Monday, September 11, 2006

Who Called The Shots In WTC '93?

Sgt. Ali Mohamed Was The Right Man, In The Right Place, At The Right Time

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

 

Ali Mohamed More than a decade after the first World Trade Center bombing, one of the most important questions remains unanswered: Who called the shots?

 

Ali A. Mohamed, a shadowy Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) member who infiltrated the U.S. Army, was the right man, in the right place, at the right time. At minimum, he was an irreplaceable link in the 1993 bombing plot. At most, he may be the man responsible for unleashing Ramzi Yousef on the United States.

History, thus far, has not looked far past Yousef for the origin of the World Trade Center bombing plot. According to the widely accepted view, the plot originated with Yousef, who was a sort of terrorist "freelancer" working independently or -- at best -- informally aligned with a terrorist network. In recent years, it has become fashionable to say the attack "was al Qaeda" without explaining what that is supposed to mean.

But there are many problems with the conventional view of how the bombing was conceived and how Yousef assembled his crew of conspirators. At the center of these issues is Ali Mohamed.

Mohamed's terrorist history has long been a mystery, shrouded in official government secrecy and bedeviled by conflicting accounts and apocryphal stories.  

 

But a close examination of the best sources reveals Mohamed's involvement in virtually every aspect of the first World Trade Center bombing plot except for building the actual bomb -- as well as providing tantalizing hints which could link him to al Qaeda's successful second foray against the building, five years ago today.

 

NEW: The Ali Mohamed Sourcebook from INTELWIRE

 

National Geographic Documentary on Mohamed; J.M. Berger, Lead Researcher

 

The evidence for Mohamed's role in the 1993 bombing is substantial and -- by the standards of most terrorism investigations -- extraordinarily concrete.

 

  • Mohamed trained several members of the Brooklyn terror cell responsible for the bombing, including Mahmud Abouhalima, Mohamed Salameh, and Siddig Siddig Ali, according to extensive court records, testimony and physical evidence.
  • When Ramzi Yousef and an accomplice entered the U.S. in 1992 to begin work on the bombing, they were carrying terrorist training material directly linked to Mohamed, according to physical evidence presented in court.
  • Yousef and his accomplice flew into the country after visting an al Qaeda encampment where -- according to multiple eyewitness accounts -- Mohamed was working as a trainer and assembling terrorist training manuals.
  • On entering the country, Yousef immediately contacted two of Mohamed's trainees, both of whom were later indicted for the World Trade Center bombing, court records show. 

 

The 9/11 Commission's final report concluded that the WTC bombing had been crafted in Afghanistan during the summer of 1992, when Yousef and Mohamed were both in the region. Yousef's support network when he arrived in the United States consisted almost entirely of figures with links to Mohamed.

 

But when the Brooklyn cell was finally indicted in 1993, Ali A. Mohamed was not one of the defendants. He wasn't a witness. Through a tangle of intrigues, negotiations and apparent investigative oversights, Mohamed escaped prosecution until after the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa.

 

THE BROOKLYN CELL

 

A former Egyptian solider, Mohamed joined Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) during the early 1980s, apparently some time after the assassination of Sadat. Serving as an intelligence officer in the Egyptian Special Forces, he was later forced out of the Army for his Islamic extremist inclinations.[1]

 

Mohamed initially worked with Ayman Al-Zawahiri, then a cell leader within EIJ, who specialized in recruiting military and intelligence personnel.[2]

 

After his discharge, Zawahiri instructed Mohamed to infiltrate the U.S. intelligence apparatus. Mohamed made a short and (allegedly) unsuccessful run on the CIA, before switching gears and moving to the United States.[3]

 

In the U.S., he signed up for the Army and was eventually stationed at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg. Mohamed had attended an exchange program there several years earlier, while he was still in the Egyptian military.

