The speech is interspersed with accounts of torture, mistreatment and blasphemy from Arab regimes, and what he characterizes as the enslavement of Arab and Muslim governments to the wishes of the U.S. and its allies. By keeping it simple and relevant, al-Libbi also comes across as a more credible Islamic scholar than bin Laden.

Al-Libbi uses extremely specific anecdotes related to recent events, such as April's mass arrest of Saudi militants, highlighting the fact that he is current and involved in the struggle, out among the mujahideen -- providing a sharp contrast to the leadership-in-exile practiced by bin Laden and Zawahiri. Images distributed on extremist Web sites even show al-Libbi conducting military training before a class of Libyan jihadists.

The content of al-Libbi's messages also reflect the diverse interests of his growing international audience. He has spoken and written in depth on topics ranging from Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and even the plight of children with AIDS in Libya.

Overall, al-Libbi comes across as someone living in the present, whose viewpoint is informed by the past. In contrast, bin Laden comes across as someone who is living in the past and seeks to turn back the clock. That's intentional, and it's part of his appeal for a certain segment of the fundamentalist audience.

But it's not necessarily as attractive to new recruits, many of whom are becoming radicalized in response to relatively recent U.S. policies in the Middle East. Al-Libbi is better positioned to draw moderate and modern Muslims into the nexus of al Qaeda sympathizers and supporters.

It's noteworthy that this week's message, released by al Qaeda's al-Sahab media production arm, included English subtitles even though its message seems tailored to a Saudi audience.

In the past, messages from Zawahiri which were aimed at mainly Arab audiences have been delivered without subtitles. The extra effort reflects al-Libbi's strength in speaking to the concerns of jihadis around the world.

Al-Libbi has already been connected to significant terrorist and military attacks within Afghanistan, including a daring attempt to assassinate Vice President Dick Cheney at the very same air base where al-Libbi was once imprisoned.

He has yet to score a spectacular, mass-casualty terrorist attack outside of Afghanistan, but it's only a matter of time. Saudi Arabia, the country targeted in his latest message, could be in his sights. A map of Saudi Arabia was displayed throughout the message, reminiscent of past videos by bin Laden which were keyed to specific attacks.

Should al-Libbi be able to claim a devastating attack outside Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden may find himself officially replaced. And the United States may find itself fighting an enemy with a lot more upside potential.