 

Even as he worked for the JFK School as a lecturer on Middle Eastern affairs, Mohamed was also helping build a cell of professional terrorists in Brooklyn -- a rogue's gallery that would eventually unleash an unprecedented terror campaign against New York City. [4]  

 

Ali Mohamed was not the only member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the United States. Mustafa Shalabi, a close associate of Zawahiri,[5] opened an office in Brooklyn to funnel cash and volunteers to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The office opened no later than 1987.[6]

 

The Brooklyn center fell under the umbrella of Abdullah Azzam's "Services Office" based in Peshawar, Pakistan, near the Afghan border. As part of his duties, Shalabi traveled back and forth to Peshawar, delivering money and tending to his volunteers.[7] The organization also worked closely with a newly formed jihadist coalition known as "al Qaeda" and led by Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden.[8]

 

In 1988, a crucial nexus of terrorist figures came together in Peshawar. These men would dominate jihadist activity for a decade to come.

 

At the top of the food chain, directly beneath Azzam, were men like bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri -- who had served in a terrorist cell in Egypt alongside Shalabi.[9]

 

Beneath them were a cadre of followers, with various degrees of dedication and organizational involvement. Most were skilled in both combat arts and in organizing the web of charities and organizations funding the Afghan jihad.

 

A delegation from Brooklyn traveled to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border during the spring or summer of 1988, including Shalabi and his deputy, Fawaz Damra.[10]

 

Several of their known associates traveled to the region throughout 1988 for paramilitary training at jihadist camps around the border regions, and, in some cases, to fight the Soviets inside Afghanistan.

 

Brooklyn native Clement Hampton-El went to Afghanistan and fought, injuring his leg in the process. Brooklyn residents Mahmud Abouhalima, an Egyptian, and Siddig Siddig Ali, a Sudanese, went for training in 1988 and later returned for combat.

 

In 1988, a young Pakistani from Baluchistan who would later become known as Ramzi Yousef traveled to Peshawar and from there into Afghanistan, where he received his first formal training in the art of bomb-building at camps funded by bin Laden.[11]

 

Ali A. Mohamed also made his first known trip to the border regions in 1988. At the time, Mohamed was stationed at Fort Bragg as an active duty sergeant in the U.S. Army.

 

Ignoring the advice of his superiors, he took 30 days of leave and traveled to Afghanistan. Later, he admitted he had performed training at al Qaeda-linked camps during that visit.[12] There is no documentation of whether Yousef and Ali Mohamed met in 1988, but their visits to the camps overlapped on more than one occasion.

 

TRAINING IN NEW JERSEY

 

The history of the Services Office in Brooklyn is tale of intrigue, murder and machinations. After 1988, Shalabi and his associates began to attract an ever-larger group of extremists.

 

Some were sent to assist bin Laden in Afghanistan, others were positioned in New York as "sleeper agents" under the loose umbrella of two Egyptian jihadist organizations -- the Islamic Group, led by blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and the new Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a breakaway group independent of the original.

 

The new EIJ was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who had chosen to cast his lot with bin Laden. Although al Qaeda and EIJ maintained some degree of separation, Zawahiri was a member of al Qaeda's ruling council. By 1992 at the latest, Zawahiri was sufficiently embedded in al Qaeda that he could give orders to sworn members of the group, and the two groups paid some operatives out of a common fund.[13]

 

Mohamed was positioned as a trainer and facilitator for both groups. In 1989, while he was still in the Army, he traveled to New Jersey at Shalabi's request to train members of the growing Brooklyn contingent, including Salameh, Abouhalima, and El-Sayyid Nosair, an Egyptian who would later assassinate right-wing rabbi Meyer Kahane. Mohamed provided the group with weapons, paramilitary and survival training.[14]

 

Mohamed also gave them training manuals, including military training materials taken from the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, where he was stationed. Some of the manuals were kept at Nosair's house.

 

Others were added to the library of the "Jersey Jihad Office" founded by Nosair in Jersey City, N.J., as a splinter from Shalabi's original Services Office in Brooklyn. Mohamed made appearances at the Jersey Jihad Office throughout the summer and fall of 1989.[15]  

 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad was closely affiliated with the still-young al Qaeda organization. Zawahiri was a member of the group's ruling council and the two organizations shared funding, personnel, training camps and resources. Remaining a member of EIJ throughout the 1990s, Mohamed nevertheless began working closely with al Qaeda.[16]

 

As part of this work, Mohamed began assembling and translating military and terrorist manuals for al Qaeda in Afghanistan, including the material taken from Fort Bragg.

 

That project began no later than 1992,[17] probably earlier. Mohamed's training manual project is the key that unlocks his connection to Ramzi Yousef and the World Trade Center bombing.

 

MOHAMED AND YOUSEF IN AFGHANISTAN

 

In the spring of 1992, Ramzi Yousef and a Palestinian named Ahmad Ajaj (who had been living in Texas) traveled to Khaldan, an Al Qaeda training camp in the vicinity of Khost, Afghanistan. Yousef and Ajaj spent several months between Khost and Peshawar, engaged in high-level explosives training -- Ajaj as the trainee, Yousef the trainer.

 

While at Khaldan and in parallel training at the University of Dawa and Jihad in Pakistan, the pair -- along with an unknown number of additional participants -- began crafting a plot to bomb the World Trade Center.Yousef and Ajaj remained until the last day of August 1992, when they flew to New York.[18]

 

There are extensive testaments to Mohamed's high profile role in the area during the time Yousef and Ajaj were laying the groundwork for the World Trade Center bombing.

 

Three separate eyewitnesses said Ali Mohamed was working in the Khost-Peshawar area during 1992, and Mohamed himself confirmed it during a confession years later.[19]

 

According to a confidential informant cited in an FBI affidavit, Mohamed was seen "in Khost, Afghanistan, in about September 1992, where MOHAMED was training persons who were commanders in al Qaeda. MOHAMED was in this camp for at least four weeks."[20]

 

Khalid Ibrahim, an FBI cooperating witness and probably the confidential source named above, testified that in the fall of 1992 Mohamed showed up at al Qaeda's al-Farouq training camp near Khost.

 

"He had come from someplace else, I mean like overseas maybe, and he was there to train some of their people, some of their commanders," Ibrahim said.

 

During the testimony (in the 1995 trial of Omar Abdel Rahman), then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald tried to get Ibrahim to talk about the nearby Camp Khaldan, but Ibrahim said he couldn't remember having heard that name.[21] 

 

Also in 1992, an al Qaeda operative named L'Houssaine Kherchtou was trained in surveillance techniques by Ali Mohamed in Hyatabad, a neighborhood of Peshawar. He described Mohamed as a "very, very strict and not gentle" trainer, adding that "You can hear from him some bad words."[22]

 

Finally, there is the testimony of Mohamed himself, years later, after the law finally caught up with him.

 

"In 1992, I conducted military and basic explosives training for al Qaeda in Afghanistan.... I also conducted intelligence training for al Qaeda. I taught my trainees how to create cell structures that could be used for operations."[23] Mohamed also confessed to moving bin Laden out of Afghanistan, via Peshawar, in 1992.

 

Another confidential informant -- not Ibrahim and probably not Kherchtou -- told the FBI that Ali Mohamed had been training mujahideen in Afghanistan while translating written training manuals into Arabic.[24] The latter activity provides the direct link between Mohamed and Yousef -- a link that was plainly evident to investigators as early as 1993, but which has never been illuminated in a court of law.

 

BY THE BOOKS

 

Yousef and Ajaj flew from Peshawar to New York City, arriving on Sept. 1, 1992. Ajaj carried a "cheat sheet" for talking with immigration officials, which coached him to claim he had come from Hyatabad -- the location where Ali Mohamed had carried out surveillance training.[25]

 

In his luggage, Ajaj was carrying a collection of terrorist and military manuals in Arabic and English. The books were virtually identical to the collection Mohamed had given to El Sayyid Nosair in New Jersey a few years earlier.[26]

 

 

In some instances pages were mixed and matched to content written in Arabic, in other cases the original manuals had simply been photocopied. Some of the material -- written in English -- begged for closer government scrutiny.

Manuals carried by Ajaj and possessed by Nosair included U.S. Army training manuals on improvised explosives, special patrolling, map reading and land navigation, booby traps and firearms. One of the books contained a note suggesting readers send feedback "directly to Commandant, United States Army, Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307."[27]

 

There is a third chain of testimony and evidence tying the material to Ali Mohamed. Khalid Ibrahim -- one of multiple informants who had seen Mohamed in the Khost-Peshawar area at the same time Yousef and Ajaj were leaving -- testified that a number of similar manuals had been provided to the Jersey Jihad Office by Ali Mohamed.

 

Ibrahim testified that the Jersey Jihad[28] manuals were identical to the Nosair manuals, and he testified that Ali Mohamed was the source of the Jersey manuals as well.[29] The Jersey manuals as described in court also match the Ajaj manuals.

 

The chain of evidence here is not difficult to decipher.

 

  1. Ali Mohamed was the source of the original set of manuals.
  2. Ali Mohamed spent part of 1992 in Afghanistan copying and translating his training manuals into Arabic.
  3. Ajaj came from Afghanistan carrying copies of Ali Mohamed's manuals.

 

The Ajaj manuals almost certainly came from Ali Mohamed. The likelihood of this conclusion is even more striking as additional facts are considered.

 

  1. Ali Mohamed was training al Qaeda operatives in bomb-making and other skills for a significant portion of 1992, including (at minimum) the month of September.
  2. Mohamed conducted training in Peshawar and also near Khost, Afghanistan.
  3. Ajaj and Yousef spent the summer of 1992 in Peshawar and near Khost, Afghanistan, departing on the last day of August. 
  4. At minimum, Ajaj received bomb-making training while in Afghanistan.

 

ALI MOHAMED'S TEAM

Ajaj was stopped at the airport and arrested, when customs inspectors discovered the collection of terrorist and bomb-making manuals in his luggage. His luggage was seized and eventually transferred to the custody of the FBI.[30]

 

Yousef was also detained, but he was released due to overcrowding at the INS facility where he was supposed to be held.

 

Upon his release, Yousef went directly Brooklyn and immediately connected with Mahmud Abouhalima and Mohamed Salameh -- two of Ali Mohamed's trainees.

 

He didn’t pause to assimilate, and he didn't work his way through a social network. The evidence overwhelmingly indicates Yousef specifically planned to meet Abouhalima on arrival.[31]

 

By the time the Brooklyn cell was finally shut down (at least, in part), the list of Ali Mohamed trainees who would be implicated -- to a greater or lesser degree -- in the World Trade Center bombing was truly impressive.

 

Among the indictees for the direct act of bombing the World Trade Center -- Abouhalima, Salameh and Nidal Ayyad -- and potentially Ajaj and Yousef.

 

Among those indicted for supporting the bombing indirectly, Clement Hampton-El, Siddig Ali, and Nosair. A list of unindicted coconspirators identified by the New York US Attorney's Office included even more Mohamed trainees -- Sabri Hassan, Mikial Abdur Rahim and Khalid Ibrahim, not to mention Osama bin Laden himself, and Mohamed's close associate Mustafa Shalabi (who had been murdered in 1991).[32]

 

ALI MOHAMED'S M.O.

 

Mohamed himself has never been linked to an overt act in the World Trade Center bombing conspiracy. However, his role in another major terrorist attack -- the 1998 East African embassy bombings -- is highly instructive in analyzing the WTC plot.

 

In 1993 and 1994, Mohamed spent several months surveying targets and helping to craft plans to attack the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. He took his surveillance to Osama bin Laden, who in turn proposed a specific route for attack.[33]

 

Mohamed also helped recruit and train the terrorist cell that actually carried out the attack. But by the time the embassy was actually bombed in August 1998, simultaneous with an attack on the U.S. embassy in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, Mohamed's direct role was long finished.[34]

 

This separation was consistent with the terrorist techniques taught by Mohamed, who designed the basic cell structure used by al Qaeda. Mohamed wrote in terrorist training documents that the surveillance team should be strictly separate from the team charged with actually carrying out a terrorist attack.[35]

 

Mohamed's involvement with the World Trade Center bombing followed a similar template. He was traveling between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Sudan during most of the period in which the overt acts of the World Trade Center bombing plot occurred.

 

There is no direct testimony concerning the surveillance of the World Trade Center prior to the 1993 bombing. But during interrogation after his 1998 arrest, Mohamed did display detailed knowledge of the United Nations building in New York City, which had been targeted for a second wave of attacks by Brooklyn cell members Hampton-El and Siddig Ali.[36]

 

It's also possible that Mohamed had a hand in guiding affairs from afar.

 

Every single one of Ali Mohamed's Brooklyn-area trainees were linked to Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, leader of the Brooklyn cell. Rahman repeatedly called a phone number in Peshawar, Pakistan during late 1992.

 

Rahman called the number several times in August, just before Ajaj and Yousef came to the U.S. Prosecutors implied that the August phone calls were for the purpose of summoning an expert bombmaker to implement the Trade Center plot. After arriving in the U.S., Yousef called the number while he worked on the bombing plot.

 

No one has ever conclusively identified who was on the other end of that telephone, the person who unleashed Ramzi Yousef on the United States -- a fateful act that started al Qaeda down the long road to September 11.

 

But the same phone number was found written on the inside cover of one of the Ali Mohamed-linked terrorist manuals carried by Ahmad Ajaj.[37]

 

AFTERMATH AS PRELUDE

 

Ali A. Mohamed's name was No. 109 on the list of unindicted coconspirators in the Brooklyn cell. The former Green Beret was never charged in the case, but he was well-known to prosecutors and FBI agents -- as an FBI informant, as an untrustworthy individual, and as a man who had attracted the attention of U.S. military intelligence.

 

To be continued…

 

The story of Mohamed's interactions with the Justice Department in the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing, and his links to the September 11 attack on America, will be discussed in detail in upcoming installments of "Unlocking 9/11." Click here for details on the series.

J.M. Berger is a freelance journalist and researcher covering terrorism and al Qaeda for a variety of national media outlets. Full resume is available at www.jmberger.com.

 

 

 



[1] National Geographic Presents: Triple Cross: bin Laden's Spy in America, original air date, Monday, August 28, 2006

[2] The Road To Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man (Critical Studies on Islam), by Montasser al-Zayyat, Sara Nimis (Editor), Ahmed Fekry (Translator), Pluto Press (January 20, 2004)

[3] National Geographic Presents: Triple Cross: bin Laden's Spy in America, original air date, Monday, August 28, 2006

[4] Benjamin Weiser and James Risen, "The Masking of a Militant: A Special Report," The New York Times, December 1, 1998; Tom Hays and Sharon Theimer, "Egyptian Agent Worked with Green Berets, bin Laden," The Associated Press, December 31, 2001

[5] The Road To Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man (Critical Studies on Islam), by Montasser al-Zayyat, Sara Nimis (Editor), Ahmed Fekry (Translator), Pluto Press (January 20, 2004), page 37

[6] Cleveland Plain Dealer Prelude to terror: How Damra misled FBI, September 16, 2004, Amanda Garrett

[7] Various, see particularly Testimony of Clement Hampton-El, August 7, 1995, USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181

[8] US v Usama Bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, Day 2, http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm. On the formation of al Qaeda, see The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Lawrence Wright, Knopf (August 8, 2006) for the best balance of readability and comprehensiveness. Purists will also want to review USA v Enaam Arnaout, Government's evidentiary proffer supporting the admissibility of co-conspirator statements, January 6, 2003.

[9] The Road To Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man (Critical Studies on Islam), by Montasser al-Zayyat, Sara Nimis (Editor), Ahmed Fekry (Translator), Pluto Press (January 20, 2004), page 37

[10] Testimony of Clement Hampton-El, August 7, 1995, USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181

[11] Simon Reeve, The New Jackals, Page 120 (Paperback edition, York, Pa.: Maple Press, 2002/ © 1999)

[12] Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc., (New York: Free Press, 2001), Page 143; US v Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, Sealed Complaint, September 1998 (Affidavit of Daniel Coleman) Full document on INTELWIRE

[13] US v bin Laden, Days 2, 3, 4 http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-dt.htm

[14] USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, February 7, 1995; USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, July 13, 1995

[15] USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, September 11, 1995; USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, July 13, 1995

[16] USA v Ali Mohamed, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS), Plea Hearing, October 20, 2000

[17] US v Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, Sealed Complaint, September 1998 (Affidavit of Daniel Coleman)

[18] Final Report of the 9/11 Commission, Chapter 3. See also USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181; US v. Salameh et al, S593CR.180(KTD);  Simon Reeve, The New Jackals, Page 120

[19] Ibid.; see also The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Lawrence Wright, Knopf (August 8, 2006), pp. 160-162

[20] US v Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, Sealed Complaint, September 1998 (Affidavit of Daniel Coleman)

[21] USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, July 17, 1995

[22] US v. Usama bin Laden et al, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, February 23, 1002, Testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou

[23] USA v Ali Mohamed, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS), Plea Hearing, October 20, 2000

[24] US v Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, Sealed Complaint, September 1998 (Affidavit of Daniel Coleman)

[25] US v Ramzi Yousef et al, August 11, 1997

[26] US v Salameh et al, S593CR.180(KTD), November 10, 1993, Government Exhibit Exhibits 2781 through 2786; USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, September 11, 1995; USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, July 13, 1995

[27] US v Salameh et al, S593CR.180(KTD), November 10, 1993

[28] US v Rahman,  S5 93 Cr. 181 (MBM), Defendants Exhibit J, Government Exhibit 118, among others.

[29] US v Rahman,  S5 93 Cr. 181 (MBM), 7/13/95

[30] Prior to his jihad training, Ajaj lived in Texas. Questions presented during grand jury testimony suggest that U.S. investigators suspected a connection between Ajaj and Wadih El-Hage, a Texas-based member of al Qaeda who also worked closely with Ali Mohamed and who was also in Afghanistan during the crucial 1988 confluence. The connections here are sufficiently tenuous -- at the moment -- to reserve this possible link for a footnote.

[31] Simon Reeve, The New Jackals, Page 143 (Paperback edition, York, Pa.: Maple Press, 2002/ © 1999), see also US v Salameh, US v Ismoil, et al. Reeve suggests, based on an anonymous source, that Yousef spoke with Abouhalima prior to leaving Pakistan. This would not preclude Ali Mohamed's involvement in setting up the rendezvous. Reeve and others claim Yousef and Abouhalima first met in Afghanistan in 1988, around the same period when Ali Mohamed and others were there, which is entirely plausible. Even if they had met before, however, Yousef clearly had some guidance finding Abouhalima's current location.

[32] http://www.jdo.org/blacklist.htm. The contents of this list have been confirmed to be accurate by people with knowledge of the investigation.

[33] USA v Ali Mohamed, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS), Plea Hearing, October 20, 2000

[34] US v Bin Laden, all dates; USA v Ali Mohamed, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS), Plea Hearing, October 20, 2000; Lance Williams and Erin McCormick, "Al Qaeda terrorist worked with FBI," San Francisco Chronicle, November 4, 2001; National Geographic Presents: Triple Cross: bin Laden's Spy in America, original air date, Monday, August 28, 2006

[35] US v bin Laden, Day 20, http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-20.htm

[36] National Geographic Presents: Triple Cross: bin Laden's Spy in America, original air date, Monday, August 28, 2006

[37] USA v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman et al, S5-93-CR-181, September 5, 1995